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Only literature can describe experience, for the excellent
reason that the terms of experience are moral and literary
from the beginning. Mind is incorrigibly poetical: not be-
cause it is not attentive to material facts and practical
exigencies, but because, being intensely attentive to them,
it turns them into pleasures and pains, and into many-colored
ideas.
GEORGE SANTAYANA

TO
CAROL MOODEY ROSS

INTRODUCTION
The most important questions of our time are philosoph-
ical. All about us we see the clash of ideas and ideologies.
Yet the formal study of philosophy has been losing rather
than gaining ground. There is increasing interest in the issues,
but up to the present there has been no corresponding
increase in their systematic study. In many American colleges
the work in philosophy attracts fewer and fewer students.
Because philosophy is in the doldrums, I have wondered
for some time what should be done to breathe into it fresh
life. One idea that appeals strongly to me is to invite brilliant
teachers in other fields to become students of philosophy and
thus encourage a marriage of economics and philosophy,
political science and philosophy, art and philosophy, and last
but not least, literature and philosophy. This book is a kind
of Exhibit A of this approach to the problem.
Julian Lenhart Ross is one of the most gifted under-
graduate teachers I have known. He is a graduate of Allegheny
College in the Class of 1923, and he returned to the faculty
of that institution after taking his doctorate at Harvard in
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1927. He is now Professor of English. Because of his remark-
able success as a teacher, I felt confident that if he could be
persuaded to teach a course in philosophy, his classroom
would be crowded. When we first discussed the matter, he
volunteered the suggestion that if I would teach the history
of philosophy, he would join the class as an auditor and, if
all went well, might then try his hand at a course introducing
students to certain perennial problems of philosophy through
the eyes of literature. I still remember my attempts to make
the history of philosophy interesting not only to a number of
very superior students, but to the brightest member of a
distinguished faculty. What is more memorable, however, is
that the following year Professor Ross offered for the first
time his course in philosophy and literature. The hundreds
of students who have been privileged to sit at his feet treasure
the memory of this course as the richest intellectual experience
of their undergraduate years.
We have encouraged Professor Ross to put some of his
material in book form, and we are pleased with the result.
This is a book that should appeal to thoughtful men and
women. It is an appropriate text for departments of philoso-
phy, but it will probably reach more readers and inspire more
interest in philosophical ideas if it is introduced by a particu-
larly talented member of the English department.
There are many roads to "that dear delight" which is the
study of philosophy. This is by no means the only one. For
our generation it is not a well-traveled road, but it is a
highway through a countryside rich in history. It leads us
through the territory of the classics. It has unusual vistas. It
has enduring interest. Its charm will be felt by many who
have resisted the lure of other paths that lead to truth and
wisdom.
WILLIAM P. TOLLEY
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CHAPTER ONE
PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE
SUPPOSE that some morning you
should awaken in a place you have never seen before; every-
thing is new to you. Around you is a strange field, with
unfamiliar creatures moving in it. You see objects which you
do not recognize, and hear sounds which you cannot interpret.
What would you do? If you would do nothing at all, but
merely go to sleep again or sit inertly all day waiting for
something to happen, then this book will have no interest
for you. But it is doubtful if such would be your reaction.
Most persons under these circumstances would begin to
explore, would feel a strong interest in finding out where
they were, and why. They would be a little frightened and
intensely curious. They would examine the objects and
creatures around them, try to get into communication with
someone, look for clues that might account for their presence
in this environment. In other words, they would become
philosophers.
For philosophy is simply exploration of a strange
universe. Every person, at least once, has the experience that
has just been mentioned. Not in the morning of a single day,
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but in the morning of life, he finds himself in an unfamiliar
place, surrounded by unaccountable phenomena and creatures
of whose purpose he is ignorant. If he feels curiosity and sets
out to quench it, then he takes the first step in philosophy.
He can go as far as he likes, for the exploration is endless.
The more intelligent he is, the more questions he asks and
the less satisfied he is with conventional answers. It is this
capacity for wonder at his own existence that distinguishes
man from the animals around him. From birth to death he
never stops asking questions; and only after long experience
and many disappointments does he realize the difficulty and
the fascination of his inquiry.
Of course he never succeeds in reaching the one and
final answer. Instead, he discovers a great many incomplete
explanations of the world, often impressive but also often
flatly contradictory. At this he may become discouraged, and
decide to imitate the cow, who looks satisfied and does not
seem worried by anything. He finds, however, that this is
more easily said than done. After one has tasted the delight
of intellectual curiosity, a placid bovine existence is not easy
to maintain. In Somerset Maugham's novel Of Human
Bondage, Philip Carey has this experience. He reads a
number of philosophers in the hope of finding an answer to
all his perplexities. Observing that each philosopher refutes
the ideas of the preceding ones, whom their successor con-
siders misguided fools, Philip concludes that philosophy is
a matter of temperament, that all ideas are equally true and
equally false, and that the best policy is to act on almost any
rough working-rule of conduct and ignore the whole matter.
Nevertheless he continues to philosophize in spite of himself,
and questions concerning the meaning of life are never
completely absent from his mind. To abandon philosophy
because it cannot solve the riddle of the universe is like saying
that we shall relinquish all friendship because none of our
friends is perfect.
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Students are often puzzled to distinguish between
philosophy and other subjects, particularly such fields as
science, religion, and art; each of these seems to be an attempt
of human beings to find meaning in life. Is not science
typically a form of exploration, motivated by curiosity? Does
not religion confidently search for a benevolent plan in a
chaotic universe? Is not art merely another form of the quest
for meaning, a meaning more rich and significant because
it is discerned by a sensitive imagination? It is true that
each of these kinds of exploration furnishes material for
philosophy; but philosophy in its own way includes them
all, and more too. The business of the philosopher is to take
everything into consideration. He must try to reconcile all
contradictions and paradoxes. He must use the discoveries
of science, the existence of the "scientific method," and also
the fact that most people make decisions on a quite unscien-
tific basis. He must allow for the existence of the .religious
emotion, that sense of dependence on a divine being which
exerts a transforming power on many lives; but at the same
time he must recognize that in some persons this emotion is
entirely absent, and in others so distorted that it causes evil
instead of good. He must take into account as data the
existence of creative art and also the scorn with which
"practical" men regard the artist. In short, he must make
sense of a world which at every step contradicts itself, which
appears at the same time good and evil, planned and acci-
dental, progressive and decadent. All other subjects of study
provide pieces for an enormous jigsaw puzzle; the philosopher
tries to put together the picture.
This inclusiveness of philosophy can be seen more
clearly if we compare it with its most closely related subject-
science. At first glance it may seem that both have the same
purpose: the discovery of truth, the exploration of the world
to discover how it is made. The only difference may appear
to be that the scientist proceeds toward this goal in a more
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practical and less vague way than the philosopher, by using
the method of controlled experiment and by insisting that
every step be checked by definite evidence. On examination,
however, we find that the differences are more deep-seated.
There are four important differences between the work
of the scientist and of the philosopher. A good scientist must
specialize; a good philosopher should not. It is misleading
to say that the aim of any scientist is the discovery of truth;
his aim is rather the discovery of some particular fact or law
relating to some particular subject matter. He may study the
properties of lenses, the distance and chemical composition
of the star Betelgeuse, or the respiratory system of the frog.
He is not a "scientist," not even a biologist, but perhaps an
entomologist or a specialist in endocrine glands. To be sure,
a philosopher may also specialize, if he wishes; but the more
he does so, at the expense of his understanding of the whole,
the less effective he is likely to be as a philosopher. His
business is not to cut the picture up, but to put it together.
Since he can never quite succeed in doing so, and since the
scientist can find answers for some of his specific questions,
we are likely to regard the latter as more efficient; but that
is only because the philosopher sets himself a much harder
task to perform.
The scientist prefers to work with materials that can
be precisely measured; the philosopher cannot do so. The
scientific method depends upon the possibility of exact
measurement, for what cannot be measured cannot be
controlled for the purpose of experiment. In the physical
sciences this is obvious: the investigator labors to measure
the exact amount of nitrogen in a given chemical compound,
the precise parallax of a star, or the mechanical force exerted
by a muscle pulling on a bone. Even in the "social" and
"mental" sciences the aim is to express results in quantitative
or mathematical terms. The sociologist works with percent-
ages of illiteracy or feeble-mindedness in a community. The
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psychologist speaks of an intelligence quotient. All scientists
hesitate to deal with things which, being intangible, cannot
be measured. Nevertheless, since such things are as much a
part of the life picture as the measurable ones, the philosopher
cannot ignore them. Thus the field of philosophy is again
more inclusive than that of science.
The scientist makes more assumptions than the philoso-
pher. Both, of course, assume something to start with;
otherwise they could not think at all. But the botanist
classifying flowers is not likely to question the existence of
those flowers, the fact that they have certain colors, or the
fact that they flourish and then die within a certain period
of time. He assumes those matters and goes about his business.
If the philosopher made as many initial assumptions as this,
he would be regarded as neglectful of his duty. He must
question and examine every part of experience he must be
inclusive. One philosopher, Descartes, began his investigations
by attempting to reject every assumption which had been
made up to his time, and basing his conclusions on the one
and only fact to which he believed he could bear personal
witness: namely, that he himself was conscious. It is inter-
esting that science is coming more and more to question its
own assumptions; it no longer asserts dogmatically that such
things as time, space, and matter exist, and on the whole
seems less confident than it was in the nineteenth century.
In this sense it may be said to be growing more philosophical.
The most important difference of all is the fact that
science as such is not primarily interested in the value
or
worth of what it discovers. This is not to say that science has
no value; its benefit to mankind is, of course, incalculable.
But that is more or less a by-product, not the direct concern
of the scientist. The one value in which he is interested is
truth; whether a discovery is good or bad does not concern
him in so far as he is a scientist Atomic energy may be used
to generate power, to combat cancer, or to destroy a city
in a
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few seconds; but its discovery was a scientific fact irrespective
of its good or evil results. The inventors of the radio might
prefer that their brain-child should transmit symphonic
music rather than war propaganda; but their scientific success
and integrity are not diminished by any other use to which
their discovery may be put. Philosophy, on the other hand,
must not fail to consider the question of values. They are
part of the picture, an essential portion of reality. As far as
possible, nothing must be torn from its context; everything
must be related to everything else.
From this brief account of what philosophy is, it is
evident that we ought not to split up the subject into separate
fields as is done with science and most other studies. Never-
theless, it is possible to explore the total structure of the
world from different angles, to ask different questions about
it. If we are careful never to forget the unity of the whole
subject, we may safely inquire what these separate methods
of approach are.
When a child sees something unfamiliar to him (say a
mowing machine) , he is likely to ask first of all, what is
that? how does it work? Being told that it consists of many
little blades moving back and forth against one another to
cut the hay, he may next inquire, how do you know? To that
his father will probably reply that he has actually seen it
working, moving through a field with the grass falling down
behind it. Next the child may look doubtfully at the mower
and ask, what good is it? The father answers that it saves the
farmer time, and hopes that the boy will not think to inquire
what he does with the time he saves.
Though the child does not know it, he has really been
asking his father the three major questions of philosophy:
What is it? How do you know? What good is it? To answer
them about a mowing machine is hard enough; to answer
them about the world in general is the unfinished business
of all philosophy. Each question is the basis of one angle of
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approach toward our total exploratory process. If we ask,
"What is the nature and structure of reality?" then we are
studying the division of philosophy known as metaphysics.
If the question is, "How can we know anything about
reality? What is the nature of knowledge?" then we are
studying epistemology. If we inquire concerning the relative
values of various parts of reality, asking, "Why are some
things better than others?" we are usually studying ethics.
No matter which question we are considering, however,
we find that it does not stand alone and that it cannot be
answered without taking the others into account. If we decide
to examine only a certain portion of the field and exclude
the rest, we are like an explorer who sets out to make maps
of all the rivers in a certain district, but ignores the jungle
and the wild animals; the latter are soon forced vividly on
his notice. We shall find at once that these separate questions
of philosophy are not independent, but constantly over-
lapping. The existence of value can hardly be explained
without inquiring how the universe is put together and how
it is possible for a person to get far enough outside his own
mind to perceive value at all. In later chapters the reader
will notice that some of the problems could be discussed
under more than one general head. For example, the question
of optimism and pessimism is at the same time ethical and
metaphysical, since it deals both with values and with the
problem whether one is justified in regarding the whole
universe as predominantly good or evil. We divide philosophy
into parts only for convenience in discussion.
It is interesting that all three of the questions previously
outlined appeared at the very beginning of philosophy in
ancient Greek times. When thinkers began to ask one of the
questions, they soon found it necessary to study the others
also. The inquiry started in the sixth century B.C., when a
group of men in the Greek colony of Miletus set out to
discover what the world is made of that is, raised the
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problem of metaphysics. The first answers seem to us crudely
simple. One inquirer announced that everything is composed
of water; another, that air is the primary substance; a third,
that the basic substance is no kind of matter as we know it,
but an indeterminate material called The Infinite. One
ingenious theory, put forward by Heraclitus, was that reality
is composed merely of a continuous process of change or flux,
just as we might say that a candle flame, which appears real
and constant, is a transition from tallow and wick to oxygen
and heat. But he was straightway contradicted by Parmenides,
who asserted that change cannot exist at all, because every-
thing in the universe is a fixed part of a single great whole,
where nothing can be added or taken away. In course of time
the Greeks hit upon the startling new explanation called the
atomic theory. According to this, all objects are made up, not
of any continuous substance, but of tiny indivisible particles,
all alike in material but differing in size and shape. These
particles are then put together in various ways to form the
universe. 1
All these theories concern the metaphysical problem, but
at this point the second question arose. No one can see an
atom; how, then, can we know of its existence? If bodies are
really composed of atoms, then reality is very unlike what
our senses tell us it is. And if we cannot trust the evidence
of our senses, how can we know anything at all? This question
became so baffling that a group of Athenian teachers, called
Sophists, began to assert that no general, objective knowledge
is possible. Nothing is true in itself; it is true only with
reference to the particular person who believes or perceives
it, and varies according to the individual.
The Sophists, however, concerned themselves only
indirectly with the problem of knowledge. Their main
interest was in conduct (thus the third question arises),
which they approached from a similar point of view. Just as
there is no objective truth, so there is no objective right or
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wrong; ethical standards must vary with the individual. Once
this ethical problem had emerged as an important part of
philosophy, it occupied the center of attention for some time.
Socrates, the most remarkable personality among the Greek
thinkers, was an ethical teacher who urged men to develop
the good of their souls instead of seeking honor and wealth.
Finally, in the early part of the fourth century, the three
problems were all joined by Plato, who showed how insepa-
rable they really are and how all philosophy is a unit.
So far we have said nothing about literature, with which
our exploration is to be primarily concerned. The reference
to Plato should remind us of the close connection that may
exist between literature and philosophy, for besides being a
philosopher Plato was a great artist, a poet and dramatist.
To be sure, few philosophers possess any particular literary
skill; but most great writers have in them an element of
philosophy. Through the medium of literature, therefore,
it is possible to learn a good deal, in an unusually interesting
way, about philosophical problems. In a novel, a poem, or a
play, the artist offers us many riches. He appeals to our senses
and our emotions; he makes us acquainted with varieties of
human character; he gives us vicarious experience in living.
But behind the story, the descriptions, and the characters,
sometimes directly stated and sometimes left for the reader
to inter from the whole situation, he reveals to us a general
point of view toward life. The idea behind a piece of litera-
ture can be studied as philosophy, and such a study is our
object in the present book.
Besides being more informal and less involved than a
direct technical study of philosophy, this approach through
the medium of literature has one outstanding advantage.
Philosophy has a tendency to become too abstract. It runs
the danger of withdrawing itself from life as one lives it every
day, of moving on with both its head and its feet in the
clouds. Vitally as it concerns everyone's actions and opinions,
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many readers are likely to be perplexed by its constant use
of abstract terms such as monism, categorical imperative, or
hedonism. But when we approach philosophy by means of
literature, this difficulty is diminished. Good literature is,
among other things, a combination of abstract ideas wifH a
concrete presentation; it relates specific individual persons
and things to general concepts. "The object of art," it has
been said, "is a particular that contains a universal." The
combination is irresistible.
Two literary examples will illustrate the advantages of
concreteness. In John Galsworthy's play The Pigeon, we find
two enthusiastic social reformers, Professor Calway and Sir
Thomas Hoxton, arguing about the best way to reclaim a
drunken old ne'er-do-well named Timson. In the heat of
abstract controversy, they rush out of the house without
noticing that Timson is reclining in a stupor on the threshold.
Of course they trip over him, and as they pick themselves up
one of their friends remarks, "You see, they had lost sight of
the individual!" Good literature never loses sight of the indi-
vidual; abstract philosophy is likely to do so.
The second example is from Thomas Mann's The Magic
Mountain, in which two extremely intelligent men, Settem-
brini and Naphta, engage in long theoretical arguments
about the state of society and the future of Europe. Brilliant
as these discussions are, Mann gradually impresses oh the
reader that they are getting nowhere; that, losing themselves
in a maze of abstractions, they run into the ground. To
emphasize this fact, Mann introduces the character of Peeper-
korn, a man incapable of coherent thought or abstract
reasoning, but with a vivid sense of concrete reality. When
the two philosophers theorize about the "sense of power"
and the "primitive urge for mastery," Peeperkorn quietly
points upward to a golden eagle circling overhead, his keen
eyes watching for his prey beneath, his iron beak and curved
talons ready to bury themselves in its flesh a living symbol
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of the ruthless force of nature. And Mann remarks: "All
interest in Settembrini's and Naphta's antinomies fled away.
But the vision of the eagle remained." So it is with literature.
We may study philosophy through the medium of art, for the
artist and the philosopher often deal with the same concepts.
But no matter how remote from ordinary life those concepts
may appear to be, the artist never loses sight of the eagle.
CHAPTER TWO
CAKES AND ALE
IT IS NOW our business to find
a starting-point from which to conduct our exploration into
philosophy. At once we find ourselves in a curious dilemma:
there is no place to begin. In order to understand any phase
of philosophy, it is necessary first to understand all the other
phases; for, as we have seen, philosophy must take everything
into consideration. Metaphysics and ethics, for instance, are
so interrelated that each is essential to the other. This may
be made clear by an analogy. If we were studying a suspension
bridge instead of all reality, we might approach it from the
point of view of ethics by asking wherein the bridge is
valuable and which parts of it are more valuable than others.
From observation we might conclude that its greatest value,
its "highest good," is the floor or pavement, because by using
that people actually get across the river. As for the steel cable
draped across the piers, we might even ignore that entirely,
regarding it as a mere convenience or ornament. This mistake
would arise because we had failed to consider the structure
of the bridge. A structural examination would at once show
us that the cable is of paramount importance, since the bridge
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would collapse without it. On the other hand, we cannot
understand the structure without some knowledge of the
purpose for which it is to be used. Ideally we should advance
on all fronts simultaneously.
As there is no real escape from this dilemma, we must
make the best of it and arbitrarily decide to begin with ethics
as the more definite and immediate problem. A student of
philosophy probably desires to understand life in order to
live it better, and this motive is ethical. Let us assume,
therefore, that the universe exists, that it is somehow organ-
ized, and that we can know something about it. If so, we may
turn our attention to the striking fact that some things are
apparently better than others. Some persons get along more
successfully, are more admired, seem happier than others.
Some things are of more use to human life than others: there
seems to be a clear difference in value between a hospital and
a rubbish heap. Philosophy must inquire what makes these
differences. It must not accept apparently obvious value; for
example, a conqueror winning rich new oil-fields for his
country may seem to be its greatest asset, but may really be
a liability. Rather, philosophy must take everything into
consideration. It must ask whether values are unrelated, or
whether they can be unified into a general theory of worth.
At this point philosophy and literature are especially
close together, for literature is primarily concerned with
human values. This does not mean that a chief function of
literature is ethical or that it should be judged on ethical
standards. Indeed, when a novel makes too many direct moral
statements it is frequently ineffective. But it should and does
analyze the effect of certain kinds of conduct on human
beings, and thus throws light on ethical problems.
There have been many ethical theories and combinations
of them. Our purpose is not to cover them all, but to choose
those best illustrated in literature. Let us discuss four theories,
three Greek and one Oriental in origin. The aim of each of
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them is to discover the "highest good" or what is best for
human welfare. They make, respectively, the following
assertions.
1. The highest good springs from the senses and
emotions, and seeks the ideal of pleasure or
happiness.
2. The highest good springs from the will, and seeks
the ideal of duty.
3. The highest good springs from the intellect, and
tries to achieve wisdom, or the rational balancing
of all factors in life.
4. The highest good springs from one specific
emotion, and seeks the ideal of love or altruism. 1
The first theory is called hedonism, the second Stoicism, the
third Sooratic ethics, and the fourth Christianity. We shall
consider them in this order.
When the straitlaced steward Malvolio rebuked Sir Toby
Belch for reveling the night away in drunken singing, Sir
Toby replied, "Dost thou think, because thou art virtuous,
there shall be no more cakes and ale?"2 So saying, he uttered
the perennial protest of the hedonist against all moralists and
killjoys. Moral codes and social customs come and go, but the
pleasures of the senses remain. The welfare of civilization, the
ultimate purpose of life, the hope of heaven all are vague
and uncertain ideals; but the warm glow of satisfaction fol-
lowing a good dinner is an immediate value that no argument
can take away. Though it may be short-lived, yet for the time
being it is irrefutable. So with all direct activity of the senses.
Whether it takes the form of eating, love-making, vigorous
exercise, enjoying a sunset, dancing, or listening to music,
such activity appeals to many people as something fundamen-
tally good-perhaps the only fundamental good there is. Life
CAKES AND ALE 15
is not to be analyzed and worried about, but to be enjoyed.
This is the simplest and most attractive of all ethical theories:
the highest good of life is pleasure.
Before we examine the good and bad points of hedonism,
let us approach it by means of a famous poem, The Rubaiyat
of Omar Khayyam. Most people know this poem in the
English version written by Edward FitzGerald in 1859, a book
which our Victorian grandparents considered rather daring. 8
FitzGerald was more than a mere translator, since he added
ideas of his own, tried to render the spirit instead of the
letter, and created a haunting new verse form which has ever
since been associated with this poem. At first it seems unlikely
that such a retiring classical scholar, the friend of Tennyson
and Thackeray, should have been interested in a glorification
of pleasure; yet he lived at a time when the expansion of
science had raised doubt of established standards, and his
own character was hedonistic in a quiet way. Indeed, a
biographer remarks, "FitzGerald's habits were absolutely
simple; his only plan of action was to do what he liked and
not be bothered," which is always one aim of the hedonist.
Omar himself was a Persian scientist who lived about
the time of the Norman Conquest, a time when the Seljuk
Turks had overrun Persia and had made life there insecure.
From the Sultan's court, where he was fortunate in obtaining
harborage, he observed how brief and uncertain was the
happiness of his friends. He was far from a useless pleasure-
seeker, being a skillful mathematician, astronomer, and
reformer of the calendar. Yet his researches merely convinced
him of the futility of speculation and the transitory nature
of every human experience. In this mood he wrote his series
of epigrams (rubaiyat means simply "quatrains") , connected
only by general subject matter and similarity of tone. If you
read FitzGerald's adaptation for the first time,* you will feel
that it contains beautiful music and imagery but little
coherence; ideas seem to be thrown out at random, without
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plan. We need, therefore, to pick out several of these ideas
from the separate quatrains.
Throughout much of the poem we notice that Omar is an
agnostic; that is, he believes that it is not possible for anyone
to find the meaning of life. There are two possible ways of
trying to find it: through the exercise of reason, and through
supernatural aid in the form of appeals to the gods. Neither
is successful. Saints and sages alike have been trying it for
centuries, but all have died with their quest unfulfilled. In
his youth, Omar confidently sought for knowledge, only to
find that no one could explain why we are born or what our
destiny is:
Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
About it and about: but evermore
Came out by the same Door where in I went.5
Though he was able to solve a number of specific problems,
to learn about planetary motions and mathematical processes,
he could never unravel the only problem that mattered to
him, the "master-knot of human fate." Nor was an appeal to
the gods any more useful; the heavens that he studied so
long offered no key to the value of human life.
And that inverted bowl they call the Sky,
Whereunder crawling coop'd we live and die,
Lift not your hands to It for help for It
As impotently moves as you or I.
Having failed in both respects, therefore, he concludes that
the world has no discoverable meaning.
If this is true, there follows from it that in such a mean-
ingless world what one does is unimportant. An action is
significant only if it has lasting consequences; and to Omar
such consequences are impossible because nothing endures.
He was obsessed with the brevity of life and the finality of
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death. The poem is filled with image after image of the
ephemeral nature of human beings. Life is compared to a
pebble cast in the sea, to a bubble of wine poured from a
bowl, to a tent wherein a Sultan stays for a night and which
is then folded up, to a mirage in the desert, to a patch of
snow on the sand. Moreover, death not only terminates life,
but reduces all men's actions to a common level. After a man
is dead, what he did during life, whether he was good or bad,
does not matter. FitzGerald expresses this idea in a striking
stanza:
And those who husbanded the Golden grain,
And those who flung it to the winds like Rain,
Alike to no such aureate Earth are turned
As, buried once, Men want dug up again. 7
That is, whether you were a miser or a spendthrift, your body
after death must return to dust to be forgotten; people don't
care to have you alive again, no matter what you were. Duty,
kindness, and value can have no more meaning than life in
general has.
What, then, remains to make life endurable? Only one
thing: the immediate present moment as it exists each day.
None of these moments will last; but as each one races by,
you can snatch from it whatever of beauty or pleasure it may
hold, then relinquish it gracefully and turn to the next one.
This is the essence of pure hedonism, summed up in Horace's
phrase carpe diem> "reap the harvest of the day," and recurr-
ing throughout history as man's compensation for failure to
find meaning. "Take the cash and let the credit go," says
Omar. Yesterday is gone, tomorrow may never come, but
today there is poetry, wine, or love to be enjoyed. Do not
waste it in repentance or worry. To make this idea vivid,
Omar uses a number of symbols, of which the most important
is his emphasis on wine as the best source of enjoyment and
cure for worry. He who drinks can live in the present. Fears
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and scruples have no power over him, secure in his reliance
on "the Grape that can with Logic Absolute The Two and
Seventy jarring Sects confute." Omar even inserts an ironical
bow at the religious detractor of drinking. Did not God make
the grape? he asks. God's creations should be used as bless-
ings; and if we regard the vine as evil, then God who put it
there is evil too. This symbol of wine is carried through to
the last stanza of the poem, where Omar declares that the
monument he desires after his death is an empty glass inverted
at his place in the feast.
Though we shall return to Omar's poem for one addi-
tional idea, let us first examine the origins of his particular
kind of hedonism. Though it has doubtless been a motive of
human action ever since man descended from the trees, it
was first formulated by a Greek named Aristippus, a con-
temporary of Plato. Since Aristippus lived in Gyrene, his
followers are known as Cyrenaics. Their doctrine, similar to
that implied in the Rubaiyat, is the most complete and
uncompromising form of hedonism. Everything in life is
uncertain, they declared, except individual sensations. General
ideas, codes of conduct, public opinion, and the will of the
gods are all ambiguous and problematical. Though a man
may think he is following the gods' decrees, some new inter-
pretation of those gods or some whim of the priesthood may
prove him mistaken. Whether he is doing good or evil,
whether he is acting for social betterment or injuring his city,
he cannot be sure. But if he is eating a ripe fig, then he
knows indubitably that he is experiencing a certain sensation
of taste, and that the sensation gives him pleasure. Conse-
quently, the only attainable certainty about life is that it
consists of a series of pleasurable and painful sensations: on
one side the delight of eating, drinking, exercise, sex, personal
freedom, or the feeling of superiority; on the other the vexa-
tion of starving, abstinence, physical pain, slavery, or the
feeling of inferiority. Every creature animal, child, or adult
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instinctively seeks the pleasurable and avoids the painful
sensation. Thus the simplest and most logical good, the
natural manifestation of life, is to live pleasurably.
It will be noted that the Cyrenaics did not talk about
"happiness." Pleasure is an individual, immediate sensation;
happiness is a lasting state of mind which may or may not
result from a series of particular pleasures. The possibility of
attaining such a state the Cyrenaics considered very doubtful.
It is better, they felt, not to seek for happiness, which depends
on too many circumstances beyond one's control. Pleasure,
on the other hand, is really certain; that is, each separate
pleasant sensation, as it comes, is undeniably there. Though
it may shortly vanish and be replaced by pain, yet at the
moment nothing can remove it. As a person may remark
while looking at the Grand Canyon, "Whatever happens
later, nothing can take away this experience," so the Cyrenaic
feels that by sacrificing happiness to the joy of the moment
he has wrung an elemental certainty from a fickle and hostile
universe. In short, his recipe for enjoying life is this: Instead
of having a general plan or aim, adapt yourself rapidly to
each sensation as it comes, and then give it up without regret
for a new one.
Though the Cyrenaic view can be presented rather attrac-
tively, the reader should already feel that this first attempt to
explore the value of life is a superficial one. One warning
may be necessary: He should not object to it on the ground
that it is selfish or immoral. That would be begging the
question, for it would assume that one ethical standard is bad
merely because it contradicts some other ethical standard. If
we assume that unselfishness is the highest good, then any
self-gratification is evil; but we have no right to assume this
without investigation. Instead, we must inquire whether the
Cyrenaic ideal is really possible of attainment, and whether it
involves any self-contradiction. Can one base his life on a
series of separate pleasurable sensations? To a certain extent
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everyone does so; we cannot deny that the individual pleas-
ures of each day are an important factor that makes life worth
living. Yet when we attempt to base our entire ethical con-
duct on this standard, at least three objections arise.
The first objection is that pleasures cannot be constant
or even very frequent; there are long gaps between them. If
the value of life depends on the succession of pleasures, then
those gaps become painful. And there is no adequate way of
filling them, for if the hedonist relies on memories of the
preceding joy or anticipations of the next one, he is beginning
to hedge from his assertion that only sensations themselves
have value.
In the second place, even when pleasures come they may
not satisfy us; in fact, the more we have the less likely we are
to appreciate the next one. Unfortunate as this may be, any
ethical theory must take account of it. Our senses quickly
grow dulled and demand ever more stimulation. Food must
be seasoned more and more highly to give us the tang we
insist on. When we buy a new car, it must be slightly larger
than the old one to give us the same feeling of pleasure.
Having grown satiated and emotionally exhausted, we find
that the series of pleasures must be cumulative, not equal, if
they are to have trie desired effect. Since there is a limit to
such acceleration, the Cyrenaic standard is not a lasting one.
The third objection is the most serious. Any honest
attempt to practice the standard convinces most people that
it is actually self-destructive. Free indulgence in pleasure
inevitably results in pain, so that the more effectively a
hedonist achieves his ideal the more certain he is to defeat it.
This comes about in two ways, by natural reaction and by
the effect on other persons. The first point need only be
mentioned. It is obvious that overeating, drunkenness, and
sexual promiscuity bring immediate or eventual pain and
disease; and as soon as the hedonist raises the question of
which is more important to him, pleasure now or pain later,
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he is casting doubt on his whole system. Still worse is the
fact that several people want the same pleasure. When the
hedonist insists on having a particular sensation at the
present moment, he comes into conflict with others who
oppose his desires and injure him in order to defend their
own pleasures. The hedonistic standard is no real solution of
anything.
From these weaknesses in the Cyrenaic theory arises the
paradox that the extreme hedonist, basing his life on the
search for pleasure, almost never attains happiness; and the
harder he seeks, the more certain he is to fail. 'There is a
peculiar sadness and bitterness about hedonistic literature.
If we look again at the Rubaiyat, we find that the whole poem
is suffused with sorrow. FitzGerald called it "a desperate sort
of thing, unfortunately at the bottom of all thinking men's
minds." Omar, far from having illusions as to the value of
the brief pleasures, resents the necessity of relying on them,
and feels deep sadness that life is as meaningless and transi-
tory as he believes it is. He exclaims in sentimental longing:
Yet Ah, that Spring should vanish with the Rose!
That Youth's sweet-scented manuscript should dose!
*
Ah Love! could you and I with Him conspire
To grasp this sorry scheme of Things enure,
Would we not shatter it to bits and then
Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire! 8
Cyrenaic hedonism, then, does not prove to be a satisfactory
standard.
About a century after Aristippus, a new kind of hedon-
ism appeared in Athens and endeavored to overcome these
defects. Its leader was Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) , a man who
has suffered the curious fate of being identified with the very
doctrines which he opposed. No one has been more maligned.
To most people an Epicurean is an advocate of sensual
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excesses, and an epicure is synonymous with a gourmand.
When Chaucer describes a rich and hospitable country gentle-
man who loved good food so much that it fairly snowed meat
and drink in his house, he calls him "a very son of Epicurus."
In reality, Epicurus advised his disciples to live on bread and
water. He was a cheerful, abstinent man, living quietly in his
famous garden, conversing with his friends and writing books
on philosophy for his students and the general public.
9 He
was more truly a philosopher than the Cyrenaics, since his
system includes a complete metaphysic as well as an ethic.
Epicurus's standard, in brief, was not pleasure, but hap-
piness. Instead of being based on a series of momentary
sensations, life should be planned so as to gain the greatest
total happiness; if necessary, one should forego a pleasure now
in order to attain a greater satisfaction later. Though ulti-
mate pleasure is still the criterion, Epicurus finds it in an
almost mathematical formula: seek the maximum remainder
of pleasure minus pain. This point of view led him to two
interesting conclusions.
It led him, first, to define happiness in terms that would
have seemed ludicrous to the Cyrenaics. To him, happiness
meant merely the absence of pain. If a man is alone in a wild-
erness with no source of active joy, but with enough food and
exercise to keep him in reasonable health, then, feeling no
pain, he is happy. In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus writes,
"When we do not feel pain, we no longer need pleasure. . . .
When we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean
the pleasure of profligates and those that consist in sensuality,
as is supposed by some, . . . but freedom from pain in the
body and trouble in the soul."10 Consequently we should be
content with little: "It is not the stomach that is insatiable,
as is generally said, but the false opinion that the stomach
needs an unlimited amount to fill it." 11 We should live in
retirement, avoiding what Epicurus calls "the prison of affairs
and politics."12 We should find satisfaction not so much in
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present experiences as in memory and imagination. This with-
drawal into a completely peaceful state is the Epicurean ideal
of ataraxy. It is obvious that if such an ideal evades some of
the difficulties of early hedonism, it straightway encounters
new ones. Persons of normal vitality are not attracted by it;
they are dubious of a standard that urges them to avoid
human existence. A man may be actuated either by the desire
for pleasure or by a sense of duty; but this seems to fall
between the two and miss the values of both. Though Epi-
curus frowns on the man who would commit suicide, he seems
to be guilty of a kind of mental and moral suicide. 13 His
withdrawal from life eventually kills hedonism and leads the
ethical inquirer toward the ideal of stoicism.
The second conclusion to which Epicurus came proves
equally unsatisfactory. From his general notion of passive
happiness, he properly goes on to discuss the means of attain-
ing it. What principles should govern our actual conduct?
Since the aim is to avoid trouble, we should refrain from
doing anything which calls attention to ourselves. Therefore
obey the laws as they exist, follow the social customs of those
around you, and do not question the conventional moral code
of the state. This results in the paradox that the "immoral"
Epicurus is the most "moral" of philosophers, simply because
to violate the code arouses opposition and risks trouble. A
man should not steal or murder, not because there is anything
wrong in it, but because detection would result in trouble
and pain. In Epicurus's words:
Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in conse-
quence of the fear which attaches to the apprehen-
sion of being unable to escape those appointed to
punish such actions.
14
This conclusion nullifies the whole system. If the purpose of
ethics is to scrutinize moral codes to find values behind them,
and if Epicurus refuses to scrutinize or question a moral code,
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then he provides no satisfactory ethics. He deliberately
declines to take everything into consideration as a philosopher
must do. We must conclude that neither the active nor the
passive phase of Greek hedonism is an adequate point of View
toward values. Let us turn next to two samples of hedonism
in later literature.
Since Greek times hedonistic ethics has undergone many
reversals of popular favor, ranging from the sensuality of the
early Renaissance to the horror with which the seventeenth-
century Puritans regarded pleasure. Hedonistic periods have
taken various forms, but have generally been brought about
by a sudden discovery that something which had formerly
been valued was really of little importance. The Renaissance,
for example, marked the end of an era of otherworldliness in
which the fate of one's soul in the next life had seemed more
vital than the conditions of living in the present one. When
that point of view was discarded in favor of an emphasis on
life here and now, the first reaction was naturally an attempt
to gain as much pleasure as possible from the world.
Of these hedonistic periods, none is more interesting
than the decade of the 1920's, bounded by the first World
War on one side and the depression of 1929 on the other. At
this time the breakdown of standards formerly regarded as
important is especially clear. Not only had the moral codes
and progressive ideals of the nineteenth century merely led
to disaster, but the high hopes engendered by wishful think-
ing during the war itself were soon demolished after the
Treaty of Versailles. Nothing in the past was worth saving.
At the same time came a decade of sudden scientific advance
and material prosperity. People had the money and machines
to do anything; but no one knew what ought to be done, or
whether anything was worth doing. The result was that sense
of meaninglessness in which hedonism flourishes.
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No writer has been better fitted to record this era than
Aldous Huxley. Nephew of Matthew Arnold, grandson of
Darwin's disciple Thomas Henry Huxley, brother of the
biologist Julian Huxley, he comes from a famous literary and
scientific family. He attended Eton and Oxford, survived the
war, had long experience in journalism, and mastered a fic-
tional technique by writing three successful novels between
1921 and 1926. He therefore reached literary maturity as the
postwar decade was ending, just in time to paint a brilliant
picture of it in one of the most interesting modern novels,
Point Counter Point (1928) .
Reading this book is an enjoyable and stimulating experi-
ence for anyone. The reader is carried along by its rapidity of
movement, the original twist of its ideas, and the vivid humor
of its situations. There is little consecutive story; individual
strands of action appear and disappear surprisingly, dispers-
ing the reader's attention among a large cast of characters,
yet resulting in an unexpectedly dear picture of one stratum
of upper-class English society. The people are hardly intended
to be real. Some are caricatures; many are based on a single
exaggerated trait such as hypocrisy, timidity, or love of power;
only one is subtle or complex. But they are all excessively
articulate, able to analyze their own motives and express their
own philosophies to the last shade of meaning. Huxley is
quite aware of this, and consciously sacrifices reality to create
a novel of ideas. In this sacrifice the reader willingly follows;
indeed, so great are Huxley's cleverness and satiric power that
one is almost hypnotized into believing that these people
might exist.
Though it is unfair to look at only one aspect of so rich a
novel, our purpose is to study it as a treatment of hedonism.
To understand this we must first examine two specific ele-
ments of Huxley's technique.
The first springs both from his family connections with
science and from the temper of the age, which led many
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people to turn to science as one phase of life in which some
confidence might be placed. Science answered the call by
solving some questions, but by raising many more serious
ones to replace them. It explained many phenomena, and yet
in the process of explaining them it succeeded in making them
even more mysterious. This is reflected in Huxley. He has a
tendency to regard events and people, mental and spiritual
facts, as physical mysteries: first he reduces them to their low-
est physical terms and then makes us see how astounding
they are. We are not accustomed, for instance, to associate
the emotional effect of music with its immediate physical
source; Huxley does so when he writes:
Pongileoni blew, the fiddlers drew their rosined
horsehair across the stretched intestines of lambs;
through the long Sarabande the poet slowly medi-
tated his lovely and consoling certitude.
15
Regarded in this way, life becomes incredible and almost
meaningless; and, as we noted in Omar Khayyam, this sense
of meaninglessness is a premise of hedonism.
The other device Huxley describes as the technique of
"multiplicity," or the inclusion and sudden contrasting of
many diverse points of view expressed by a crowd of char-
acters. An ordinary human situation is made vivid by his
describing how opposite types of people meet it under the
most antithetical circumstances, as when a sudden memory
of childhood flashes successively across the mind of an old
man watching his grandson, a terror-stricken youth about to
commit a murder, and a credulous girl seduced by a man she
has considered a saint. Similarly Huxley plays in different
keys on such themes as death, illicit love, and, most important
for our purpose, hedonism. For one reason or another, and
with varying degrees of success, many of his main characters
consciously crave pleasure as the end of life. Two of them
will illustrate the point: a Cyrenaic and an Epicurean.
CAKES AND ALE 27
There is no better picture of the modern Cyrenaic than
the formidable Lucy Tantamount, the "refined and perfumed
imitation of a savage or an animal," endowed by nature with
every quality that would make possible a life of immediate
pleasure. Her mother calls her a leprechaun, which, she
remarks, is not an easy creature to rear. If she had any
scruples, they were dissipated by the postwar collapse. Her
avowed aim in life is to do what she likes and never to admit
anyone's right to question her actions. What she likes is to
experience one pleasant sensation after another without
thought of the next day or the next minute.
Her success in doing this is extraordinary, for she has
certain advantages which allow her almost to evade the
difficulties confronting the Cyrenaic. One is her personal
attractiveness and persuasive technique; when things grow
tiresome because no thrill appears imminent, she can cajole
or bully her friends into providing one. Most of them exert
themselves to furnish pleasures, on the mistaken assumption
that she will be grateful. Another advantage is that one of
her most titillating varieties of pleasure is fighting to get her
own way, so that the very opposition aroused by her selfish-
ness is transformed into a new kind of diversion. She is a
fully active hedonist, not taking her joys as they come, but
setting out to wrest them from the world. The greatest fun,
she declares, consists in breaking rules; perhaps the Victorians
really had a better time than we, because they had so many
more rules to break. "I simply won't let myself be bullied
by the universe," she asserts. When she enters a love affair,
it is to enjoy herself consciously, to enslave her lover, but
never to become emotionally involved. If the lover is of some
novel or interesting type, perhaps a stranger whom she meets
on the street, so much the better; he will provide a new thrill.
If he is too demanding, she discards him; if he is too sub-
missive, she takes delight in arousing his hopes and then
dashing them.
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Here, then, seems to be the perfect Cyrenaic, the pleas-
ure-seeker who attains her goal as part of the very search;
but Huxley does not leave us with that impression. With all
her advantages Lucy is not happy. She can never relax, for
there is always the fear that tomorrow may provide no excite-
ment. For her not prosperity, but boredom, is just around the
corner, and the more loudly she asserts that the universe must
not bully her the more uneasy she is that it might do so in
spite of her. She develops a morbid fear of being alone; to
associate with herself is tedious to her. She finds that all her
diversions, to be satisfying, must grow progressively stronger,
a process which cannot continue forever. When it culminates
in her extravagant attempt to experience a new sensation by
picking up the Italian boy on the street in Paris, we have the
impression that nothing further is possible, and she quietly
vanishes from the book a hundred pages from the end. Both
here and in his other novels Huxley implies that the Cyrenaic
cannot ultimately escape pain and ennui.
The Epicurean hedonist is more subtly developed, but
represented as no more successful. He appears several times
in Huxley's novels, portrayed so sympathetically that his
creator must have a sincere affinity for him, yet realistically
dissected as if the author were guarding himself against a
tendency of his own. Usually this character is a scholar, sub-
consciously desirous of avoiding the responsibility of active
life or human relations, and using academic research or
writing to rationalize this impulse. An early trace of him can
be seen in the young Theodore Gumbril in Antic Hay. He is
fully developed in Anthony Beavis, the hero of Eyeless in
Gaza, and is mildly satirized in After Many a Summer in the
portrait of the Oxford scholar Jeremy Pordage. But the best
rounded and most human example is Philip Quarles in Point
Counter Point.
Philip is a novelist who keeps a notebook. In it are
recorded his plans for a new novel, his impressions of scenes
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and people that may be grist for his mill, and his comments
on life. These comments are exceedingly penetrating, for he
is the most intelligent person in the book, so intelligent that
he is a little terrifying. Everything in his environment he
subjects instinctively to a cool, dispassionate analysis; his
mind engulfs it, dissects it, and transforms it into an acute
generalization. The accidental death of a dog leads him to
compare animal with human morality; when a group of
tanned young Englishmen pass him on a steamer deck, he
remarks that the habit of exercise explains the British Empire.
In the realm of logical cerebration, then, Philip is at
home and contented. But in the realm of personal relations
he is uneasy. Though he can analyze emotions in others, he
is unhappy when he feels them himself. This makes him an
intellectual Epicurean; his happiness depends on a with-
drawal into his own mind. A boyhood accident that pre-
vented him from playing normal games increases this tendency,
until he reaches the point where people make an impression
on his mind but not at all on his feelings. He does not want
his feelings touched or his routine interfered with. When his
wife tries experimentally to draw him out of himself, even
simulating flirtations with other men to arouse his jealousy,
she finds him always good-humored and always impervious.
In short, like a good Epicurean he cannot be bothered.
His failure to attain happiness comes, properly enough,
as a kind of nemesis from his intelligence. He understands
himself too well, for he realizes not only that his happiness
depends on withdrawal from life, but also that it ought not
to. He analyzes himself as mercilessly as anything else, and is
aware that his intellectual labors are mere self-indulgence.
Knowing what he should do, he lacks the stamina to make
himself do it, and so inevitably despises himself. Reading
about a species of female angler-fish that reduces its mates to
parasites, he notes a striking analogy to Lucy Tantamount
and to Riviera society; simultaneously half his brain is telling
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him that he ought to show more feeling when his wife
threatens to leave him. To show such feeling is difficult and
a nuisance; he puts it off until tomorrow, and continues
reading about angler-fish. In his own notebook he writes,
"Shall I ever have the strength of mind to break myself of
these indolent habits of intellectualism and devote my energies
to the more serious and difficult task of living integrally?"
From these and many other portraits, it appears that
although Huxley describes pleasure-philosophy with insight,
he believes that hedonism is not enough; in his recent books
he has even been turning to mysticism as one antidote for it.
In Point Counter Point he introduces two characters who
directly oppose pleasure as an end of life. Rachel Quarles
placidly points out that the reason few people are happy in
the modern world is that almost everyone tries to be and
constantly wonders why he is not. "Why am I not having a
good time?" is the question on everyone's lips. But, as Rachel
remarks, happiness is like coke a by-product in the process
of making something else. Still more important is the char-
acter of Mark Rampion, the advocate of balance and sanity,
who tries to relegate hedonism to its proper place by arguing
for "wholeness of life." He distrusts everything that interferes
with complete, natural human existence: artificial civilization,
for instance, or romantic illusion, or prudery, or animalism.
His philosophy is summed up in a conversation with Philip
and two other men, curiously enough during a late dinner at
a fashionable restaurant; this plea for health and sanity in a
perverted world may fairly represent Huxley's own attitude
at the time:
Nobody's asking you to be anything but a man. A
man, mind you, not an angel or a devil. A man's a
creature on a tightrope, walking delicately, equili-
brated, with mind and consciousness and spirit at
one end of his balancing pole and body and instinct
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and all that's unconscious and earthy and mysteri-
ous at the other. Balanced. Which is damnably
difficult. And the only absolute he can ever really
know is the absolute of perfect balance. 16
At this point we may well ask ourselves whether we have
been fair to hedonistic ethics. Our conclusions in the main
have been adverse. Alluring as the criterion of pleasure may
be, it seems on theoretical grounds insufficient and in practice
unable to produce a satisfactory life. Nevertheless one might
argue that the cards have been stacked against these hedonists,
in that each has been restricted in some rather serious way.
Perhaps it was not their philosophies but their limited per-
sonalities that caused the difficulty. If Omar was a sentimen-
talist who bewailed the passing of spring and demanded that
his happiness last forever, was that the fault of hedonism?
Lucy Tantamount, war baby and pampered rich girl, tem-
peramentally ruthless, would under any circumstances be
bored with life and leave a trail of bitterness behind her.
Philip Quarles's mind was so warped by his childhood accident
that his behavior is hardly a fair test of any philosophy. Why
judge hedonism by such abnormal practitioners?
The question may be answered in several ways. We might
point out that any philosophy must to some extent be judged
by the kind of people who are led to adopt it; if hedonism
attracts distorted personalities, so much the worse for it. Or
we might reply that all persons are hedged about by restric-
tions, whether external or psychological, and that a philosophy
must be realistic about them if it is of any value. Ethics is an
attempt to find the best sort of life, not for perfect abstract
beings, but for man in his habit as he lives; and an ethical
theory is weak just in so far as it fails to do this. Instead of
answering thus, however, let us meet the argument directly
by examining hedonism under the most favorable conditions,
by asking what happens when it is given full sway in a person
not bound by any ordinary restrictions at all. Let us imagine
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someone who is free from the possibility of boredom, of
remorse, of envy, of hatred, of conventional moral standards,
of anything which impedes most people in their search for
happiness. Then would a satisfactory life of pleasure be
possible?
Such a person, of course, is hard to imagine; he is likely
to become a mere idea, a non-human abstraction. Only a
tolerant, flexible, and very human writer could create him
successfullyin fact, hardly anyone but Shakespeare. In the
character of Sir John Falstaff we have the ultimate test of
hedonistic ethics.
Falstaff appears in the two parts of King Henry the
Fourth, and his death is described in Henry the Fifth. Though
his fame is so great that he ought to be the hero of the play,
he was conceived as a mere piece of comic relief. Within two
acts, however, he has so effectually relieved the serious his-
torical material as to overshadow the whole play. Originally
he was created to account for the unconventional behavior of
Prince Hal, son to Henry IV and heir to the throne, who,
instead of attending court functions like a proper prince,
frittered away his time at the Boar's Head Tavern. Hal was
not a wastrel, however; indeed, since he was to become in due
time the hero-king of England, the audience must never be
permitted to lose respect for him. The attraction at the Boar's
Head must be so overwhelming as to lead anyone to ignore
his plain duty. Therefore we have Sir John Falstaff, a knight
of good family and formerly some wealth, now suffering from
"consumption of the purse," reduced to making a living by
shady deals with highwaymen, not yet quite in disgrace but
equivocally poised between court and prison. Often Prince
Hal solemnly assures himself that he is merely conducting a
sociological experiment to see how the other half lives before
taking up his serious duties, and that he can give up the
Falstaff habit at any time; the fact* is Falstaff bewitches him,
and not until he actually becomes king is he able to emerge
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from the fat knight's influence. And in the audience no one
but the Malvolios can blame him.
When a reader of Shakespeare first meets Falstaff, the
character may seem conventionally comic, even farcical. He is
fat and unwieldy, subject to all the jokes made about fat
people. He is often drunk. He is clearly a descendant of the
old stock figure of the "miles gloriosus" or braggart soldier,
cowardly at heart but lying vigorously concerning his deeds
of valor. He is getting old (since he admits to being almost
sixty, he must be somewhat more than that age) , yet tries
ridiculously to act young; one excuse he gives for robbing
merchants on the road is that "young men must live." But
from this stereotyped figure Shakespeare develops a complete
high-comic portrait, which we must examine in so far as it
illustrates hedonism.18
That Falstaff is a positive Cyrenaic hedonist needs no
demonstration. He lives for active pleasure and loves it so
intensely that we share his feeling in spite of ourselves. He has
such vitality that he can enjoy every pleasure more vividly
than the average person. With disarming gusto does he relish
eating and drinking, wenching, robbing, talking, acting,
playing jokes, observing life. Just as Omar used wine as a
symbol of the world's delight, so Falstaff is at his most
eloquent in praising it: it is a blessing, he says, because it
stimulates a man's imagination and makes him a better con-
versationalist:
It ascends me into the brain; dries me there all the
foolish and dull and crudy vapors which environ it;
makes it apprehensive, quick, forgetive, full of
nimble, fiery, and delectable shapes; which delivered
o'er to the voice, the tongue, which is the birth, be-
comes excellent wit. 19
This love of physical pleasure makes him typical enough of
this philosophy, more attractive than most hedonists, perhaps,
because somewhat wittier and less intense.
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Falstaff, however, has one great advantage over all others
of his kind: he is not impeded by any of the restraints which
we have seen interfering with the ordinary life of pleasure.
Other hedonists abide our question; Sir John is free. This
point is so important that it must be examined in some detail.
Falstaff is free because nothing that worries other people is of
the slightest concern to him. He has no standards. He is
impervious to ridicule, moral imperatives, demands of honor,
truth, social position, or personal sensitiveness. This is not a
pose; he honestly and instinctively does not care a hoot about
any of these things. Consequently he, if anyone, might be a
successful hedonist.
Take, for example, his attitude toward law and public
morality. Moral standards are in the way of most hedonists,
and must be despised or elaborately circumvented if they are
not to spoil the fun. But they are part and parcel of Falstaffs
fun, because they are such good jokes that they add to the
gaiety of life. He is honestly indifferent to their serious impli-
cations; they mean nothing to him, and he is puzzled and
amused that otherwise intelligent people should bother with
them. When Hal mildly hints that purse-snatching is hardly
the life for a gentleman, he answers,
"
'Tis my vocation, Hal.
'Tis no sin for a man to labor in his vocation." The best
example of his nonchalance in breaking the law appears when
he conscripts a troop of soldiers for the war; walking along a
country road, he thinks delightedly of the good day's work he
has made of it. First, he drafted only gentlemen's sons and
newly engaged bachelors who paid him a total of over three
hundred pounds to let them off; then he collected as substi-
tutes a crowd of tattered hoboes, discharged servants, and
cheating tapsters who wouldn't need to be paid anyway.
Truly a fair profit, and what was the difference? The men
were only cannon fodder in any case, good enough to fill a
ditch. His joy is so infectious that we feel the pleasure of a
good trick to have meant more to him than the money.
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Most people, again, are sensitive about honor and cour-
age; a man's enjoyment of life is disturbed if he is called a
coward. To Falstaff such matters mean nothing either way;
he is brave or cowardly, whichever provides more fun at the
moment. When the sheriff comes to arrest him for stealing,
for which he might have been hanged, he walks behind the
arras and calmly falls asleep. He is active in the battle,
actually leading his motley regiment into the fight for the
pleasure of seeing them shot. To be sure, some of his activity
consists in skillfully feigning death when the Earl of Douglas
attacks him; but, as he remarks, what do you expect? It was
time to do something, or he might have been killed 1 Poins
sums it up by saying that Sir John will never fight longer than
he sees reason; that is, he will fight as long as there is any
fun in it, but when things get too serious, of course he runs
away. Life should not be taken seriously. And so Falstaff
recites his catechism of honor, this word to which men pay
such homage. Can it set a leg? Can it do anything practical?
No; for it is a mere word, nothing but air and no use if you
are dead or living either, for then slander will ruin it.
No less is he free from standards of truth. Many hedonists
are willing enough to lie, but would prefer not to be found
out. What makes people tell the truth is fear of not being
believed if they have a reputation for lying. Falstaff does not
care either way. It gives him as much pleasure to be caught
up as to succeed in the lie; a good lie, like a good dinner, is
one of the riches of life to be enjoyed. This is the point of
the famous tavern scene in which the Prince and Poins, having
just robbed the robbers themselves of their plunder, trick
Falstaff into a glowing account of his own valor. But it is
evident that he does not lie in the hope of deceiving anyone,
but merely to add to the general entertainment. His mendacity
is so obvious that no one could possibly believe it: in one
breath he calls for a drink of sack, and in the next, after
wiping his mouth, protests that he has drunk nothing all day.
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He exaggerates openly so as to make the best possible story,
beginning mildly by asserting that singlehanded he defeated
four rogues in buckram, and increasing the number in every
sentence until it reaches eleven. At another time, the Prince
overhears him boasting that Hal owes him a thousand pounds
and will rue the day if he does not settle. "Sirrah, do I owe
you a thousand pound?" demands the Prince. "A thousand
pound, Hal?" Falstaff replies. "A millionl Thy love is worth
a million; thou owest me thy love." To gain the maximum
pleasure from life, it is an advantage to be a liar so impreg-
nable that one has not the slightest concern about being
found out.
Finally, Falstaff is free not only from all external stand-
ards but from personal sensitiveness. This is the rarest of all
kinds of freedom, the freedom from fear of ridicule. He is
invulnerable because he laughs at himself as cleverly and as
heartily as others could. Again, this is not a pose; he thor-
oughly enjoys the humor of his own absurdities. His stoutness
he ascribes to his arduous and sorrowful life: "A plague of
sighing and grief; it blows a man up like a bladder." When
the Prince tells him to put his ear to the ground and listen
for hoofbeats, he inquires, "Have you any levers to lift me up
again, being down?" And by a stroke of genius he even uses
his size to justify his sins. When Hal half seriously berates
him for cheating the hostess of the tavern, he utters this
overwhelming apologia:
Dost thou hear, Hal? Thou knowest in the state of
innocency Adam fell; and what should poor Jack
Falstaff do in the days of villainy? Thou seest I have
more flesh than another man, and therefore more
frailty.
Thus Falstaff transforms every phase of his personality and
environment into huge enjoyment of life, and extracts pleasure
even from ridicule and disgrace.
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If, then, hedonism can ever be a sufficient philosophy of
life, it should be here. Falstaff is the ideally unrestricted
person whom we imagined: intelligent, clever enough to turn
everything to account, indifferent to consequences, not vul-
nerable in any of the usual ways. Anyone who is adaptable
and not too exacting could enjoy him as a friend and even
envy him his personality. In spite of the tricks he plays and
the ill turns he did them, the people around him loved him
to idolatry. Prince Hal lied to the sheriff to save FalstafFs
life, and privately paid back the money he had stolen. Mistress
Quickly, the Hostess, whom Falstaff gulled and robbed, was
broken-hearted at his death, repudiating indignantly the
suggestion that he might have gone to hell. The red-faced
drunkard Bardolph, whom Falstaff had infuriated by remark-
ing that a fly on his nose looked like a damned soul in hell-fire,
exclaimed, "Would I were with him wheresome'er Jie is,
either in heaven or in helll" To that extent his life was
sufficient.
It would be pleasant to end here our discussion of
Falstaff, but Shakespeare does not do so. We find at the end
that, even under these almost perfect conditions, FalstafFs
philosophy is not successful and his freedom only an illusion.
For he is not free from human feelings or from overconfidence.
Imperceptibly, without being fully conscious of the fact, he
grows so fond of the Prince as to be dependent on him, and
so sure of his own power that he presumes on it too far. Hal's
love is in truth worth a million to him. The perfect hedonist
must be able to relinquish any pleasure at any time, to hold
it lightly enough so that he can turn easily to the next one;
and when the companionship and favor of this "most com-
parative, rascalliest, sweet young Prince" becomes a necessity
to Sir John, he is doomed to disillusionment. For there is a
strain of calculation in Hal which warns him that, as King
Henry the Fifth, he must no longer tolerate his old friend.
On the public street, in the most humiliating circumstances,
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he repudiates Falstaff. Compelled for the first time to take
something seriously, the knight's morale is broken and he
loses heart.
The blustering thief, Pistol, whose talk is impressively
sonorous but incomprehensible, says the last word on Falstaff.
Meaning to convey that Sir John dies of a broken heart, he
announces, "His heart is fracted and corroborate!" Even the
most perfect of all hedonists does not die happy; and when
hedonism once breaks down, one is left more exposed to pain,
more defenceless, than is true of any other philosophy of life.
It would be unfair to conclude from our discussion that
hedonistic ethics is of no value at all. All we can say is that,
taken alone in its extreme form, without admixture of other
codes of conduct, it fails. Happiness is not attained by a direct
search for it as the highest good of life. Some sort of personal
happiness is the goal of most systems of ethics; the question
is merely whether the hedonist goes about in the right way to
attain it. A dash of hedonism would sweeten any of the sterner
ethical doctrines, to which we must now turn.
CHAPTER THREE
STOIC ENDURANCE
IT IS probably safe to say that
the majority of people govern their conduct by a sort of
instinctive hedonism, limited by social custom, early training,
and fear of the policeman on the corner. The best proof of
this is the prevalence of the capitalistic system, whose profit
motive is based on the assumption that for most people the
highest good is money and the things money will buy. Only
a few rationally question personal success and happiness as
the end of life, and still fewer deliberately substitute a
different ethical aim. Though men generally deny that they
are hedonists, they often act as if they were. Yet in every age
some have acted otherwise, insisting that it is beneath the
dignity of man to base his conduct on the dictates of the
senses, and upholding instead some other element of human
nature: the will, the reason, or the higher emotions.
The earliest important theory of this sort was the doctrine
known as Stoicism, arising in Athens about the time of
Epicurus and reaching its highest influence in the Roman
Empire. During the fourth century B. C. a group of anti-
hedonists called Cynics were attacking and satirizing the
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conventional seekers after pleasure and power in Athenian
society, and by the beginning of the third century these attacks
had crystallized into a definite philosophy first preached by
Zeno of Citium (336-264) . After flourishing for many years
in Athens, this philosophy proved attractive to the Roman
conquerors and became the doctrine most typical of the
Roman temperament, spreading among all classes of society
and growing more influential in the later days of the Empire.
1
The general popularity of Stoic ethics is illustrated by the
fact that the two most readable accounts of it were the work
respectively of a freed slave and of an emperor. Epictetus, a
Greek born about 50 A. D., transported to Rome as a slave
during the reign of Nero, found time and inclination to study
philosophy. After gaining his freedom, he worked as best he
could to promulgate ethical ideals in a fascist state, ever on
guard against the emperor's Gestapo, who, as disciples or
table-companions, would try to lure him into subversive
utterances. Banished by the Emperor Domitian in the year
94, he set up a little school in Nicopolis and lectured effec-
tively for a number of years. Though no writings of his own
survive, his lectures were taken down and published by his
pupil Arrian in the form of a long series of Discourses and a
briefer summary called the Encheiridion or handbook. Nearly
a century later the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, his sincere
desire for culture and peace frustrated by court intriguers,
importunate office-seekers, and incessant wars, wrote his
Meditations in the intervals of campaigns against invading
Parthians and rebellious German tribes. The composition of
these books under the circumstances confronting both men
is evidence of the power of Stoic philosophy to achieve toler-
ance of outlook and tranquillity of mind in the midst of
difficulties.
It is interesting to analyze Stoicism as it is pictured by
these two men, using examples from later literature to illus-
trate special points. Both the Discourses and the Meditations
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will repay any modern reader; indeed, he will find them of
real help in difficult times. They are very different from each
other. Marcus Aurelius had a poetic imagination, a quiet
common sense, a disarmingly tolerant spirit, and a cheerful
yet slightly tired acceptance of the fluctuations of life; Epic-
tetus was a teacher, with a flair for concrete and homely
illustration, a keen wit, and an admirable resilience in the
face of physical illness and persecution. What, then, is the
doctrine espoused by two such opposite characters?
2
On the negative side, it begins with a double attack on
hedonism, with which the Stoics had no patience./ Reliance on
pleasure, they asserted, is both weak and futile. It is weak
because either an active search for pleasure or a retreat from
pain is cowardly, unworthy of a man.) Undoubtedly, says
Marcus Aurelius, it is more pleasant to lie in bed in the morn-
ing than to get up; but when tempted to oversleep, remember
that you were created to help build a world, not to find
pleasure.? If you think back over history, you will realize that
men are praised, not for having experienced pleasure, but for
goodness, stamina, and positive achievement. |Even harmless
enjoyments, even general happiness, are unthinkable as an
end of life. Though it may be pardonable to accept them as
an occasional by-product, it is shameful to pursue them as the
highest good.
The other part of the Stoic attack involves an objection
to hedonism which we have already examined: to depend on
pleasure is futile. Why even argue about the value of the
quest when its chances of success are so slight? It leaves the
hedonist exposed to circumstances. When the immediate pleas-
ure is gone, he has nothing to fall back on; when pain comes,
he has no defence against it. Better depend on nothing than
on such quicksand. The Stoic would deny that it is better to
have loved and lost than never to have loved at all. By refusing
to rely on the permanence of the delight, he would prepare
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himself for a disappointment which he would regard as
inevitable and even proper in the nature of things. "He that
dreads pain will some day be in dread of something that must
be in the world."4 To the Stoic, the hedonist is a man
demented, led by a will-o'-the-wisp into the mire. It is as if
he should exalt the sun as his highest good, and then, when
the sun disappeared, should run frantically through the night
to overtake it, oblivious of the precipice in front of him.
Much better be realistic, accept the inescapable night as part
of nature, and see whether some illumination cannot be
found. Indeed, a large part of Stoicism may be described as
the attempt to light a candle in the dark.
The flame of the candle, and the highest good in the
Stoic system, is the ideal of duty. In general, doing your duty
means establishing a standard and making yourself conform
to it. The standard may vary in details; in fact, the Stoic
advises that, as regards specific daily actions, you follow the
moral code in favor at your time, because that represents long
racial experience. The emphasis is not upon the exact code
to be followed, but upon the firmness and constancy with
which you follow it. Beware of every impulse which urges
you to make an exception to your standard. Be "impervious
to all passions." whether of hunger, lust, anger, vengeance,
greed, or sloth. Control your emotions instead of letting them
control you.
Although such control is difficult, nature has fortunately
provided us with a contrivance for effecting it: namely, our
will. The will is the powerful but often atrophied moral
force within every person, a force so great as to amount almost
to a separate element of the personality, by means of which
one part of us can stand aside, observe the actions of the rest,
lay hold of recalcitrant impulses, and compel them to do its
bidding. Stoics insist that men, unlike animals, are their own
masters and can make themselves do anything. Most people,
they point out, act on this assumption as far as other persons
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are concerned; any belief in moral training, any reliance on
reward or punishment, assumes that we are free to will either
right or wrong. It is only when the same standard is applied
to ourselves that the weaker among us hesitate. Physical
determinism the Stoics accept the external world is subject
to unchanging laws of cause and effect. But moral determin-
ism is hateful to them; the human mind is free, not to
interrupt causal laws, but to decide whether it will flourish
by co-operating with them or come to ruin by opposing them.
As human beings, we should prize this freedom as our most
precious possession.
The change from the ideal of pleasure to that of duty
does not mean that we are fated to a life of unhappy struggle.
Indeed, it may bring a real sense of relief, because we are no
longer the prey of chance impulses, but have solid standards
on which to lean. This point is made with quiet convincingness
by Wordsworth in his Ode to Duty. 6 For a number of years
Wordsworth had lived in the country surrounded by the
natural beauty which he loved, and had felt an almost con-
tinual emotional exaltation from the hills and woods of his
native lake district. When he reached his middle thirties,
however, this early feeling of "splendour in the grass, of glory
in the flower" began to diminish, and he reached out in
several directions for a firmer basis of moral life. Among other
things he called upon Duty, the stern but kind lawgiver, to
mould and strengthen his will. In this poem, Duty is not a
slave driver, but a refuge.
Thou, who art victory and law
When empty terrors overawe;
From vain temptations dost set free,
And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity.
Some people, it seems, can lead good lives by instinct; but
usually they must resort in the end to some consciously-willed
standard. The poet himself has hitherto avoided duty for
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impulse; now he seeks to restrain impulse by will, not from
a feeling of having done wrong, but from a sense of having
dissipated his energies. He says:
Me this unchartered freedom tires;
I feel the weight of chance desires;
My hopes no more must change their name;
I long for a repose that ever is the same.
In the most effective stanza of the poem, Wordsworth shows
that his idea is typically stoic by equating duty with natural
law. Man's highest moral standards are at bottom the same
as the forces governing the whole universe. Therefore, how-
ever strict they may be, they arouse in us a sense of fitness
and beauty.
Stern Lawgiver 1 yet thou dost wear
The Godhead's most benignant grace;
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face.
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds
And fragrance in thy footing treads;
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;
And the most ancient heavens, through thee,
are fresh and strong.
This association of duty with nature is the very center of
Stoic doctrine. Supposing that we have attained control of
our impulses and a willingness to adhere to some form of
duty or external standard, we may now ask in what that
external standard consists. The Stoic believes that it consists
in following natural law; an action is right if it is in accord
with universal nature.
The union of man and nature has been urged by many
philosophers, who differ mainly in their views of where nature
is and how to get there. Some would ascend to nature; others
retreat to it; still others return; a few even plunge. The Stoics
would have us merely open our eyes and co-operate with an
obviously good universe. To them, nature as a standard was
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both a symbol and a literal fact. As a symbol of the good life,
nothing could be more apt than the imperturbable round of
natural processes. Nature does not complain of dullness or
difficulty, but goes on about its business. This comparison is
made by Matthew Arnold, who could find little in the con-
temporary world of men to reassure him, and who alternated
between lamenting the time's decay and trying to convince
others and himself that they should not lament it. In Self-
Dependence, he represents himself as ashamed of his constant
complaining:
Weary of myself, and sick of asking
What I am, and what I ought to be,
At this vessel's prow I stand, which bears me
Forwards, forwards, o'er the starlit sea.
Knowing that from his childhood the stars have always 'had a
quieting effect on him, he now calls upon them to exert it
again; and from the sky a voice reminds him that if he desires
the freedom and calmness of the stars he must become like
them. The stars, representing the natural universe,
Unaffrighted by the silence round them,
Undistracted by the sights they see,
These demand not that the things without them
Yield them love, amusement, sympathy.
And with joy the stars perform their shining,
And the sea its long, moon-silver'd roll;
For
self-poised they live,
nor pine with noting
All the fever of some differing soul.
Bounded by themselves, and unregardful
In what state God's other works may be,
In their own tasks all their powers pouring,
These attain the mighty life you see.
If we take this literally, we may ask by what right the
stars are asserted to be joyful. If the idea is to have meaning,
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it must be accepted as a symbol. Happy or not, the stars
certainly appear imperturbable, and the early Stoics fre-
quently noted that fact. Marcus Aurelius, for example, says:
"Watch the stars in their courses as one that runneth about
with them therein, and think constantly upon the reciprocal
changes of the elements, for thoughts on these things cleanse
away the mire of our earthly life."
To follow natural law, however, was not primarily a
symbol in the Stoic doctrine. Rather it was a plain and posi-
tive fact, easy to understand, the very key to the control of
life. The cosmic plan, always moving, endlessly developing
seeds into trees and savage tribes into cities, inevitably
includes man in its spacious mechanism. Not figuratively, but
actually, every man is a part of nature, placed on earth to
accomplish a small task in the whole process. To try as best
he can to discover the plan and carry out the small task is
his duty and his highest good, providing him with the external
standard to which his will may be faithful. Nothing is good
for me which is not good for the whole universe. "To a
rational creature the same act is at once according to nature
and according to reason." The universe is often compared to
a texture of cloth, in which each thread (or each tiny action)
is interwoven with every other. If one insists on cutting
through a section of the fabric in search of individual pleasure,
then he merely causes himself pain by falling through the
hole he has made and seeing the universe move on without
him. When phenomena are regarded as parts of such a coher-
ent universe, they are transformed. Trivial creatures and
events take on significance; ugly ones achieve at least the
beauty of fitting the end for which they were intended. As
Marcus Aurelius observes, even the gaping jaws of a lion,
horrible and terrifying in themselves, are beautifully suited
to perform their function.
Asserting, then, that man, the only being endowed with
consciousness to understand his actions, should try to gain
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accord with natural law, the Stoics now ask how he can gain
it. How does one act according to nature? Their answers to
this question involve three general lines of approach, closely
related. Let us summarize them first, in the form of three
maxims:
1. Perform your function well;
2. Distinguish between what you can and what you
cannot control;
3. Comply gladly with necessity.
The first maxim is a simple and practical one. Whatever
your particular function happens to be, perform it the best
you know how. If you make shoes, let them be good ones; if
you fight in the army, do it fiercely and efficiently. Do not
complain because your function is different from what you
would have chosen. "Does the sun take upon himself to dis-
charge the functions of the rain? or Asclepius of the Fruit-
Bearer? And what of each particular star? Do they not differ
in glory yet co-operate to the same end?"
6 No matter what
your talents may be, do not worry about being useless to
your country. What do you mean by useless? No one can do
everything. The iron-worker does not make shoes for the
country, nor the cobbler arms. Whatever your particular duty
may be, your real function is to provide the state with a good
free citizen, of moral integrity and independence.
7
The fulfillment of this maxim is illustrated in Ernest
Hemingway's novel For Whom the Bell Tolls, the story of
how a young man carries out a self-imposed responsibility.
Robert Jordan, a teacher of Spanish in an American uni-
versity, enlists in the Loyalist army during the Spanish Civil
War because he feels that, as a member of the human race,
his duty is to oppose fascism before it spreads over the world.
No one forces or even urges him to do this; he takes the step
because his sense of duty convinces him it is right. In the army
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he becomes a dynamiter, traveling behind the fascist lines,
making contact with the guerilla bands in the mountains, and
blowing up the bridges and railroads over which the enemy
reinforcements are moved. Though he does not care for the
job, he performs it steadily and successfully. During the four
days covered by the story his duty is to blow up a certain
bridge at the precise moment to prevent reserves being
brought across it to stop a Loyalist offensive. Confronted by
external and internal obstacles, he focusses his mind on the
one objective and forces his reluctant will to remain firm.
When a treacherous guerilla leader steals his detonator, he
makes another out of hand-grenades. When he perceives that
news of the attack has leaked out and that the enemy has
already advanced mechanized columns before the bridge can
be blown, he nevertheless does his business in the hope of
delaying even a small number of the fascists. Wounded and
facing certain capture, he still tries to disorganize the enemy
slightly by killing one fascist officer. All this time, he is
haunted by the realization that the government for which he
is fighting is often corrupt and cruel, and by doubts of the
wisdom of the whole procedure. By a deliberate effort of will
he suppresses these doubts, reminding himself that he made
the decision voluntarily and that now nothing matters but
the carrying out of his duty. As a morally independent,
rationally responsible citizen, he performs his function.
It is interesting to see so clear an example of Stoicism in
a man fighting for democratic principles, because the Stoic
assertion that man's first duty is to the State might sound like
totalitarianism. To merge oneself in the social group is the
reiterated aim of the Stoics. Epictetus repeatedly affirms that
the function of anything detached differs from its function as
part of a whole; for example, it is natural for the foot, taken
as a separate entity, to remain clean, but taken as part of
the body it is natural for it to step in mud. So with the fate
of a man: "If you regard yourself as a thing detached, it is
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natural for you to live to old age, be rich, enjoy health. But
if you regard yourself as part of some whole, on account of
that whole it is fitting for you now to be sick, now to make
a voyage and run risks, now to be in want, now to die before
your time. Why then are you vexed? Do you not know that as
the foot, if detached, will no longer be a foot, so you too, if
detached, will no longer be a man? For what is a man? A part
of a state." 8
If we stop here, this sounds like good totalitarian
doctrine. But we must not forget that trie Stoic must be not
only a citizen but a free citizen, and that he has a function
to perform, not only as a citizen, but as a man. For the
nature and purpose of man is opposed to that of animals,
and Epictetus has a section on this difference.9 A man, he
asserts, is gentle and reasonable, an animal brutal and
contentious. "Here is a man who does not listen to reason,
does not understand when he is confuted; he is an ass. Here
is one whose sense of self-respect has grown numb; he is
useless, a sheep, anything but a human being. Here is a man
who is looking for someone to punch in the head; so that
he is not even a sheep or an ass, but some wild beast."
Fascists who teach their children that violence is the height
of moral grandeur would not agree with this part of Stoic
doctrine.
This first maxim, then, urges one to go about his business
as a man and a citizen, not to be seduced by frivolous
pleasures or intimidated by dangers, but to take that place
in the universe where duty calls him. Epictetus even outlines
a typical "Stoic personality" that will result from doing
these things, a personality at once admirable and distasteful.
10
"Lay down for yourself at the outset a certain stamp and type
of character which you are to maintain whether you are by
yourself or meeting with people." The essence of this
character is dignity and gravity. He does not talk or laugh
much, or make others laugh. He neither chatters about
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himself noi gossips about others. He eats sparingly, and owns
nothing that might hint of luxury. Though personally
continent, he does not censure those who indulge sexually.
He is modest; if someone speaks ill of him, he does not
defend himself, but says, "If he had known me better, he
would have found more to criticize." He never shows
emotion, whether it is excitement, pleasure or disapproval.
In this picture, where there is no room for human weakness,
joy of living, or relaxation with a friend, we see how the
Stoic felt that a good man should perform his function.
The second maxim, a necessary complement of the first,
is less easy to understand. In order to follow natural law,
the Stoic says, a man must distinguish between what he can
control and what he cannot, for upon that distinction
depends his whole confidence in the will. This confidence is
not easy to justify." The reader probably felt skeptical about
it when we began our study of Stoicism. Is not the power
of the will very limited? Is there any use in trusting it, since
it must inevitably be overcome by circumstances? No amount
of willing can make a person taller or more intelligent.
Admitting this fact, the Stoic nevertheless insisted that a
proper understanding of nature teaches us to have neither
too much nor too little reliance on the will, because it shows
what is under our control and what is not.
Common sense tells us that most things are not under
our control: our birth and heredity, our appearance, the
society in which we are reared, the accidents and illnesses
that beset us, the general good or bad fortune that comes to
us, and the length of our life. But the Stoic believes that
one thing is under our control, and one thing only: our mind.
No external power can prescribe our thoughts, perceptions,
emotions, reason, moral purpose. Freedom of speech and
action may be annihilated; that of thought, never. This is
obvious enough, but the Stoic asserts that men have never
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properly taken advantage of the fact. He argues that the
things not under our control can make no essential difference
to us. It is not events, but our reactions to them, that matter
and these we can govern by our will. The opening section
of Epictetus's manual for students is devoted to this point.
The first lesson, he says, is to avoid mistaking things not
under your control (such as body, property, reputation,
office) for things under your control (such as choice, desire,
aversion, thought) . The former are nothing to you, and no
one can govern the latter. This he illustrates in many
sections of the Encheiridion and the Discourses. We shall
look briefly at three of these passages.
In Discourses III, viii, he shows that no external event
is either good or evil, but is given significance only by a
man's inner response to it. For example, "So-and-so's son is
dead. Answer, 'That lies outside the sphere of the moral
purpose; it is not an evil/ . . . But he was grieved at it.
'That lies within the sphere of the moral purpose; it is an
evil.' Or again, he has borne up under it manfully. 'That
lies within the sphere of the moral purpose; it is a good'."
In Encheiridion 43 the idea reappears in the form of a
striking image. "Everything has two handles, by one of which
it ought to be carried and by the other not." If your brother
wrongs you, you cannot help that, but you can decide which
handle of the fact you should take hold of: (a) he has
cheated me, and I must hate him; or (b) we were brought
up together, I understand and am fond of him, and so I
shall forgive him. Only your will can determine which
handle you will grasp.
Finally, in Discourses III, xix, Epictetus inquires what
is the difference between a layman and a Stoic philosopher,
and answers, "The layman says, 'Woe is me because of my
child, my brother, my father. The philosopher, if he can
ever be compelled to say, 'Woe is me/ adds after a pause,
'because of myself/ For nothing outside the sphere of the
moral purpose can hamper or injure the moral purpose."
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Such is the distinction which the second maxim insists on.
From it the Stoics drew far-reaching conclusions. If a man
can once realize that external events are of no account
compared to internal reactions, then he is released from most
sources of pain and sorrow he has achieved freedom. If we
are accustomed to think of freedom as involving the power
of overcoming external obstacles, of gaining control over
what was formerly beyond us, then this Stoic version may
seem a diluted substitute. Even its name is likely to be
misinterpreted: the Stoics called it "apathy." They meant,
however, not lethargy, but a calm conquest of one's emotions,
a realization that the will does control the most important
part of life. Though a man may be enslaved physically, yet
he is free if he does not desire any other life. The value of
this apparently ersatz freedom Epictetus defends in vigorous
terms: "He is free who lives as he wills, who is subject neither
to compulsion nor hindrance nor force, whose choices are
unhampered, whose desires attain their end, whose aversions
do not fall into what they would avoid." 11 There is only one
way of attaining this happy state: in order to get what you
want, want only what you can get. If you submit to a desire,
you are not free; but your desire is completely under your
controlyou can be forced to do something, but not to desire
it. The best analogy of this is given by Epictetus in Discourses
III, ix, 22, when he is talking to a man who desires state
honors and is discontented at not getting them: "Your strong
desire is insatiate; mine is already satisfied. The same thing
happens to a child who puts his hand into a narrow-necked
jar and tries to take out figs and nuts; if he gets his hand full
he can't get it out, and then he cries. Drop a few and you
will get it out. And so too drop your desire; do not set your
heart upon many things, and you will obtain." This freedom,
then, is achieved only by understanding the difference between
what a person can and what he cannot get.
There is, however, another road to freedom. In discussing
it we shall observe in Stoic ethics a new element which may
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be troublesome to a reader. This alternative road is that of
death, toward which the Stoics had an interesting and logical
attitude. Death is not a terror but an opportunity not for
immortal reward, as the Christian believes, but for union with
nature. Here the Stoic and the hedonist agree. Both Omar
Khayyam and Marcus Aurelius have nothing to anticipate
beyond the grave except re-immersion in the cosmic reservoir
of life. "You have subsisted as part of the Whole," says
Aurelius. 12 "You shall vanish into that which begat you, or
rather shall be taken again into its Seminal Reason by a
process of change." But whereas the hedonist feels that the
finality of death should lead him to seek more happiness in
life, the Stoic denies that it should have any effect on his
conduct. In any case one's actions should be modeled upon
natural law, and death is merely part of that law. Why, then,
should it have any influence on one's life?
Marcus Aurelius approaches this subject in his usual
poetic mood, with calm admiration of the great universal
cycles. "Pass through this tiny span of time in accordance
with Nature, and come to thy journey's end with a good
grace, just as an olive falls when it is fully ripe, praising the
earth that bare it and grateful to the tree that gave it
growth."
18 With special emphasis he says, "Despise not death,
but welcome it, for nature wills it like all else. For dissolution
is but one of the processes of Nature, associated with thy
life's various seasons, such as to be young, to be old, to wax
to our prime and reach it, to grow teeth and beard and gray
hairs, to beget, conceive, and bring forth. . . . Look for the
hour when thy soul shall emerge from this its sheath as
now thou waitest the moment when the child she carries
shall come forth from thy wife's womb." 14
Epictetus's views, as always, are more matter-of-fact. Any
man of sense can .understand that death, as one of the parts
of nature over which we have no control, should be regarded
with interest but no immediate concern. Apparently some
people are paralyzed by the idea, unable to make any plans
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for fear of dying. "Well," he remarks, "since you have to
die in any event, you must be found doing something or
other farming, or digging, or engaged in commerce, or
holding a consulship, or suffering with dyspepsia or dysentery.
What is it, then, you wish to be doing when death finds you?
I should wish it to be some work that befits a man." 15
One is tempted to comment that, while this is well
enough for an old man, "like a ripe olive," it is hard to see
the proper work of natural law in a young man cut off with
his promise unfulfilled. The Stoics spend some time in
answering this objection. An early death, they assert, is just
as natural as a late one, because no one can possess or use
either the past or the future. All he has, and therefore all
he can be deprived of, is the present the same whether he is
young or old. To complain at having no more years to live
is as silly as complaining because one does not weigh three
hundred pounds. Moreover, he who fears death at one age
would fear it equally at another; if he lived thirty thousand
years death would still be a deprivation. "The longest life
and the shortest amount to but the same. For the present
time is of equal duration for all, while that which we lose
is not ours. . . . No man can part with either the past or the
future. ... It is but the present that a man can be deprived
of." 1 **
So far we see the Stoics urging that death should not be
feared, but should be accepted with the same equanimity
that should characterize all our living. But they did not stop
at this point. Death is to be welcomed as a natural process
and even as a source of freedom yes, but it may also be
summoned as an escape from life. From this escape a good
man need not shrink. If a sincere attempt to live according
to nature fails, then he does not complain, but quietly chooses
death. The ultimate possibility of suicide is always in the
background of Stoic etrncs. The door is always open, say
both writers; walk through it if necessary. To the Stoic the
alternative is: die or adapt yourself, bm do not complain I
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"Remember that the door is open. Do not become a greater
coward than the children, but just as they say, 'I won't play
any longer/ when the thing does not please them, so do you
also, when things seem to you to have reached that stage,
merely say, 'I won't play any longer,' and take your departure.
But if you stay, stop lamenting."
17
In beginning the discussion of the second maxim, we
said that one thing not under man's control is the length of
his life. This statement must now be modified. He cannot
lengthen his life, but he can shorten it. He is in control of
life's cessation, not of its continuance; and this control follows
from his reason, attitude, or moral purpose. The value of
this attitude toward death will be considered later in the
general estimate of stoicism.
Let us now examine the third maxim. If you do your
duty, if you understand what you can and what you cannot
get, then you are ready to see that whatever happens must
be in accord with natural law. By fighting against it you
accomplish nothing but grief for yourself. Why not adapt
your life to conditions of the universe instead of struggling
vainly against them? Therefore the final maxim is, "Comply
gladly with necessity." This is the typical Stoic attitude;
this is what we mean in common speech by a stoical
acceptance of hardship.
The popular conception, however, is not always clear
or accurate. Sometimes being stoical is interpreted as steeling
oneself, setting one's teeth and enduring pain like a martyr.
But the Stoic is not a martyr; he prefers to be happy, and
does not go out of his way to show fortitude. When
misfortune comes, he welcomes it calmly as an inevitable
part of the environment. He complies gladly with necessity.
The difference may be illustrated by a popular poem, which,
though it is often referred to as a fine example of Stoic
endurance, does not truly reflect the doctrine. This is
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William Ernest Henley's Invictus, written by a man in whom
a long struggle with pain and invalidism had developed
strength and courage. As we read it, or especially as we
hear it sung over the radio, it seems impressively Stoic:
Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul.
In the fell clutch of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud.
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbowed.
Beyond this place of wrath and tears
Looms but the Horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of the years
Finds, and shall find, me unafraid.
It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll;
I am the master of my fate;
I am the captain of my soul.
What, we ask, should Stoicism be if not this? Here is the
emphasis on strength of will, the highest courage in meeting
difficulties, the waiving of any hope of reward in a future
life. But look closely at the poem, and then compare it with
the real Stoic passages which follow. Henley does not give
the impression of calm conquest of emotion and performance
of one's normal function. Instead be is highly emotional,
even theatrical. He insists so strongly on his own intrepidity
that we may wonder whether he was trying to convince
himself about it. Might it have been an attempt to
compensate for a subconscious feeling of weakness and failure?
Moreover, he hates the clutch of circumstance and the
bludgeonings of chance; to him the world holds menace.
There is no gladness in his compliance. He avows courage
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to accept his wounds, but not willingness to endure his fate.
The Stoic temper is much calmer than this. Henley is
perturbed but resolute; the Stoic is imperturbable, and even
finds quiet joy in meeting adversity. His custom is "to delight
in and welcome what befalls and what is spun for him by
destiny."
Epictetus gives the following neat formula for a serene
life: "Do not seek to have everything that happens happen
as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually
does happen." Nothing could be more sensible, Marcus
Aurelius echoes, than this obvious procedure which most
people overlook. Why should we wish things to be otherwise
than they are? An act of treachery by an unscrupulous man
is nothing to be surprised at; it is his nature, and must be
accepted as we accept the hardness of a stone. "He that
would not have the wicked do wrong is as one who would
not have the fig tree secrete acrid juice in its fruit, would
not have babies cry, or the horse neigh, or any other things
be that must be." Analogies are found from medicine and
athletics. Just as a doctor prescribes medicine or cold baths
or exercise, so nature prescribes sickness, deprivation, or
sorrow. Just as young athletes appreciate having a strong
wrestling partner to toughen them, so we should appreciate
having a strong difficulty to wrestle with.
The point is argued with some elaborateness by Epictetus
in Discourses I, xii, showing that the ultimate aim of this
maxim, as of the preceding one, is to gain freedom. He
begins by drawing the analogy of language. Suppose a person
should insist on being free to write any words he chooses
(such as purgle or spomff) . No one will stop him, but it will
do him no good. Since he cannot communicate with others
which is the function of languagehis so-called freedom
will be irrelevant. First he must learn the language, and
follow its conventions of meaning and grammar. Though this
apparently restricts him, yet only when he undergoes such
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restriction is he really free to express himself. Epictetus now
draws the conclusion that the same is true of freedom in
general: it conies only from complying with the rules of the
universe in other words, it comes when we desire each event
to be exactly as it happens, and keep our wills in harmony
with the facts. If we do not learn this lesson, our failure is
its own inherent punishment: "What, then, is the punishment
of those who do not accept? To be just as they are. Is one
peevish because he is alone? Let him be in solitude. Is he
peevish with his parents? Let him be an evil son and grieve.
His prison is where he is now, for he is there against his
will." This is one of the most interesting and plausible of
the Stoic arguments; the reader should test its cogency in his
own mind before we estimate its value.
William Wordsworth is the most definitely Stoic of
modern poets. 18 In his Ode to Duty we have seen how a
voluntary surrender to duty may lead to a kind of freedom
through the release of tension. Now, in the poem awkwardly
entitled Resolution and Independence, he gives a more
concrete example of the maxim of compliance with necessity.
He describes how, on a gleaming sunny morning, he started
out for a walk on the moor, delightedly watching a rabbit
kicking up a mist behind it in the wet grass. Anyone should
have been happy that morning; but suddenly a mood of
despondency settled on him. He began to worry. Everything
was well enough now, but suppose misfortune should come,
as it so often seemed to come to poets? Think of Burns and
Chatterton, for instance; they began with bright hopes, but
died young and miserable. He became querulous. Why were
not things different? Why did he not have a more secure
source of income, and more assurance of success as a poet?
In short, why were things as they were? At that moment he
caught sight of a very old man, so ancient and so motionless
that he seemed more like a part of nature than a person
a huge stone on a hilltop, or a great, slow-moving cloud. He
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was sitting beside a little pond, which at intervals he would
stir feebly with his staff. The poet, approaching, asked what
he was doing; and the old man answered that he was trying
to earn an honest living by gathering leeches, which had
formerly been plentiful but were now scarce. Yet he did not
complain, for there were still just enough to keep him alive,
and he asked nothing more. As he listened, Wordsworth felt
suddenly ashamed of himself. What had he to complain of
compared to this old man? Here was a symbol of one who
accepted things as they were without grumbling, and the
poet idealized him as the eternal Stoic, honestly contented
with his lot as it was.
And soon with this he other matter blended,
Cheerfully uttered, with demeanor kind,
But stately in the main; and, when he ended,
I could have laughed myself to scorn to find
In that decrepit man so firm a mind.
Comply gladly with necessity. He who does so will, like
the leech-gatherer, achieve resignation to his fate. The only
misfortune a man can really sufler is to complain of his lot.
The wiser and better informed he becomes, the less will toe
dream of blaming anything at all for his misfortunes. It is
better, as we have seen, to blame oneself than another; but
it is better to rise above all feeling, to be perfectly resigned
to what happens. So Epictetus concludes: "It is the part of
an uneducated person to blame others where he himself fares
ill; to blame himself is the part of one whose education has
begun; to blame neither another nor himself is the part of
one whose education is already complete." This is the
ultimate Stoic reconciliation with fate. Through it he felt
able to achieve a calmness and relaxation possible in no other
ethical system.
This completes our analysis of the nature of Stoicism.
Let us sum it up with four lines of Shakespeare, one of his
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finest and most moving passages, characteristically uttered by
a Roman general, Octavius Caesar. This is what he says to
his sister when her husband Antony abandons her for the
Serpent of the Nile. It is the Stoic consolation: let fate bring
what it must, and let it do so without complaint.
Be you not troubled with the time, which drives
O'er your content these strong necessities;
But let determined things to destiny
Hold unbewailed their way. 19
Now, having described what the Stoic ethical ideal is,
we must inquire what is its value. Does it mean anything to
us? Is it a way of life that we can accept and use in the
modern world? It is, without question. Indeed, the more
directly we face the world of the twentieth century, the more
evident it seems that only a Stoic attitude can enable us to
live in it. Professor Gilbert Murray once remarked that
Stoicism is a philosophy for times of oppression and the
decline of civilization; that is why it flourished in the late
Roman Empire. It has recently been driven home to us that
we must endure certain "strong necessities" whether we like
it or not. This fact is so obvious and immediate that we may
even tend to overrate the value of an ethic of stern, joyful
endurance. Let us, then, analyze as dispassionately as we can
its strength and its shortcomings.
At the outset Stoicism seems to have an initial advantage
over hedonism in its inherent nobility and dignity. We are
not instantly led to admire a hedonist; a real Stoic does arouse
admiration. Hedonism makes concessions to human weakness
and desire; Stoicism builds on human strength of will. When
a man is governing himself he generally appears noble and
admirable. The hedonist often admits this by envying the
Stoic; one often hears him say, "I wish I had your self-
control, but I guess it just isn't in me," He then consoles
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himself by deciding that it isn't really in human nature. The
Stoic must be a prodigy, no possible model for an ordinary
man. The Stoic answers that any worthy system of ethics
must be above the ordinary, and that he is merely endeavoring
to show what human nature can be at its best, which is when
it demonstrates mastery over circumstances. By the exertion
of his will, man can achieve dignity and self-respect in the
"high Roman fashion." "Every hour," said the Stoic emperor,
"make up thy mind sturdily as a Roman and a man to do
what thou hast in hand with scrupulous and unaffected
dignity and love of thy kind and independence and justice."
The appeal of this ideal is very great; the hedonist can offer
nothing so inspiring.
Stoicism has an even stronger personal advantage in that
its highest good need not exclude that of the hedonist, so that
it is not impossible to gain the benefits of both systems. The
fulfilment of duty often creates a happiness of its own. Far
from admitting that he is a martyr, the Stoic meets the
hedonist on his own ground by asserting that in the end
Stoicism leads to more happiness than the direct search does.
This is one evidence that the apparently opposite theories
have a paradoxical affinity. The hedonist, we observed,
usually finds something wrong with whatever pleasure he
attains. Perhaps the result would be better if he stopped
trying and concentrated on something else. It is well known
that the way to see a dim star is not to look straight at it, but
to look at one side of it. The Stoic emphasis on duty not
only distracts attention from pleasure, but may bring about
conditions in which happiness is more likely. For example,
if a man directly seeks pleasure by lying in bed all day,
dozing, and stuffing himself with food, he deteriorates so
rapidly as to be an easy prey to disease. If, through an effort
of will, he hardens himself by activity and exercise, he
probably experiences greater pleasure in the end. Likewise
the Stoic, toughened by self-control, is not easy prey to
emotional or neurotic disturbances.
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In another way, also, Stoicism may increase happiness:
it saves one from disappointment. The hedonist is easily
disillusioned, the Stoic seldom. He manifests an interesting
combination of universal optimism with personal pessimism.
What natural law brings about is for the best; the cycles of
universal change are good. But his own individual place
in this scheme is trifling; for the good of the whole he
probably must endure trouble. This being true, he expects
nothing; consequently any happiness that does come is pure
gain. We should not accept this reasoning, however, without
thinking about it. It is puzzling and rather tricky. We should
ask ourselves: to what extent can a Stoic be conscious of this
paradox and still remain a Stoic? If he undertakes voluntary
self-control with the feeling that happiness will result from it,
then, in aim and purpose, has he not become a hedonist?
In fact, the hedonist makes this very charge against the Stoic.
Though it occasionally may be true, it seems on the whole
unjust, for the distinction remains that the hedonist regards
happiness itself as the highest good, while the Stoic regards
it only as a possible by-product of doing one's duty.
Furthermore, aside from its personal advantages, Stoicism
usually leads to a better society than hedonism. Most of the
hedonists whom we met in the last chapter were anti-social:
the good of his country meant nothing to Falstaff. Only the
most exalted form of hedonism, known as "universal
hedonism," holds the happiness of the greatest number as its
ideal. The Stoics are more social in outlook. "What is a
man? a part of a state," said Epictetus; and natural law
brings about the smooth running of the whole machine
without regard to the happiness of any individual part.
When a man believes that duty is his highest good, he is more
likely to allow for the rights of others than when his ideal
is pleasure. To perform one's function well, to realize that
some things are not in one's control, and to comply gladly
with necessity are all social doctrines. And if the Stoic is
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more likely to sacrifice his personal profit or ambition for
the good of the group, then his value is not negligible in the
modern state. The hedonistic reaction that followed the
First World War was avenged by nature in the second one.
If civilization is to survive, it must achieve duty and
discipline. One way is by external force totalitarianism; a
better way is by inner self-discipline.
But before we all decide to become Stoics, we should be
aware that the system involves more than one serious
weakness. The reader should already be questioning one
detail. A code of ethics is an attempt to achieve a good life.
Is it not paradoxical and suspicious that this attempt falls
back on suicide as one of its tenets? This is almost an
admission of defeat. If you can attain a worth-while lite,
good; if not, you can die. Of course, death is advocated only
in extreme cases as a last resort. Yet to advise it at all is to
give away the whole game. Moreover, the analogy that
Epictetus gives in making this point is not an attractive one.
He compares the man who departs from life to the child who,
displeased by something in the game, says, "I won't play any
longer." But the I-won't-play attitude is not one that a
parent cultivates in a child. To pick up his marbles and go
home is an easy way out, but one which he is expected to
outgrow as he matures. What accounts for this defeatism in
Stoic ethics? Probably the fact, already noted, that it is a
code for times of difficulty and decay, one that may easily
slip into a counsel of desperation. All the more, then, it
needs to be examined critically.
For this last resort of suicide is not essential to the
system. It is possible to base one's conduct on Stoic principles
without even accepting it. The real weaknesses must be
sought in the ethic as a whole. In the first place, many people
are repelled and frightened by Stoicism. It's all right if you
are up to it, they say, but it's not human. They feel beaten
from the start. It seems to be a philosophy for a few people
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with strong wills and intrepid characters, a stern, forbidding
ideal with no allurement or motivating force. Holding out
no hope of ultimate victory, it merely urges one to endure
and welcome inevitable frustration.
Again, the rigid self-denial may easily turn into coldness
and lack of sympathy. If you are convinced that nothing
which happens to you is an evil just as long as you endure it
firmly, then you may come to believe that nothing which
befalls anyone else is an evil either; and you feel some
contempt if he does not endure it firmly. My friend's child
has died that is not an evil; he is grieving at the loss that
is an evil! One striking instance of this aspect of Stoicism
is given by Epictetus. It is well, he says, to hold everything
in life so lightly that you can at any time give it up without
regret. Take Hercules, for instance. He traveled rapidly
from one country to another, never bewailing the places or
the people he left. "He was even in the habit of marrying
when he saw fit, begetting children, and deserting his children
without either groaning or yearning for them." God will
provide for my children, says the noble Stoic; I can leave
them without sorrow. Epictetus does not discuss the matter
from the point of view of the abandoned wives. Doubtless
they should regard their husband's vagaries as part of natural
law and comply gladly with necessity.
It is conceivable, then, that the Stoic might come to
emphasize will power and control at the expense of everything
else; though such a result is not necessary, it is all too likely.
Strange as it may seem, this danger is illustrated in
Shakespeare's character of lago. lago is a villain, not a noble
Stoic, and Emperor Aurelius would be indignant at the
comparison. Nevertheless, so fair-minded a man would
ultimately concede that lago is essentially Stoic in two
fundamental elements of his character: his exaltation of
will power, and his reliance on natural law.
Throughout the play lago demonstrates his belief in the
will. He is cold and unemotional, with no understanding of
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weakness or the influence of affection in other people. He
believes that a man can do whatever he makes himself do.
No Stoic could disapprove when lago utters one of the most
inspiring of all exhortations to be captain of one's soul. He is
talking to the ingenuous, confiding young Venetian Roderigo,
who has boundless faith in lago as an older and cleverer man.
Roderigo has just suffered a sad blow in learning that Desde-
mona, with whom he thinks himself in love, has eloped with
Othello and is leaving the city. This is more than he can
endure. The hedonist, deprived of his pleasure, has nothing
left, and he disconsolately tells lago that the only prospect
now is to jump in the river. lago is contemptuous; this is
mere weakness, unworthy of a man. "Ere I would say I would
drown myself for the love of a guinea hen, I would change
my humanity with a baboon." Roderigo makes the usual
excuse: "What should I do? I confess it is my shame to be so
fond, but it is not in my virtue to amend it." The word virtue
here means not goodness, but innate character or essential
quality. In other words, Roderigo is saying that he cannot
help his actions because his character comes from his parents
or his environment he isn't responsible. Then lago answers:
Virtue? a fig! 'Tis in ourselves that we are thus or
thus. Our bodies are our gardens, to which the wills
are gardeners; so that if we will plant nettles or sow
lettuce, set hyssop and weed up thyme, supply it with
one gender of herbs or distract it with many either
to have it sterile with idleness or manured with in-
dustrywhy, the power and corrigible authority of
this lies in our wills.20
lago not only preaches control by the will, but practices
it too, as we see at the end of the play when he is captured
and his villainies exposed. Then he refuses to explain or
excuse himself; he makes no appeal for mercy; setting his
jaw he says, "From this time forth I never will speak word."
Evil though he is, this is Stoic will power; the trouble is that
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his self-control is turned to uses destructive of human values.
The other Stoic element in lago's character is his reli-
ance on natural law. To him the most obviously "natural"
law is the survival of the fittest. He feels nothing but puzzled
scorn for the honest average man who does his duty and gets
nowhere, the
;' duteous and knee-crooking knave
That, doting on his own obsequious bondage,
Wears out his time, much like his master's ass,
For naught but provender. . . .
Whip me such honest knaves!
Instead, he believes that nature favors the animal who kills
his enemy by force or guile, and the man who turns his
neighbor's scruples into a ladder for his own advancement.
Others there are
Who, trimm'd in forms and visages of duty,
Keep yet their hearts attending on themselves;
And, throwing but shows of service on their lords,
Do well thrive by them, and when they have
lin'd their coats,
Do themselves homage. These fellows have some soul.21
Though the indignant Stoic would repudiate this picture, he
would be left feeling slightly uneasy. lago is not a typical
Stoic. He is a distorted reflection of what Stoicism might
become if carried to certain extremesnot a fair example, but
a warning of danger.
There are, however, more fundamental questions to be
raised about the whole doctrine of complying with necessity.
First, we ought to be very sure that it is necessity before we
comply with it. Frequently some effort would enable us to
mitigate or overcome the evil circumstances; but the Stoic
doctrine is likely to emphasize the endurance of trouble rather
than the endeavor to oppose it. The danger is that this may
lead to passive acceptance of the status quo, to an ignoring
STOIC ENDURANCE 67
of the necessity of change. What is, must be, says the Stoic;
don't change it and don't lament about it. It is a doctrine of
endurance rather than amelioration. It gives one courage to
suffer toothache in patient silence; it often ignores the fact
that proper diet and dental care might prevent another
toothache. The hedonists, we noted, urge men to follow the
conventional moral code of their time in order to avoid the
pain of punishment; the Stoics urge the same thing, but on
the ground that this contemporary code is an existing fact of
the time, brought about by the natural law of the universe.
This seems too conservative a doctrine to give much hope of
being a lasting key to the good life. One illuminating sentence
of Epictetus reveals the weakness: "We ought not to cast out
poverty, but only our judgment about poverty, and so we
shall be serene." This is a devastating comment. What can't be
cured should be endured; but what can be cured, should be.
In the second place, the whole compliance doctrine is
specious and questionable. Reflection shows that it pretends
to give more than it can fulfil, and is really arguing in a
circle. It is disingenuous to hold out a promise of consolation
and then evade it by a rhetorical trick. The following conver-
sation will show the line of reasoning:
Stoic: You are not the plaything of fate, but can
achieve a good life by your faculty of will
power.
Disciple: But the human will is often powerless in
the face of necessity.
Stoic: Not so. Here is a way to guarantee that your
will can attain what it seeks.
Disciple: How can that be done?
Stoic: Will to have only what you can get!
This is what the matter really comes down to. It is like the
sure cure for potato-bugs advertized several years ago your
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money back if it does not work. The cure consisted of two
smooth blocks of wood, with the directions: Place the potato-
bug on one block and press firmly with the other. Of course
it can't fail. Nor can you fail to get what you want if you
want only what you can get. Meanwhile, the potato crop does
not thrive.
Finally, we must observe a more technical yet very impor-
tant weakness in Stoicism as a philosophy. Philosophy, we
said, must make as few assumptions as possible; yet the Stoic
makes a glaring one. The real center of his belief, the founda-
tion under the ideas of compliance, of internal control, of
performing one's function, is a trust in the majestic march
of natural law. To believe that everything he does and suffers
is an inescapable detail in the plan of beneficent natural law
is both noble and consoling. But it is based on the assumption
that natural law is beneficent and salutary for man. We hope
that it is; but what business has the Stoic to assume it, except
wishful thinking? It is unprovable either way, but it is one
point that makes many modern people unwilling to accept
Stoicism. Yet it is not a belief to be lightly discarded. Like
hedonism, it is a wholesome corrective of other systems, and
in some circumstances an admirable attitude toward life.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE RATIONAL IDEAL
IT MIGHT seem logical to call
our third ethical system "rationalism." But since that word
was later associated with a certain type of epistemology, it
will be convenient to use the term Socratic ethics, after its
earliest expounder. In brief, its assertion is that the highest
good springs from the intellect, and consists of a rational
balancing of all actions, feelings, and external phenomena
to produce a sense of total well-being. To the Socratic, man
differs from animals in his possession of an intellect, and his
highest good is the complete development of that distinction.
Man is the reasoning animal, and either to grasp pleasure
or grimly to endure nature's batterings is a failure to make
use of his native powers.
It is not that the Socratic rejects hedonism and a stoical
attitude; indeed, he prides himself somewhat on including
them both, purged of their irrational elements and harnessed
to the service of the mind. Some pleasures, and certainly
some happiness, must always be present in well-being; but
they are subject to the wise choice of the intellect, which
discards all that might not fit into the balanced outline of the
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good life. Some standard of duty must be followed, but a
rationally creative duty which understands and moulds its
environment, not merely a glad compliance with things as
they are. The Socratic, welcoming diverse sensations, voli-
tions, and experiences, has confidence that his mind can
organize them into a logical pattern. According to our earlier
description of a philosopher as a man who takes everything
into consideration, this inclusiveness appears to give Socratic
ethics an initial advantage.
The three Greek philosophers who exemplify this theory
can hardly be separated, but should be taken together as
emphasizing complementary parts of the same ethics. Differ-
ent as they are otherwise, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle agree
in their common trust in reason as the guide of life. The lives
of the three men overlapped: Socrates 469-399 B. C.; Plato
c 427-347; Aristotle 384-322. Plato was a friend and disciple of
Socrates, Aristotle a student in Plato's Academy. Plato to some
extent tried to modify and expand Socrates' views; Aristotle
did the same for Plato's. Socrates had great personal influence,
but wrote nothing; Plato was a combination of teacher, liter-
ary artist, and mathematician; Aristotle was a research
scientist who wrote with encyclopedic knowledge and unusual
clarity. Though he and his teacher differed so widely as to
lead to the remark that every man is born either a Platonist
or an Aristotelian, yet both of them combined with Socrates
to create the ethics of reason.
The dialogues of Plato are the best of all examples of
"philosophy in literature."
1 As philosophy, they discuss most
of the moral, social, and metaphysical problems which con-
fronted Athens and still confront Western civilization. As
literature, they comprise a series of plays about a great man
and his friends, plays ranging from a brief conversation with
an acquaintance on the street to an elaborate scene including
many characters and much action. With the actor Ion, Soc-
rates discusses the nature of poetic inspiration; with the
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formally devout Euthyphro, he questions the true relation
of men to gods; in prison two days before his death, he calmly
explains to his worried friend Crito why an escape would be
unreasonable. These are direct and simple dialogues. On the
other extreme are scenes like the Republic and the Sympos-
ium, not only involving a complicated interchange of views,
but even being narrated at second or third hand, as when
Aristodemus tells Appollodorus about the festivities at Aga-
thon's house, and Apollodorus then repeats the story to an
unnamed companion.
But whatever the setting, most of the dialogues truly
belong in the realm of imaginative literature. They are
vividly dramatic, filled with poetic images, concrete illustra-
tions, myths and stories of all kinds, tragedy and pathos,
satire and sly humor. They arouse abundant emotion not only
in such great scenes as that of Socrates' death, but in many
skillfully created situations to which the narrated dialogue is
especially adapted. For example, Phaedo recounts to his
friend Echecrates the last conversation of Socrates, an exciting
argument in which the advantage shifts frequently from one
side to the other, so that the reader is kept in suspense. But
Plato heightens the effect by having Echecrates wildly excited
about the outcome, fairly biting his nails as a telling blow
is delivered, and, when Phaedo admits to having been discon-
certed by an opposing argument, bursting out eagerly, "There
I feel with you by Heaven I do, Phaedo I . . . Tell me, I
implore you, how did Socrates proceed? . . . Did he calmly
meet the attack? Did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate
what passed as exactly as you can."
Especially do the dialogues excel in characterization, the
essence of literature. Through their pages walk individuals
and types of all kinds, young and old, politicians and sooth-
sayers, rhetoricians and revolutionists. Few are described,
but their words reveal what they are: the candid, naive
young Charmides; the conceited show-off Euthydemus; down-
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right, thick-headed old General Laches, who thinks instruct-
ing the youth in modern mechanized warfare a waste of
time; the "Dynamic men," roaring Thrasymachus and the
intelligent fascist Callicles; shrewd old Cephalus, who recol-
lects a previous engagement when the argument grows too
hot. All these are grouped around the outstanding figure of
Socrates, a portrait at once biographical and literary. No one
knows precisely how accurate Plato's account is; recent
scholarship has affirmed its probable truth both to the per-
sonality and to the ideas. But whatever the proportion, it
must contain both truth and fiction. As we examine Socratic
ethics in these dialogues, we shall regard Socrates as a complex
literary character, just as we did Falstaff.
Socrates' aim in life was a practical one. Loving his city
Athens and aware that its civilization was declining, he set
out to help it if he could by arousing it to its ignorance and
its danger. He worked to convince his fellow citizens that
only careful, accurate thinking could bring them well-being,
and especially to show them that hitherto they had reflected
not accurately, but vaguely and at random. He grew up in a
civilization just passing its prime, beginning to take its suc-
cess for granted and to grow overambitious, justly proud of
its greatness and unaware how soon its democracy would be
threatened from both without and within. With its class
struggle, its partial democracy, its dependence on foreign
trade and colonies, its failure to avoid war, its trust in science
and reason, and its attempt to achieve freedom without falling
into anarchy, it prefigured on a small scale both England and
America of the twentieth century. By becoming an imperial-
istic power with vassal states all around the Aegean, it
aroused the fear and rivalry of totalitarian Sparta, |who
gathered a league against it. Weakened by the death of its
leader Pericles, exhausted by the long war, and torn by
dissension among the landowners, the business men, and the
proletariat, Athens began to disintegrate and to alternate
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between mob rule and dictators. Meanwhile, again like the
modern world, it passed through a period of intellectual
eminence, a brilliant and skeptical age, with enough democ-
racy to promote free, educated discussion of everything and
enough uncertainty to necessitate reappraisal of the whole
basis of society.
This spirit of inquiry was to some extent stimulated by
the Sophists, a group of professional lecturers, traveling
teachers of public speaking and logic, whose services were
considered as valuable for the well-to-do youth as a college
course is today. Their avowed aim was ethical, their real one
prudential. They taught boys to be skillful debaters and
political winners, but hardly honest thinkers. They are re-
called by the word sophistry, which means plausible but in-
sincere or fallacious reasoning.
The surest way to insult Socrates was to associate him
with the Sophists. He was their lifelong opponent. Living
much of his life in poverty, like them gathering a group of
young men around him, he questioned every conventional
opinion, attacked the Sophists as rhetorical hairsplitters, beat
them at their own game, but insisted that he sought truth
rather than victory in debate. The politicians feared his
independence and his undermining influence; the pillars of
society suspected him because he taught their sons subversive
doctrines. After some of his friends were implicated in an
aristocratic pro-Spartan revolution (with which he did not
sympathize) , he was indicted for corrupting the youth and
worshipping strange gods, and in 399 was executed.
How does Plato, in his plays, characterize this small,
ugly, disturbing man? The best direct account of him is
given by his younger friend Alcibiades, who bursts into
Agathon's house during a party and tells the company what
he thinks of Socrates. The description is probably accurate,
both because Alcibiades is drunk enough to be outspoken
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and because he is giving unwilling testimony. Despite his
admiration of Socrates, he himself has chosen to live the life
of wealth, "honor," and political ambition which Socrates
always deprecated. We must believe him, therefore, when he
says, "He makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do,
neglecting the wants of my own soul .... He is the only
person who ever made me ashamed." We may also believe
his description of Socrates' appearance, which he compares
to a statue of Silenus the satyr, who was a stout, bald, puckish
old fellow, teacher to the wine-god Dionysus. No one could
help noticing so ugly a man, with his squat figure, his wide
mouth with its sly smile, and the disconcerting directness of
the gaze from his protruding eyes. Few who fell under his
spell could escape. Condemned to death, he found friends
ready to risk their positions and fortunes to get him away;
and Phaedo says, "Of all men of his time whom I have
known, he was the wisest and justest and best."
Plato emphasizes the paradox that Socrates was both
hedonist and Stoic, yet much more than either. He enjoyed
pleasure himself, as at Agathon's banquet, and never tried to
stifle it in others. He was no Puritan. In the Protagoras he
denies that sensual pleasures as such are evil; the evil appears
only if they cause pain later, but so far as they are pleasures
they are good. Yet, like the Stoic, he had control over his own
desires. Though he had no scruples against drinking, he could
drink or not, as he chose, and no one ever saw him drunk. He
toughened himself physically and morally. He excelled others
in enduring hunger, cold, and the fatigue of army life. He
would not yield to evil authority, but he calmly complied
with what seemed to him the necessity of imprisonment and
death. Both hedonists and Stoics consequently adduced his
character as authority for their theories.
He went beyond both, however, in his complete reliance
on reason. Emotion he regarded as carnal and temporal;
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reason as divine and eternal. In every argument, pleasure, or
danger, he trusted his intellect to govern his actions. The only
emotion he showed was a sly, sometimes fantastic humor,
which in any case was born of the mind. His sincere enthusi-
asms were intellectual. "Let me think this matter out," was
his instinctive reaction. So deeply did he concentrate that he
sometimes fell into fits of abstraction, which his friends
learned to ignore. A brief one occurred on the way to Aga-
thon's banquet, and once during a military campaign he was
oblivious to his surroundings for most of a day and night,
arousing the curiosity of the whole camp. When his friends
grew excited, he steadied them; when they acted at the dictate
of fear or desire or hatred, he tried to bring them back to the
rational level. He refused to introduce his wife and children
into court in order to make an emotional appeal. When he
awoke one morning in prison to find Crito beside him, agog
with excitement over a plan for escape, he said, "Crito; your
zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong, the greater the
zeal, the greater the danger .... For I am and always have
been one of those natures who must be guided by reason,
whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to
me the best."
The most emphatic example of this trust in reason occurs
in the Phaedo, at a moment when Socrates is hard pressed
and when the rival arguments seem to have canceled each
other out and reached a dead end. Here Socrates inserts a
warning to all young men. At such a time, when rationality
appears futile and self-contradictory, it is tempting to aban-
don the whole thing as a bad job and decide that one might
as well act on impulse. The person who yields to this tempta-
tion Socrates calls a "misologist," or hater of ideas, a word
formed on the analogy of "misanthropist," hater of men.
Both conditions are the natural result of disillusionment.
When a boy with little experience finds that one or two
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trusted friends are not perfect, he decides that all mankind
is untrustworthy. He blames the evil in human nature instead
of his own ignorance of how to deal with its varied qualities.
Likewise when an enthusiastic young debater finds that one
or two trusted arguments are not perfect, but are easily
refuted, he conceives a distrust of all argument. We recall, for
instance, that Omar Khayyam became a misologist in this
way. Socrates feels that such a condition is pathetic and a
little conceited. Don't blame reason, he says, if your ideas are
proved wrong; blame yourself for having failed to reason
correctly. "Let us then be careful of admitting into our souls
the notion that there is no health or soundness in any argu-
ments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to
soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully
to gain health of mind."
2
Typical of Socrates' emphasis on reason was his charac-
teristic way of teaching, known as the Socratic method. This
was neither lecturing nor recitation, but a special form of
the question-and-answer technique. Rational truth exists in
every man's mind, Socrates believed, if only it can be brought
out. The teacher's function is to dig for this truth among the
errors and irrelevancies of his pupil's thoughts, to bring it to
light, and to show the youth that it was really there all the
time. Like a modern psychiatrist, Socrates brought to the
surface things that the subject did not even suspect were in
his mind. In other words, he taught the pupil to "know
himself." More specifically, this excavation in search of truth
took the form of a series of shifting definitions. Most people
think at random, without defining their terms or examining
their premises. If only they would take a little trouble, they
might arrange their ideas in some clear order; and Socrates'
object was to stimulate them into taking the trouble. That
was what made him annoying. He was always asking, "What
do you mean by that?" always inserting a simple question that
upset everything, always saying, "Before I answer, let me first
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understand you/' In the Phaedrus he puts into the mouth of
an imaginary lover words typical of his own point of view:
All good counsel begins in the same way; a man
should know what he is advising about, or his counsel
will all come to naught. But people imagine that they
know about the nature of things, when they don't
know about them, and not having come to an
understanding at first because they think they know,
they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one
another and themselves.
In this process of definition the main difficulty was that each
interlocutor was convinced he knew what he was talking
about. By making him admit one small inconsistency after
another, Socrates led him to realize that all his ideas needed
revision. For example, they might start with some moral idea
such as courage, temperance, friendship, or piety. The oppo-
nent would postulate a definition: courage is never running
away from anything. By examining the consequences of this
definition, Socrates would always find it too narrow: even a
courageous man might run away from an avalanche, or might
feign flight in order to lure an enemy into a trap. Then a
new, more inclusive definition would be found, and again
tested and modified, until the result always turned out to be
some form of knowledge or wisdom: real courage is knowledge
of when to stand and when to run. The purpose of the whole
process was to start the opponent thinking for himself.
In describing his teacher's technique, Plato makes much
of the characteristic tone or attitude that Socrates adopted
toward his disputants, a tone which is called Socratic irony.
His object was to draw people out, to make them confidently
express ideas that he could tear down. To do this he assumed
a pose of ignorance, even helplessness. He knew nothing, he
said; wouldn't they please help him out of his difficulty? His
attitude was perplexed, eager to learn, almost openmouthed.
His objections were raised so modestly that no one could
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suspect them. He insisted slily that his friends, being so wise,
could enlighten him if only they would. Since Euthyphro, in
order to put himself right with the gods, has formally charged
his aged father with murder, he must know what piety really
is. Yet all his attempts to explain it have been shown to be
inadequate. Obviously, therefore, Euthyphro must be unwill-
ing to share his wisdom with poor ignorant Socrates come,
sir, please don't leave me in this uncertainty. The effect of
this on Euthyphro may be imagined.
The famous little questions are also examples of this
attitude. Protagoras, for instance, has just finished an effective
speech on the function of a Sophist in teaching virtue and
improving the State. Socrates stands dazzled by the great
rhetorician's brilliance. At last he says in awed tones, "O son
of Appollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having
brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of
Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no
human care could make men good; but I know better now.
Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that
Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so
much." Needless to say, the small difficulty disrupted most of
what Protagoras had said.
This ironic tone reaches a climax in Socrates' speech in
his own defence before the jury, when he turns its full force
on the pillars of Athenian society. The Delphic Oracle, he
reminds them, once said that no man in Athens was wiser
than Socrates. This, of course, was ridiculous, "for I know
that I have no wisdom, small or great." The oracle, as usual,
must have had a double meaning; and Socrates determined
to test it by seeking out a wiser man. Accordingly he ap-
proached a statesman with a simple question, only to find the
man's ideas in confusion; the same thing happened with a
poet, a teacher, and a general. Ultimately it dawned on
Socrates that the oracle was right: whereas others thought
themselves wise but were deceived, only Socrates realized his
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own ignorance. Thus, understanding himself better than the
others did, he was really wiser. The nice balance of true
modesty and underlying conceit in this attitude is evident.
If a reader feels that the Socratic method is often trivial
and the pose of ignorance disingenuous, he must remember
three considerations. One is that Socrates' purpose was nega-
tive as well as positive. He wanted to disseminate truth if he
could; but before he could do so he had to break down
prejudices of traditional morality, disturb men's minds,
agitate and even anger them, convince them that what they
had taken for thinking would not endure analysis as he
said, be a gadfly. Many of his questions, therefore, are intended
to be simply provocative, sometimes made tricky to stimulate
some young friend to detect the fallacy. For example, he
confronts the youthful Lysis with the following elementary
dilemma:
One who is a slave and can't do what he likes is not
happy;
Your parents love you and want you to be happy;
Nevertheless they will not let you do whatever you
like;
Therefore their attitude is contradictory.
Clearly this is no real dilemma. Not only is the major premise
untrue, but its application to the conclusion is shaky. But
Socrates did not mean it to be sound. What he wanted was
to startle Lysis into thinking about the problem of freedom
and restraint, to make him reason for himself that a boy may
be given freedom to do only what he understands in short,
that freedom depends on the maturing of wisdom. 3
In the second place, we must observe Socrates' reasoning
as contrasted with another type of dialectic fashionable at
the time and popular with some Sophists. The aim of this
eristic reasoning was victory, not truth; it set out to impress
the audience with its brilliance, to silence and baffle rather
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than convince an opponent; it tried to establish antinomies
or contradictory conclusions based on the same premise.
Against such a background, Socrates' arguments seem straight-
forward indeed. A well-known example of the quibbling
dialectic is Zeno's proof that a flying arrow cannot really be
moving, but only appears to be. The motion, said Zeno, must
take place either where the arrow is or where it is not. The
latter alternative is impossible, because an object cannot
exhibit any characteristics or perform any functions in a place
where it does not exist. But the former alternative is likewise
impossible, because the space where the arrow is is completely
filled by the arrow itself, allowing no room for motion.
Therefore the arrow cannot move at all. Again, in the dia-
logue Euthydemus, Plato has Socrates make fun of the eristics
who pride themselves on being able to silence anyone by
catching up the ambiguities in his words. If we are irritated
by Socrates' questioning of Lysis, what must we feel when
Euthydemus and his brother argue about a young man as
follows? If you are fond of this boy, you cannot really desire
to make him wise. For if he is not now wise, then you must
wish him to be no longer what he is now. But to be no longer
must mean to die, and you cannot sincerely want that! A little
contact with such argument must convince the reader how
reasonable Socrates' method is.
But the most important evidence of the soundness of
Socrates' trust in reason is the fact that, not content with
merely arguing, he actually governed his own conduct on
rational grounds. His choices were made after careful consid-
eration of all sides. We cannot escape this conclusion even if
we disagree with his decisions. This is the impression most
emphasized in Plato's picture of his trial, imprisonment, and
death in the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. Many times he
could have saved himself by being more tactful, by playing
on the feelings of the people, by agreeing to abandon his
public teachings in Athens. As a man of seventy, he could
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have considered his work finished and retirement his due.
Even his accusers did not want to inflict the death penalty.
But he forced them to face the issue they had raised. To
withdraw or recant seemed to him logically inconsistent with
his previous life. So he warned the Athenians that he would
continue to do what his reason told him was best for the city:
While I have life and strength I shall never cease
from the practice and teaching of philosophy, ex-
horting anyone whom I meet and saying to him
after my manner: You, my friend, a citizen of the
great and mighty and wise city of Athens, are you
not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of
money and honor and reputation, and caring so
little about wisdom and truth and the greatest im-
provement of the soul, which you never regard or
heed at all ? And if the person with whom I am
arguing says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave
him or let him go at once; but I proceed to interro-
gate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I
think that he has no virtue in him, but only says
that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the
greater, and overvaluing the less.
Instead of escaping, he reasoned with Crito that escape,
like recantation, would belie the doctrines he had already
taught, and still more the ideals his whole life had implied.
By living in Athens, he said, he had entered into a tacit com-
pact with the Athenian laws, which had provided him with
legitimate birth, education, and security of life. Even though
the laws now effect his death, he has no reasonable right to
undermine them by breaking the compact. If he fled to some
other city, how could he logically continue his teachings
there? And on the day of his death, almost in the act of
drinking the hemlock, he reasoned quietly that for a philoso-
pher to fear death is illogical, because the aim of his whole
life has been to escape the trammels of body into the realm
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of mind and soul. Death is merely the final consummation of
that escape.
So far we have been examining Socrates' particular type
of rational ethics by observing his own character as Plato
pictures it. Before proceeding, we should consider two possible
objections to this way of life. The first is that reliance on
reason may easily be transformed into a habit of rationalizing
one's actions. It is not too hard to find plausible reasons for
what we want to do, and to convince ourselves that this
process is the noble one of basing our conduct on the intellect.
Whether Socrates was guilty of this habit must be decided by
each reader for himself. Perhaps Socrates temperamentally
loved an argument, enjoyed the feeling of superiority aroused
by pointing out the confused thinking of his friends, and so
justified his desires by glorifying the life of the intellect.
Perhaps his real impulse at the end was to become a martyr
in order to feel self-satisfied and to increase his fame and
influence; if so, his appeal to reason was merely specious. We
have not enough evidence to be sure; probably his motives,
like most people's, were mixed.
But even if one can free himself of all rationalization,
there is a further objection to setting up reason as the highest
good. To do so picks out one element of human nature and
exalts it at the expense of others. Granted that it is nobler for
the Socratic to exalt the intellect than for the Cyrenaic to
exalt the senses, yet each omits some essential qualities in the
total organism. It is not possible for men to live by ratio-
cination alone; if it were possible, it might be unpleasantly
arid. Socrates was both admired and loved, but there are few
like him. Too often the totally rational man is as forbidding
as anything else totalitarian. Usually we cannot argue away
the senses and emotions. Either we fail, or we produce a
distorted personality. Here as in other cases the success of
the great man does not prove the universal value of his ethics.
The fact that Socrates arouses our admiration does not mean
that everyone should be like Socrates.
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While keeping in mind that no one has distinguished
the ideas of Socrates from those of Plato, we may now observe
two extensions of rational ethics more typically Platonic than
Socratic. The highest good became not only reason, but
absolute reason; and this ideal good was expanded to include
the state as well as the individual. Both these ideas have had
interesting reflections in later literature.
When knowledge or reliance on reason is mentioned, a
modern reader automatically thinks of the methods and
results of science; experiment, observation of phenomena, gen-
eralization, verifying and testing of results. This is not quite
what Plato meant. Though he was versed in mathematics, he
knew little of experimental science, and what he did know
he disliked. He has Socrates describe how, as a young man,
he had temporarily flirted with science, but had abandoned
it as too materialistic and as diverting his mind from real
knowledge. For real knowledge does not come from the senses
at all, but from mind alone, from pure cerebration. This
divergent view of knowledge has caused much enmity between
Platonic philosophy and modern science.4
To some extent, though not completely, the difference is
the same as that between inductive and deductive reasoning.
Induction starts with a number of concrete facts found to be
true by actual observation, and from them infers the truth of
a general statement. Deduction starts with a general state-
ment believed by the reasoner to be true, applies this idea to
a specific case, and infers the truth of a concrete statement.
It is almost impossible to use either of these methods alone.
Science always uses both, though we think of it as inductive.
For instance, by observation and experiment scientists induced
the generalization that yellow fever is always carried by the
stegomyia mosquito. Then, using this general statement as
the starting point, they deduced that (a) if X contracts yellow
fever, he must have been bitten by a stegomyia, and (b) if
every stegomyia in this village is destroyed, there will be no
yellow fever in the village. A scientific hypothesis is the end
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of an induction and the beginning of a deduction. Likewise
Plato uses both methods. When he observes that fathers send
their sons to a flute-player to learn music and to a rhetorician
to learn oratory, he concludes inductively that everyone is
best qualified to teach his own specialty. When he assumes
that the soul is the principle of life in the individual, he con-
cludes deductively that his own soul is immortal, because a
life principle cannot be thought of as dying.
Nevertheless, in the main, induction is the method of
science and deduction the method of Plato. The scientist trusts
the observation of his senses and suspects abstract generaliza-
tions. Plato was dubious about sense impressions, but confi-
dent in the results of abstract thinking based on what he
believed to be a few self-evident universal truths. To him,
truth existed in the mind, never .in the body or in matter.
After asserting that the soul is imprisoned in the body,
Socrates continues:
Philosophy, seeing how terrible was her confinement,
. . . received and gently comforted her and sought
to release her, pointing out that the eye and the ear
and the other senses are full of deception, and per-
suading her to retire from them, and abstain from
all the necessary use of them, and be gathered up
and collected into herself, bidding her trust in her-
self and her own pure apprehension of pure ex-
istence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her
through other channels and is subject to variation;
for such things are visible and tangible, but what
she sees in her own nature is intelligible and in-
visible.5
What does this have to do with ethics? It simply shows
that a modern scientist would probably have no unchanging
standard of good; if he placed knowledge as the highest good,
that knowledge would be relative to the time, place, and
environment. But Plato's good was not relative to anything;
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it was self-evident, eternal, true always and without exception.
It passed over into the abstract realm and became an abso-
lute. And so to understand this basis of rational ethics we
must travel one step into Plato's metaphysics.
According to Plato, the whole universe is made up, not
of objects like trees, planets, and people, not of elements like
air and water, but of ideas. What seems to consist of matter
really consists of something mental or non-material, of which
matter is only an external symbol. This is hard to apprehend,
because our habits of thinking lead us to assume that matter
is real, that seeing is believing. But everyone who has studied
psychology knows the convenient word concept, meaning a
general idea which includes in one unit a number of specific
sense-perceptions. Having perceived successively an orange, a
plum, a banana, and a strawberry, we tie the whole group
into one bundle by referring to them as fruit. Then small
concepts are united to form more inclusive ones: fruit plus
meat plus vegetables plus beverages make up the larger
concept food. In the field of conduct, numerous specific brave
actions fuse in the mind to form courage. It is our habit,
however, to regard concepts as conveniences for thinking, not
as real entities. For centuries during the Middle Ages a
conflict raged as to whether they existed or were merely
convenient names. But Plato, far from doubting their reality,
held that they were the only real things that did exist. In a
region of the mind, independent of time or space, ideas dwell
eternally without change, unaffected by anything that hap-
pens. They are the models, the archetypes; and what we call
things or events are merely faint and imperfect copies of
them. A man is courageous only inasmuch as he partakes of
or has a share in the idea of absolute courage. He becomes a
good speaker as he partakes more in the idea of absolute
eloquence.
Both as a proof and as an illustration of this theory Plato
uses his doctrine of recollection, which he may or may not
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have taken literally. The soul, being non-material, has a
permanent existence before birth and after death. Between
incarnations it exists in the realm of ideas, and of course is
there acquainted with the absolutes. At birth it forgets them,
but every sensory experience of life reminds it of them, just
as the sight of a portrait may remind us of a person whom
we formerly knew but have not thought of for years. The
portrait is not the person, but only an imperfect symbol of
him; had we never known the man, the portrait would have
little meaning for us. Similarly a round object may remind
the soul of the idea, perfect circle, with which it had been
familiar in the absolute realm; had it never known the idea,
it would have no standard with which to compare the sensory
object. Thus what we call learning is only being reminded of
what has been temporarily forgotten. The more we learn, the
more we can associate and unify our recollections into higher
and more inclusive concepts, until at last everything is joined
in the idea of absolute good, which comprehends the entire
universe. The highest ethical good, therefore, is not merely
the choice of one act or another by the use of reason, but the
living of a life dissociated from unreal things of sense and
based on the firm reality of ideas.
Most people, Plato knew, would never accept or even
understand this view. In The Republic he pictures the whole
situation in one of the most splendid of literary images, the
analogy of the cave. Imagine that all mankind live in a cave,
fastened so that they must always look toward the back wall
(which is smooth and white) and can never turn toward the
mouth of the cave. None of them has ever seen the world
above ground. Behind them near the entrance burns a fire,
and between it and the people is a raised walk along which
pass men and women carrying all sorts of objects. The fire
casts on the back wall shadows of these passers-by, and man-
kind can see nothing but these shadows. The sensations of life
become a sort of cinema thrown on the screen, and since
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people have no other experience of anything, they naturally
take the moving shadows for reality. Suppose, then, that one
of them should be released and taken out into the sunshine.
At first his eyes would be so dazzled that he could see nothing;
gradually he would perceive objects close to him, then hills
and clouds, finally the sun itself. If then he returned to the
cave he could see nothing at all, as one is blinded when he
enters a movie theater from a bright street. When the shadows
appeared again, he would realize their hollowness and would
pity those who mistook them for reality. But his friends would
not understand, and would deride him for having lost his
common sense while he was away. The meaning of this image
is clear and consistent. The shadows are ordinary sense impres-
sions, which we take to be real. The outer world is the realm
of absolutes, culminating in the sun, or absolute good, in
which all else merges. The released man is the philosopher,
who, having attained a glimpse of the world of ideas, tries in
vain to convince others of its existence and importance. So
vivid is this whole picture that it seems at first to prove
Plato's theory instead of merely illustrating it; we must not
forget that it is merely an interesting way of making the point
clear, an analogy and nothing more.
Plato's belief that the highest good may be written with
capital letters as an eternal entity outside transitory human
life, that the mind has been acquainted with this perfection
before birth, and that the soul is capable of apprehending
and moving toward it during life has fascinated philosophers
and poets ever since. They have praised, imitated, modified,
distorted, and expanded it with new imaginative applications.
By examining two echoes of it in Romantic poetry we may
understand something of its value and its weakness in the
hands of later writers. It may seem strange that so much
Platonic influence should appear in the Romantic movement,
which was partly a reaction against classical ideas and a
glorifying of emotion over intellect. But Plato's philosophy,
88 PHILOSOPHY IN LITERATURE
despite its basis in wisdom, actually stretches into a limitless
unknown in its reaching after ideas; the Republic is really a
city in the clouds; and absolutes are the very things to attract
Romantic poets like Shelley and Keats.
Percy Shelley was an appallingly enthusiastic Platonist,
filled with admiration for the Greek spirit and unconsciously
interpreting it to correspond to his own effervescent tempera-
ment. 6 Though highly emotional, he worshipped reason, and,
finding all contemporary human institutions unreasonable,
became a lifelong rebel. Hating tyranny more than anything
else, he pointed out that Plato had classified it as the lowest
and most unhappy state of society. But his alternative for
tyranny was a form of anarchy, which he forgot that Plato
had opposed almost as vigorously as he had tyranny. 7 He was
a "perfectibilian," longing for the ideal state, ideal love and
beauty, despairing of their existence in the real world and
envisioning them always as "something afar from the sphere
of our sorrow/'8 Forgetting that Plato had given explicit
practical directions for achieving justice in the state, and
remembering only his acknowledgment that the perfect state
existed nowhere on earth but only as a pattern in heaven,
Shelley located his Utopias on some flowery western island
or "Pinnacled deep in the intense inane." His naive reaction
to Plato's theory of recollection is shown by an incident of
his younger days. On the road one day he met a woman
carrying a small baby. Taking the child in his arms, he
eagerly inquired the answers to some questions of philosophy,
and pleaded with the baby not to conceal these truths which
it must know from recollections of its pre-existence. What a
pity, he concluded sadly, that only inability to talk prevents
an infant from solving all human problems 1 What Plato said,
we remember, was that the soul at birth forgets all its previous
knowledge of reality; Shelley in his excitement missed the
point.
Especially interesting is Shelley's reaction to Plato's
theory of absolutes, which he adapted to fit his own tempera-
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mental love of extremes. There was no middle ground for
Shelley. His acquaintances were either angels or demons, his
world either hopeless tyranny or imminent Utopia. He urged
no practical program of reform that might gain one advantage
by giving up another, but a sweeping revolution trying for
all or nothing. Half a loaf was repugnant to him; compromise
was cowardice. He must have absolute perfection which, he
said, was also Plato's ideal. Of course he was mistaken. By
absolutes Plato did not mean extremes, but simply eternally
existing non-material forms or models for the sensory world.
He himself pointed out that if any good is carried too far it
becomes less good, and the whole implication of Socratic
ethics was opposed to the Shelleian temper. But the result
appears in Shelley's treatment of the Prometheus myth.
According to the original story, part of which was dramatized
by Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound, the Titan Prometheus was
the only one who knew a secret of the Fates that Zeus would
be overthrown by his own offspring just as he had conquered
his father Kronos. 9 When Prometheus stole fire from heaven,
Zeus seized the opportunity to chain him to a mountain and
offer his release as a price for revealing the secret. Prometheus
accepted the bargain, established Zeus permanently in power,
and used his freedom to help mankind by teaching them the
arts. Thus he sacrificed his opposition to tyranny for the sake
of a moderate advantage. Shelley, however, would have none
of this compromise. He represents both Prometheus and man-
kind as enduring misery and bondage for thousands of years,
until the sudden overthrow of Zeus brings perfect romantic
freedom into the world. Then nothing is left to do, and
Prometheus, instead of making any use of his new freedom,
retires forever to a vine-covered bower in the Orient while all
nature sings exultantly of the Utopia. In this way Platonic
absolutes were mistranslated into Romantic extremes.
Another Romantic poet, however, made better use of them.
Though he had even keener senses and deeper emotions,
John Keats possessed also a clear mind and more essential
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Platonic wisdom than Shelley. In his short writing life of five
years he matured from a mere recorder of disorganized sensa-
tions to a poet of depth and insight. He too sought the
absolute, at first symbolically by recounting Endymion's con-
fused quest for the moon-goddess Cynthia, later in his odes
with a direct appreciation of what Plato really meant. The
point, as Keats saw it, was this: surrounded by the shifting
and bewildering flux of their experience, most people feel the
need of something firm and lasting that can be trusted not to
flow away from under them something that remains in all
circumstances true. Many never find it. Some attain it in
religion, some in science or philosophy, others in art. This
fundamental human need was what Plato was trying to satisfy.
To see how Keats reached the same goal, let us examine his
Ode on a Grecian Urn. Fusing in his imagination several
Greek vases which he had seen in the British Museum, he
describes an urn perfect in the grace of its form and the
beauty of its paintings. As he turns it about, he sees painted
on its sides a Bacchic revel, with satyrs pursuing nymphs into
the forest, a flute-player sitting under a tree, a pair of lovers
about to kiss, and a group of villagers sacrificing at an altar.
What impresses him is that each picture has taken a moment
of active life and immortalized it. Here is the musician,
playing just as he did two thousand years ago. To be sure,
in the process life has lost its sensory quality; no one can hear
the flutist's music, and the lovers cannot enjoy a real embrace.
In fact, life seems to have sacrificed all its reality. But in
recompense it has gained eternity: the girl's beauty can never
fade, the boy's ardor never cool. And this is a higher and
more satisfying reality than the life of the senses, which lasts
only a day. This love, frozen in marble, is better than real
love:
All breathing human passion far above,
That leaves a heart high sorrowful and cloyed,
A burning forehead and a parching tongue.
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Thus Keats finds an absolute when he discovers that what the
vase says to later generations is "Beauty is Truth"; it is truth
because it is changeless and reliable, not dependent on the
senses, transcending the world of phenomena just as Plato's
non-material ideas transcended the world of shadows. The
transformation of philosophy into poetry is complete when
Keats calls the vase an eternally "unravishcd bride," a being
in a magical way consummate and yet virginal. Though Plato
disapproved of poets in his ideal commonwealth, he might
have allowed Keats to live there.
The second element we shall consider in Plato's literary
influence concerns this ideal commonwealth. It is not neces-
sary to re-analyze the Republic; that has been done enough.
Only one point concerning the series of Utopias which that
book has fathered needs to be examined. Most of them have
attempted to outline ideally rational societies. But in course
of time a curious change has come over their attitude toward
reason and the intellect, until recently they have begun to
question whether a social system based primarily on reason
would, after all, be desirable. In connection with this have
come changes in their interpretation of what reason is. This
process may be briefly traced.
In The Republic, Plato describes a state which, though
difficult of attainment, is not meant to be impossibly visionary.
With careful planning and a good deal of luck, he thought,
it might come about, at least for a time. Once, with mis-
givings, he tried it out on the young tyiant Dionysius II of
Syracuse; but nothing came of that attempt, and Plato
resumed his duties as a college president.
The ultimate aim of the discussion in The Republic is
to answer a question of personal ethics: what is justice? To
throw light on this, Socrates first explains what justice is in
society, as one might learn a sentence in large letters before
deciphering it in small ones. In both cases justice is the same:
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namely, a harmonious co-operation of parts. In the indi-
vidual, such co-operation occurs when the desires and the
aggressive will are under the control of the intellect; in the
state, when the uneducated masses and the ambitious career
men are organized and controlled by an intellectual aristoc-
racy. To show this, he analyzes at length his whole society.
That it involves a typically Platonic reliance on reason is
shown by three of its major elements.
First, Plato divides his citizens into three classes: artisans,
who produce commodities and carry on trade; administrators,
who execute the laws and defend the city; rulers, who legislate
and make all major decisions of public welfare. And the crux
of the whole system lies in the fact that the rulers are chosen,
not for wealth or military glory or power or vote-getting
ability or popularity, but exclusively for brains and the
willingness to use them.
Second, the keystone of the whole structure is education.
Never has such trust been expressed in the ability of rulers
to transmit knowledge and logical method to the next genera-
tion, and never has the period of education been so prolonged
or so intense. A young man judged a worthy candidate for
ruler must undergo a training period lasting forty years.
Only then is he qualified to govern the state.
Finally, this training for rulers goes beyond that of the
administrators in that it culminates in a knowledge of
absolutes. Mere administrators do not need such knowledge.
It is enough that they imbibe the traditional morality of the
state, and be taught loyalty to its customs. But rulers must
know the fundamental reasons for that morality. Through
study of mathematics and dialectic they must enter the world
of ideas, come out of the cave into the sunlight, and base
their legislation on abstract reason.
It is at this point, vital to Plato's thinking, that the
subsequent changes appeared. For, here as elsewhere, reason
to Plato meant abstract reasoning from axioms, deduction
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from accepted generalizations. It meant mathematics, not
science. As soon as it trusted the evidence of its senses, it was
false to itself. In modern times, however, reason has come to
be associated more and more closely with science, reasoning
about society is now called social science, and a good state is
often assumed to be one which takes fullest advantage of
scientific progress. This new interpretation has affected the
modern Utopias. Some of them exalt science as a higher and
more hopeful use of reason than Plato dreamed of; others
attack it as a perilous distortion of true reason.
The first of the Renaissance imitations of Plato, Sir
Thomas More's Utopia in 1516, came too early to concern
itself with the new science. But in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries the divergence in point of view toward
science had already appeared. The highest confidence in its
value was expressed by Francis Bacon, one of the earliest
practitioners and popularizers of the inductive method. In
1622 he published a fragmentary Utopia called The New
Atlantis, which was the first to substitute a scientist-king for
Plato's philosopher-king and to assert that a state could
prosper best by giving free rein to the scientific method. The
country described is a small island in the south Pacific,
unknown to the world but familiar with the progress of other
countries through groups of observers sent out every twelve
years to inspect them. After a brief and rather disconnected
account of the laws, organization, customs, and characteristics
of the inhabitants, Bacon spends about a third of the book
on their most important institution, the House of Salomon,
or College of the Six Days' Work, really the governing force
of the country. It amounts to a research foundation: a group
of scholars trained to carry on every kind of physical and
biological experiment, some of which Bacon knew and others
imagined in the distant future. The purpose of the College is
"the knowledge of causes and secret motions of things, and
the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting
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of all things possible." To this end their equipment is elabo-
rate, including caves for refrigeration, towers for meteorology,
animals for breeding and dissection, kitchens for experiments
in nutrition, pharmacies and "chambers of health," optical
and sound laboratories, and engine-houses for experiment on
machines. The personnel is divided into those who experi-
ment, those who record results, and those who apply them
to the enrichment of life. Though the book breaks off before
we are shown examples of what the House of Salomon could
accomplish, we are led to believe that its influence is thor-
oughly beneficent and effective, and that if science can have
its way all will be well.
This confidence is not shared by Jonathan Swift, who
wrote a century later, after Bacon's imaginary foundation had
been partly actualized in the English Royal Society. Put the
scientists in control, says Swift, and the world will go insane.
Such a world he describes in Book III of Gulliver's Travels,
in which that sensible explorer, by now almost beyond
surprise, visits the flying island of Laputa and mainland of
Balnibarbi underneath. In Laputa dwell the intellectual
aristocracy, absorbed in the study of mathematics and music-
two of Plato's favorite subjects. The heads of these thinkers
are bent by cerebral weight at right angles to their bodies.
Each man is so immersed in thought that he is accompanied
by a servant called a flapper, who, by tapping him on the
mouth and ears with a bulb filled with pebbles, arouses him
temporarily to awareness of mundane events. Since their
mathematics is too abstract to be applied in practice, their
houses are misshapen and their surveying clumsy. In this
instance, then, abstract scientists make sadly incompetent
rulers, and it is little wonder that after staying a few days on
the island, Gulliver is "very desirous to leave it, being heartily
weary of these people."
But worse awaits him in Balnibarbi, where science and
invention are really put into practice. Here the satire is two-
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fold: partly on innovation for its own sake, mostly on the
absurdities of scientific invention. Forty years before, the
country has had a "scientific revolution," since when every-
thing has been done in a new and more complicated way.
For example, one nobleman formerly had an efficient water-
mill in a river valley near his home. The Progressive Scientists
now urge him to destroy it and build another half way up a
mountain, run by water that is pumped at great expense to an
even higher level; the theory is that, as the water now runs
down a steep slope, it will take only half the amount to turn
the mill at the same rate. Idiotic as it is, this is so suggestive
of certain modern projects as to leave the reader uncomfort-
able. Gulliver is most interested, however, in the Grand
Academy of the country, a foundation with aims similar to
those of the House of Salomon, but organized as an insane
asylum, a fact promptly revealed by Gulliver's mention of the
warden. Here the inventors work at their projects: extracting
sunbeams from cucumbers; building houses from the roof
down as the bee does; training spiders to produce silk, tinted
by feeding them colored flies; or producing thought by means
of a mechanism that shifts words about like a kaleidoscope
until by chance a coherent sentence emerges. At this point
Gulliver remarks quietly, "I saw nothing in this country that
could invite me to a longer continuance."
Evidently neither Bacon nor Swift had any real grounds
for his point of view, since both wrote before science had
advanced far enough for them to understand it. Yet the same
clash of opinion persists to this day among creators of imagin-
ary societies. Once more let us look at two examples.
The case for science is convincingly set forth in H. G.
Wells's A Modern Utopia, a long essay in slightly novelized
form describing what science can do to bring perfection. The
essence of the Platonic society still remains: political authority
is vested in the intellectual leaders, now not philosophers but
research men in all fields, organized into a ruling class called
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Samurai or voluntary nobility. Membership in the Samurai is
open to anyone who has a college degree, some original
achievement in his field, good health, no desire for wealth,
and no asocial habits. 10 Under these administrators the popu-
lation is divided into four classes, resembling Plato's in that
they are not hereditary but flexible: (1) the Poietic or crea-
tive, who keep the race evolving by making new discoveries
in art and science; (2) the Kinetic or active, the backbone of
society who, though incapable of discovery, exhibit energy
and intelligence in carrying on the world's work professional
men, merchants, artisans, housewives; (3) the Dull, who are
stupid and incompetent, but amenable to discipline; (4) the
Base, or antisocial persons who lack the moral sense these
are segregated from society on islands.
Unlike all earlier Utopias from Plato's down, Wells's does
not envisage a small, isolated country as its locale, but insists
that science has now made impossible any social unit smaller
than the world. All races are equalized, war is abolished, and
there is swift, easy transportation to every part of the globe,
with all citizens encouraged to travel. The machine age has
emerged from its era of dirt and ugliness into beauty. Every-
thing is attractively streamlined, machines are works of art,
factories are segregated from cities, and all advertising is
forbidden. The economics in vogue is a modified communism,
with the state owning land, natural resources, and all indus-
tries, and the individual owning such close personal property
as clothes and books, but leasing for life intermediate products
like automobiles, radios, and furniture. Nothing can be
inherited. World trade is carried on by means of energy units
based on what each section has produced in the past year.
Poverty is abolished by having the state guarantee to every
citizen a minimum wage, beyond which he may either enjoy
leisure or earn more, as he wishes. With automatic state insur-
ance against illness and old age, there is no temptation to
save. Population is regulated by strict eugenic laws and by
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payment of the regular state wage to mothers, their job being
the equal of any other. All this, it will be agreed, is thoroughly
scientific, quite according to reason, and mostly incongruous
with the facts of human nature.
Conscious of the dangers involved, Wells takes pains to
deprecate excessive rigidity and the destruction of individual
initiative. He provides for the Poietic class. He would retain
all possible freedom, limiting it just enough to prevent
aggression. He would leave room for dissenters and critics,
who are free as long as they hurt no one, and whose sugges-
tions are, if possible, used. Yet all this amounts to little more
than an assertion that, in his state, science would avoid
excessive regimentation. The reader must ask, why would it?
Developments since the book was written have indicated that,
once the ideal of efficiency controls a state, it is likely on the
one hand to become an efficiency directed exclusively toward
making war, and on the other to engulf the individual and
deny that he has any separate importance. In fact, many
elements in modern society exhibit a distorted parody of the
Wellsian Utopia.
In 1932, the year before the Nazi state was established,
such a parody appeared in literary form in Aldous Huxley's
Brave New World, which pictures the ultimate in scientific
states with an irony so effective that some readers took it
seriously. Few modern satires can equal the devastating
impact of this one; no amount of argument could demonstrate
so clearly what might happen to the Platonic-scientific society
gone wrong. It is pertinent to our discussion of Socratic ethics
because it shows what can result from an exclusive reliance
on reason. The time is approximately A. D. 2500. Huxley
explains that, when civilization nearly blew itself to pieces in
the Nine Years' War, it became obvious that human emotions
had caused the catastrophe: fear, greed, and lust for power
must vanish if humanity was to endure. As a last hope, science
stepped in to create a rational world-state of absolute stability
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and uniformity, based on the worship of machine technology.
By the time of the story this technology is symbolized in Henry
Ford, founder of mass production with interchangeable parts.
Instead of A. D. 2500, we have A. F. 632. A noble is called
His Fordship, a judge the Ford Chancellor, and the proper
exclamation is "Good Ford, no!" By simply cutting off the
tops, all crosses have become T's (commemorating the Model
T) , so that one may now speak of Charing-T Station. And
this worship, far from being lip-service, is the basis of the
whole social structure.
The theory is simple. Human beings were unhappy
because they had feelings and aspirations. Because science
now possesses the technique of controlling those feelings, men
need no longer be unhappy, any more than cars on the pro-
duction lines. Science can regularize life by means of a
conditioning process beginning before birth. Indeed, vivi-
parous birth is unscientific; better develop the embryos in a
blood-surrogate bath, of which the chemical constituents will
partly determine the character. After the baby is taken out
of (not off) the bottle, he is conditioned throughout child-
hood by hypnopaedia or sleep-teaching. From a radio outlet
near the head of the bed proceeds, all night long, a series of
low-toned sentences which penetrate the sleeping brain with
suggestions about being contented in one's class of society.
These classes are no longer flexible (that would be unscien-
tific) , but from the time the infant is decanted are fixed in
five groups, Alpha to Epsilon. Alphas are administrators,
Epsilons unskilled laborers; but both are so adjusted that
neither would exchange places with the other. If by some
mischance anyone does become discouraged, science provides
for that too; he takes a dose of sorna, a new drug having the
combined effect of alcohol and opium with no hangover. If,
even amidst such perfection, a few heretics do arise who
demand the right to have feelings, even the right to be
unhappy, they need cause no concern, since the trouble sprang
from an unfortunate error in mixing their blood-surrogate.
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This book must be read; no brief description can reflect
its sardonic power. Plato would repudiate its inclusion in his
chapter. "This merely proves my point/* he would say. "Here
is what happens when you abandon philosophy for science,
deduction for induction, ideas for empirical information."
True as this is, it does not refute Huxley. For Plato advocated
an ethic based on reason, and Huxley's exaggeration merely
shows that man cannot achieve well-being by reason exclus-
ively; to be human he must be irrational at times, have
unhappiness as well as pleasure. Brave New World is a thor-
oughgoing attack on ultra-rational ethics, Platonic and
modern. Moreover, Plato cannot reject science; for as philoso-
phy does its work, it inevitably passes over into science. As
soon as a new realm is conquered, explained, rendered
intelligible, science annexes it while philosophy proceeds to
new unknown territory. Any assertion that reason or philoso-
phy is supreme leads in the end to the admission that science
is supreme; and that belief, carried to its ultimate conclusion,
leads to a brave new world.
The phrase "carried to its ultimate conclusion" brings
us to Aristotle and his modification of Socratic ethics; for it is
a phrase to which he would object and through which he
would attack what we have been saying. In Aristotelian ethics,
to carry anything to its ultimate conclusion is to ruin it.
Though he starts where Plato does and agrees with many of
his conclusions, yet in certain important respects he diverges
from his old teacher. By examining these differences we can
better understand rational ethics and can see how it may be
adapted to other points of view.
Born in 384, just after Plato founded the Academy,
Aristotle was not an Athenian but a Thracian. His father was
physician to the King of Macedonia, at which court Aristotle
met young Prince Philip. After doing brilliant work at the
Academy, he traveled for several years gathering scientific
materials. He wrote books covering every known field of
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knowledge. Like Plato, he founded and administered a school;
he tried unsuccessfully to educate a philosopher-king, when
he became tutor to Philip's thirteen-year-old son Alexander;
and he exalted reason. But the two differed in temperament
and habitual outlook. Despite his admiration for Plato,
Aristotle considered him too much the impractical idealist,
satisfied with nothing less than perfection. He himself was a
believer in common sense, in more matter-of-fact reasoning,
in practical compromise. These qualities are evident in his
Nichomachean Ethics.
The initial assumption is identical with Plato's. The
Highest Good springs from the intellect, and is well-being or
happiness based on rational choice. Aristotle calls it "an
activity of the soul in accordance with reason," emphasizing
mental energy in contrast to a mere life of sensation. So
thoroughly does he uphold reason that he doubts whether
very young men can study ethics effectively, because they are
too emotional. "Knowledge is as useless to such a person as it
is to an intemperate person. But where the desires and actions
of people are regulated by reason, the knowledge of these
subjects will be extremely valuable." Plato was impressed by
the eagerness of youth for ideals of perfection; Aristotle
insists more on the value of maturity. Both make the highest
good attainable through reason.
In two important ways, however, Aristotle objects to the
Platonic theory. First, he regards the notion of absolutes as
satisfactory for metaphysics but too vague and impractical
for ethics, and likely to lead the reasoner to extremes.11
Secondly, he denies that knowledge alone is enough for virtue.
Socrates had insisted that if a man had real knowledge as to
which of two courses was the better, he would always choose
the better rather than the worse that no man voluntarily and
knowingly does evil. This Aristotle considers psychologically
questionable. To know is not enough; we must do. On these
objections are based his two main additions to Socratic ethics,
the first better known, but the second more important.
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The famous one is the doctrine of the Golden Mean,
stated explicitly by Aristotle but characteristic of Greek
literature long before him. It appeals to almost everyone as
a simple and obvious answer to ethical questions. Clearly a
person's health will be impaired if he eats either too much or
too little; likewise his moral health will suffer if he allows too
much or too little of any quality to enter his habitual actions.
Therefore virtue aways turns out to be a mean or midpoint
between extremes. For example, the quality of courage is not
an ideal of absolute fearlessness, but a halfway point between
one extreme of nervous agitation and another of foolish and
reckless disregard of safety. The truly courageous man is a
sane, poised, experienced person who avoids both rashness
and amorousness. Though he does not profess to be free of
fear, he has developed the habit of disregarding fear in the
proper circumstances. The exact midpoint, of course, is hard
to find, and Aristotle reiterates that there is nothing absolute
about it, that it varies with the individual and the situation,
and that no one can attain it except through years of experi-
ment. This standard is attractive to students who pride
themselves on being realistic and hard-headed; unlike most
counsels of perfection, it seems to have no nonsense about it.
The idea will be clearer if we examine a few of the
many specific virtues with which Aristotle illustrates it, each
one a mean between extremes. One extreme is prodigality or
wasteful spending; its opposite is miserliness; the virtue some-
where between them is liberality, or moderate generosity.
Between irascibility and dull passivity is equanimity, that
controlled self-respect characteristic of the man who is neither
a firecracker nor a doormat. Friendliness, the main social
virtue, avoids both flattery and moroseness; the good friend
is neither a yes-man nor a constant fault-finder. An interesting
minor virtue is wit. Its excess is buffoonery or ribaldry, which
grows tiresome; its defect is unbending seriousness. The mean
is to be quietly humorous, tactfully, with, good taste, at the
right time. Most typical of Aristotle is magnanimity: a mag-
102 PHILOSOPHY IN LITERATURE
nanimous man is one who, "being really worthy, estimates his
own worth highly." If he estimates it too high, he is guilty
of vanity; if too low, of humilityboth undesirable.
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All this may look easy, but we should be under no such
illusion. Finding the mean suitable to an individual is hard
enough; acting on it is harder still. The law of inertia leads us
to keep moving in the same direction, probably to an extreme.
The good is a small, finite area in the middle, while evil is
infinite in both directions. All about us lie spacious oppor-
tunities for being rash or timorous; the tiny realm of real
courage between them is hard to delimit. Furthermore, since
the practitioners of both extremes are hostile, not only to
each other, but also to people who do not go as far as they
do, the virtuous moderate man is opposed from both sides.
He encounters not merely evil, but two evils. The daredevil
calls the courageous man a coward; the coward calls him
rash. The familiar plight of the liberal in modern society is an
example; while the communist regards him as a reactionary,
the conservative calls him a Red.
The Golden Mean, however, is only one of Aristotle's
ethical contributions. The second one is an even more notable
correction of Plato. Virtue is knowledge, said Socrates. Yes,
answers Aristotle, but knowledge alone is not enough to
produce it. The excessive drinker may know that a little
milder indulgence would prolong his life; but his drinking
has become so habitual that he either does it without thinking
or decides that the present pleasure is worth the price. The
unscrupulous business man may have knowledge that he is
lowering the general welfare when he deceives the public
by using shoddy material or intimidates employes by a black-
list; yet his knowledge fails to change his actions, because he
has always done things that way, everyone else does the same,
and he wants his profits. Reason will not make anyone good,
unless he spends years practicing what his reason advises him.
Just as in physical processes, teaching must be put into
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practice until a habit is formed. Virtue, then, is not knowl-
edge, but is a habit created by long practice of actions based
on knowledge.
Aristotle even adds the opinion that no one can really
be virtuous until his right actions are habitual. As long as
he needs to reason out difficult choices, his virtue is not quite
trustworthy. After sufficient experiment, he should move auto-
matically to his own proper midpoint between every pair of
extremes, and never wish to be anywhere else. A test of one's
moral reactions, therefore, is as follows: First, pick out an
action generally admitted to be virtuous, and perform it. If
pleasure follows the performance, your habit of virtue is
strong; if pain or discontent follows, the habit is weak. This
point of view contrasts with both hedonism and Stoicism.
The hedonist says: do that which causes pleasure. The, Stoic
says: endure that which causes pain. Aristotle says: practice
until you are able to gain pleasure from actions that are
otherwise right. Thus it appears that, to Aristotle, the main
purpose of both education and laws is to give people practice
in good habits.
It seems ungrateful even to raise questions about so attrac-
tively reasonable a system. It is a friendly ethic, demanding
not perfection but only reasonable control. More adapted to
the common man and the workaday world than either
Platonic or Stoic ideals, it is still on a much higher plane than
hedonism. By insistence on training and habit it creates
defences against human weakness and prepares one to meet
emergencies. And yet the very students who at first welcome
Aristotle's Golden Mean often come to view it with misgiving.
They realize first that there is danger in falling into unchang-
ing habits, even of virtue. To do so results in a stiffening of
the moral joints, a kind of automatism, a surrender of man's
cherished power to keep his decisions free and flexible. Often,
they observe, a spontaneously generous act is prevented or
denounced because people are inured in habits of virtue.
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Next they raise the logical objection that it is possible to go to
an extreme even in following the Golden Meanl Some
emergencies, if they are to be met rightly, demand excess.
For example, if a baby walks into the street toward an
approaching car, I ought to run toward the baby with
extreme, not moderate, speed; if I have schooled myself too
long in habits of deliberation, the car will arrive before I do.
Again, the question arises whether the system is really as
inclusive as it looks. May not the moderate man simply lose
the value existing in both extremes? As Dr. Johnson remarked,
"There are goods so opposed that we cannot seize both, but
by too much prudence may pass between them at too great a
distance to reach either." Sensible though it may be, the whole
idea is too cautious and pedestrian, too much like reducing
life to a mathematical formula. Like the printer Aslaksen in
Ibsen's An Enemy of the People, the Aristotelian seems to
have only two choices open to him: he may act with (a)
discreet moderation or (b) moderate discretion.
Eventually we realize that what we think of the Golden
Mean depends on who follows it, and how he does so. As we
noted once before, the value of an ethical standard often
depends on the character who adopts it, not the character on
the standard. An apt, though doubtless unintentional, illus-
tration is furnished by a pair of characters in Hamlet. The
old politician Polonius and the young student Horatio both
admire the Golden Mean. Polonius' rule of life is "don't go
too far." He warns his daughter to be circumspect in dealing
with princes, and instructs his confidential servant to spy on
Laertes by dropping slanderous hints as bait for his friends
but, mind you, "none so rank as would dishonor him; take
heed of that." He admonishes Laertes himself to make a
moderate number of friends, to dress well but not gaudily,
to avoid both silence and garrulity. Similarly Horatio is of a
steady, middle-of-the-road temperament which is contrasted
to Hamlet's rapid alternations of excitement and depression.
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Hamlet admires his friend's balance and wishes that he him-
self could be one "whose blood and judgment are so well
commingled" that is, whose emotion and reason are so
equally mixed. Nevertheless, despite this apparent agreement
in the Golden Mean, Horatio and Polonius are as unlike as
could be imagined. Hamlet respects the one and despises the
other. Polonius is an over-cautious busybody, a shifty and
time-serving political opportunist whose habits of compromise
are fossilized. In him the Golden Mean has become brass.
But in Horatio it keeps all its attractiveness because it integ-
rates his personality. Quietly and carefully, never losing his
head or getting excited, he tries to steer the explosive Hamlet
through his tumultuous problems, calming his excitement and
tactfully stimulating his inertia. He even exemplifies Aris-
totle's virtue of moderate wit, in his combination of grave
reliability with a warm, never-failing sense of humor. The
man of extremes pays tribute to the Mean when Hamlet says
impulsively:
Horatio, thou art e'en as just a man
As e'er my conversation cop'd withal.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE PITFALLS OF CHRISTIANITY
WE approach the fourth ethical
system, some disclaimer seems advisable. The intent of this
chapter is not to analyze Christianity once again, but to
examine a few varied pictures of it that have appeared in
literature, and to see whether they throw any light on the
strong and weak points of the ethic. We should not forget
that Christianity is the hardest of the four theories to regard
objectively, partly because it is more involved with emotion
than the others, chiefly because it is bound up with the
personal habits and adolescent experiences of almost everyone.
It is not hard to detach ourselves from hedonism, Stoicism,
or Socratic ethics and to weigh their respective merits; but it
is hard to allow for a subconscious mental set, whether positive
or negative, toward Christianity. Some people associate it
with happily remembered church experiences, loving parents,
or admired teachers; others react strongly against theological
dogmas, harsh moral restrictions, or the hypocrisy of society.
Either state of mind militates against a fair discussion.
Authorities argue even over whether there is such a thing
as Christian ethics apart from the Christian religion. Natur-
ally the two cannot be completely separated, but for our
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purposes we shall assume that the moral teachings of Christ
are complete in themselves and can be studied in comparison
with the three other systems already considered. This relation
has been previously outlined, when we said that the highest
good of Christianity springs not from the senses, the will, or
the intellect, but primarily from emotion, and that it seeks
the ideal of love or benevolence. Christ summed this up in
his admonition to love your neighbor as yourself, a neighbor
being defined as any other human being.
We should remember, however, that this involves, not a
rejection of the previous systems, but rather a shift of empha-
sis and an addition to them. Christianity is rightly proud of
its inclusion of many elements in Greek ethics. Hedonistic
pleasure or happiness, now called the abundant life, is one
reward of a life of perfect love. Stoic duty, now righteousness,
is as important as ever, though differently motivated. Socratic
wisdom is kept as the rational basis necessary to prevent
emotion from going to excess, and becomes a view of society
as a system of mutually dependent parts, "members of one
another/' among which voluntary co-operation is essential to
keep them from disruption. The specific Christian addition
to all these lies in its point of view toward emotion. The
Cyrenaics gave way to their emotions. The Epicureans fled
from the emotions to avoid pain. The Stoics repressed
emotions. Plato put them under the control of reason.
Aristotle trained them by practice. But Christianity was the
first to recognize the power of emotions for good. Plato and
Aristotle both somewhat lacked motive power, both tried to
find something to induce a person to perform what his reason
told him was right. This is supplied in Christian love, the
active good will which leads one to help others, not because
it is his duty or because he has completed a train of argument,
but because he wants to.
Of the moral systems we have considered, Christianity is
the only one fundamentally associated with a specific religious
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belief, and therefore with the church whose members hold
that belief. Consequently an attempt to estimate its value
always gets involved with a critique of the Christian Church
as such. Though unfortunate, this fact is not irrelevant, for
from it spring part of the strength and much of the weakness
of Christian ethics. Let us see how it resulted in a dilemma.
Christianity started with a metaphysical belief that the
substance and the motive power ot the universe is love.
Whereas Plato had asserted that reality is composed of ideas,
Jesus taught that God is love; in other words, Christianity
subsituted an emotional for an intellectual metaphysic.
The belief that the essence of reality is a benevolent feeling
provided a powerful new motive for good action; God loves
us, and we must correspondingly love others. The difficulty
was that such a view of the world was hard to reconcile with
the facts. By sending us undeserved misfortune, God often
acts as if he did not love us after all; and in the world most
people do not love others enough to let that feeling govern
their actions. For this reason it was necessary at the very
outset to reinforce the Christian motive by belittling the
value of man's present life on earth and making it a mere
testing ground for eternal life later. That shift of emphasis
marks the most characteristic difference between classical and
medieval thinking. Probably more than any other one factor,
it helped keep civilization alive during the Dark Ages. It
apparently solved Christianity's initial difficulty: for now
God's love was exhibited, not by His treatment of human
beings during their lifetime, but by the reward they might
anticipate in heaven, a reward justly proportioned to their
faith and virtues on earth. And this fortified Christian ethics
by providing it with the powerful new motive of desire for
that reward and endeavor to be worthy of it. Thus sinewed,
Christianity conquered the world.
As often happens, however, the solution engendered the
seeds of new and worse difficulties. For one thing, it under-
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mined the original basis of Christian ethics, the doctrine that
action must be governed by love of God and one's fellow men
and nothing else. The hope of a reward in heaven, however
it may be rationalized, is a hedonistic motive; the emphasis
on life eternal inserted an element of self-interest which,
though indispensable in curbing the excesses of a barbaric
society, was inconsistent with Christianity. Still worse, the
solution produced a disturbing corollary, emerging from a
particular folklore and appealing widely to popular imagina-
tion. To postulate a heaven of reward at once made necessary
a hell of punishment otherwise why strive for the reward?
To make heaven more desirable, it was set off against its
opposite; and the vivid medieval imagination ran wild in
picturing the tortures of the damned. At least three bad
results followed. First, God was again demoted from being a
power of love to one of punishment, a change which reams
of medieval dialectic sought to justify. Second, the change
introduced as a motive for action not only self-interest, but
also fear; and, potent as fear may be in deterring men from
evil, it has seemed to many people essentially non-Christian.
Third, the emphasis on hell introduced an opportunity to
rationalize the hatred and resentment which are suppressed
but not killed by the constant necessity of loving one's neigh-
bor. Since by definition Christianity seeks to foster desirable
emotions, it runs the risk of simultaneously arousing undesir-
able ones which it finds hard to control.
It may be said that these ideas of heaven and hell are
mere excrescences on Christianity, irrelevant to its central
ethical teaching. Possibly they are; Christian writers disagree
on the question. At any rate they have been taught by the
majority of Christian sects, and are an ever-present possibility
in the ethic. Their emergence illustrates the main point of
the present chapter, which is that Christianity, more than
other ethical systems, is subject to distortions and vagaries,
and yet, paradoxically, that this very danger is one source of
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its strength. No basis of action could be more slippery and
undependable than emotion. At any moment it may turn
itself inside out. Love goes hand in hand with hatred, humility
reverses itself to pride, asceticism is a mask for lust, forgive-
ness becomes the worst form of revenge. Into one or more of
these pitfalls Christianity has frequently fallen. Yet, as
happened to Joseph during his three-day sojourn in the pit,
Christianity has generally emerged the better for the experi-
ence. We may now examine three of these special dangers as
they are reflected in literature.
The first one has already been mentioned as the danger
inherent in the notion of heaven and hell. Of these realms
we can learn by consulting the one man who visited both of
them, and purgatory into the bargain: Dante Alighieri. This
will be less presumptuous than it seems if we are careful to
distinguish between Dante as an artist and his poem as an
illustration of ethics. In splendor of poetic imagination, The
Divine Comedy is unsurpassed in the Middle Ages; its very
vividness accentuates the danger with which we are concerned.
For modern readers the poem is difficult because of its
complicated symbolism and because it is filled with contempo-
rary allusions that necessitate constant reference to footnotes.
A brief summary of its background and structure may there-
fore be helpful.
1 Like many great works of literature, it
appeared just after the highest point of an era, at the proper
time to sum up and crystalli/e the thought of its age. In the
thirteenth cei tury many medieval institutions reached their
climax and began imperceptibly to be undermined by forces
which led to the Renaissance. In that century lived Innocent
III, the most powerful Pope; Richard Coeur-dc-Lion, the most
picturesque Crusader; and Thomas Aquinas, the most com-
prehensive theologian. The universities were established, the
various orders of Friars appeared on the European scene, the
Empire and the Papacy pursued their bitter quarrel, and the
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first precursor of the Renaissance arrived in the person of the
Italian artist Cimabue. Dante lived from 1256 to 1321, and
wrote The Divine Comedy in the last decade of his life. To
him his native city of Florence, as well as the European
civilization surrounding it, seemed corrupt and decadent.
Florence had tainted its original, simple Roman purity with
foreign blood and evil manners. The two world rulers, Pope
and Emperor, were not only at sword's points with each other,
but were false to their high responsibility of governing
respectively the spiritual and the temporal life of mankind.
On every side the wicked flourished, so strongly that in 1302
Dante's political enemies, backed by the venal Pope Boniface
VIII, were able to exile him forever from Florence. If any
justice existed, it must be not in this world but in eternity.
Yet Dante believed that it did exist; he had faith in an
abstract moral order, a Christianized version of Plato's abso-
lute good, which fortified him in his embittered wanderings.
Moreover, in his mind was an incarnation of this moral
perfection. Twice in his life he had seen the lady whom he
calls Beatrice: once when she was nine years old, again when
she was eighteen and married. After that he idealized her
as a symbol of perfect goodness, wrote for her a series of
poems called Vita Nuova, and promised therein to praise her
as no other woman was ever praised. This promise he fulfills
in The Divine Comedy by placing her next to the Virgin
Mary in heaven and symbolizing her as Christian Theology,
his guide and sponsor in paradise.
The Divine Comedy has so many overlapping meanings
that a thorough understanding of it requires long study. We
shall disregard most of its elaborate symbolism, its panorama
of social and political life, and much of its theology; our
purpose is to examine it as a picture of Christian ethics. In
outline, of course, it recounts Dante's journey, guided by
Virgil and Beatrice, through hell and purgatory to the pin-
nacle of heaven; on the way it defines by explanation and
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example what Christian goodness and badness are. In a letter
to his patron, Can Grande della Scala, Dante wrote, "The
subject of the whole work, taken merely in its literal sense,
is the state of souls after death. But if the work is understood
in its allegorical intention, the subject of it is man, according
as, by his deserts and demerits in the use of his free will, he is
justly open to rewards and punishments." What are these
deserts and demerits, and what is their effect on a man's soul?
The events of the journey which answer this question are
meant to be at the same time factual and allegorical; we must
try not to stress either of these aspects at the expense of the
other.
The setting of the poem is nothing less than the universe.
According to the Ptolemaic astronomy which Dante followed,
the spherical earth is motionless in the center of things.
Around it are placed seven concentric spheres, made of trans-
parent material and revolving from west to east at varying
speeds; around these is an eighth sphere, also transparent but
having no movement of its own; and finally comes a ninth
opaque sphere called the "Original Mover," which revolves
rapidly from east to west, carrying all the others with it by a
kind of magnetic attraction. In the first seven spheres are
embedded the sun, moon, and five planets, whose motions
are accounted for by the interaction of forces between their
own spheres and the Original Mover. In the eighth sphere
are the fixed stars. Surrounding this whole structure is a
spiritual realm called the Empyrean, where dwell God and
the angels. Long ago, just after the earth was created, the
angel Lucifer, impelled by pride, revolted against God and
was hurled down from the Empyrean through the nine spheres
to the earth; there his velocity was great enough to drive
him down to the very center, where he stuck fast. This projec-
tile of evil excavated a huge crater on one side of the earth,
and forced up a correspondingly large mountain on the
opposite side. The cone-shaped crater is hell; the mountain
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is purgatory; the revolving spheres are heaven, culminating
in the Empyrean. These are the three main divisions of
Dante's journey.
Each division is an elaborately organized realm embody-
ing the logical results of every shade of human conduct. Dante
takes pains to avoid merely arbitrary punishment and reward
by showing that certain courses of action produce correspond-
ing states of mind, which in turn lead to a final existence
inevitably fitted to the soul in question. The unrepentant
sinners in hell have never extricated their minds from
worldly desires; therefore they would not like heaven if they
were in it, and are inherently adapted to the suffering of
hell. In purgatory the repentant sinners welcome their tortures
willingly, because only through suffering can they learn to
appreciate heaven by harmonizing their wills with God's will.
This the blessed souls in heaven have achieved; they are
integrated, perfectly adjusted to the happiness of God's
universe, and at peace.
A reader of the Inferno is impressed by the beautiful
logic of its structure, with numberless details fitting into the
general plan. It consists of nine concentric circles or terraces,
winding around the conical pit toward the center ot the earth.
In each circle dwells a certain type of sinner.
2 Two of them,
Numbers 1 and 6, are reserved for the technical sins of
paganism and heresy. In Number 1 (Limbo) are good pagans
who, being unbaptized, suffer from unforgiven "original sin,"
and whose only punishment is an unfulfilled desire to enter
heaven. In Number 6 (the City of Dis) are the heretics who,
having heard divine truth, nevertheless reject it. The other
seven circles include three main types of sinners, according
as they have allowed one of the three faculties of the mind to
become distorted and rule their actions. These faculties are
desire, will, and reason. If animal desire gains control, then
the person commits sins of incontinence and is punished in
the second, third, fourth, or fifth circle. Here Dante sees the
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following: Number 2, the lustful or carnal sinners; Number
3, the gluttons; Number 4, the misers and spendthrifts, both
lacking restraint; Number 5, those who could not contrbl
their tempers. These sinners hurt themselves more than they
hurt others. If, however, the combative will gets out of hand
and leads to acts of aggression such as murder, then the soul
sinks to Circle Number 7, the home of doers of violence.
Finally, if the reason itself is distorted against the will of God,
the most human quality is turned to anti-human uses, and
the resulting sins of fraud or deception are punished in the
eighth and ninth circles.
Two or three examples will show Dante's attempt to
make the punishments logical. The carnal sinners in Circle 2
are those who have sacrificed all other phases of life for the
sake of sexual pleasure. In punishment, each pair of lovers,
clasped in an eternal embrace, is whirled to and fro by the
wind. This is doubly symbolic. The wind is the power of
passion to which they surrendered themselves on earth. The
embrace is the consummation which the lovers thought they
wanted more than a life of Christian service; but now,
eternally prolonged, it becomes intolerable. As another
illustration, in one chasm of the eighth circle appear the
hypocrites, walking forward forever bent down by the weight
of their cloaks, which are shining gold on the outside but
made of thick lead within. The most pertinent example of
all is the ninth circle, for those guilty of treacherous fraud,
or guile against someone who trusted them. Since hell is
traditionally associated with fire, we might expect the flames
to be hottest in this region. On the contrary, the whole circle
is a frozen lake, with the souls embedded in the ice; for by
their deeds they have shown that all human feeling is frozen
in them, and all Christian love congealed. The coldness of
their own hearts has created its inevitable environment.
While the punishments of hell are eternal, those of
purgatory last only long enough to reburnish a sinful but
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repentant character that honestly desires to achieve Christian
love. Again the painful moral exercises are carefully fitted to
the sins. For example, souls repenting of their pride must
bow their stubborn necks under the weight of huge stones.
This they do willingly, just as a proud person, wishing to
cure himself of his arrogance, might undergo humiliating
experiences or subject himself to ridicule. These proud souls
regret only that they cannot support still heavier weights and
so proceed to heaven more quickly.
Hell is a downward slope, purgatory a mountain to be
climbed; for it is easier to slip into sin than to extricate oneself
from it. On the mountain are seven cornices or ledges, corre-
sponding to the seven deadly sins, and each representing a
lapse from perfect Christian love. The result, as usual in
Dante, is a methodical and inclusive outline, as follows:
If the love is distorted, we have
1. Pridelove of oneself
2. Envy sullenness at another's good fortune
3. Anger appetite for vengeance
If the love is weak or defective, we have
4. Sloth lack of proper enthusiasm for heavenly things
If the love is excessive toward things that are good in
moderation we have
5. Avarice love of money
6. Gluttony love of food and drink
7. Lust love of sexual pleasure
Here the worst sin comes at the beginning, which is farthest
from heaven; and the slope, at first steep, grows gentler as
Dante approaches the top. When he has completed the climb,
he enters the Earthly Paradise, the garden where man lived
until he sinned. At this point Virgil (human reason) departs;
henceforth Dante's guide is Beatrice (religious faith) , who
has descended for this purpose from her abode beside the
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Virgin Mary. Though reason can lead one toward heaven,
only faith can enter it. Drawn upward by the love of God,
Dante and Beatrice ascend through the celestial spheres to
the Empyrean.
Although most critics rightly regard the Paradiso as the
climax of Dante's imaginative splendor, it is somewhat less
interesting than the first two parts, both because it involves
some long discussions of theological dogma, and because
complete goodness is always harder to portray than a human
mixture of good and evil. The blessed souls are classified by
type in the nine spheres, just as are those in the circles of hell
and the cornices of purgatory. But there is a difference.
Whereas in the former realms there is a distinction in the
amount and severity of the punishment, in heaven there is
no variation in happiness. Denizens of Sphere 3 experience the
same contentment as those of Sphere 8, because each is so
perfectly adjusted to his environment that all desire has
ceased. In his final vision of the Empyrean, Dante refers to
God as "the limit where all wishes end." After this momentary
glimpse of divine perfection, Dante ends the poem suddenly,
with no attempt to trace his return to earth.
Turning now from summary to judgment, let us consider
the ethical implications of Dante's universe. Our object is not
to criticize The Divine Comedy as a literary work; in range
and detail of imagination, it is one of the greatest poems ever
written. But this fact does not prevent it from containing
certain ethical weaknesses which illustrate the dangers of the
Christian system, and which should be examined with care
and sympathy. To be fair to the poem, we must try to under-
stand its author's intention, so as not to interpret it too
literally and yet not regard it as wholly divorced from reality.
Presumably a poem of this sort may be understood in three
ways: as literal fact, as symbolic fact, or as pure allegory. The
first point of view, however, we may discard; no one would
regard the poem as a description of actual detailed rewards
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and punishments taking place after death. The scenes of the
poem are certainly symbolic; the question is, to what extent?
Did Dante regard them as entirely allegorical, meaning that
human souls are so moulded by their own moral qualities
that some are enmeshed and tortured by sin, others working
painfully to conquer their selfish impulses, and still others
integrated by discovering the will of God and adapting their
own wills to it? Or did he view them as partially symbolic,
representing not the detailed but the essential fate of souls
after death by showing how the inner nature of a soul creates
its own eternal environment?
Dante's own statement on the question, though not con-
clusive, leans toward this latter interpretation, a mixture of
allegory and fact. In the letter to his patron, he implies that
the poem has both a literal and an allegorical intention. From
either point of view The Divine Comedy is a beautifully
logical framework. But if we examine the ethical implications
of both, we find that they are in the one case ineffective, and
in the other, questionable.
If the poem is regarded as allegorical rather than factual,
then it loses some of its ethical effectiveness, because it takes
Christianity back to its original dilemma and discards all the
motivation furnished by the shift of emphasis from this life to
the next. If post-mortem rewards and punishment are merely
figures of speech, they are poetically interesting rather than
morally forceful; and they avail little in convincing people of
the presence of a loving God or the possibility of human love
being widespread enough to create a successful society.
Besides this general difficulty, two specific questions
appear in this interpretation of the poem. The first is that the
allegory is inconsistent about free will. Dante's pictures of
evil continually imply that sin is a form of slavery, slavery to
bad habits, and that the goal of moral effort is to achieve
freedom by extricating oneself from such habits. Yet his
pictures of heaven demonstrate that virtue means a complete
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absorption in the will of God and a consequent cessation ot
effort. This is another kind of slavery a better kind, it is
true, but no more essentially free. A cruel dictatorship is bad,
a benevolent dictatorship is better, but neither one is democ-
racy. When Dante visits the sphere of the moon, he asks the
spirit of Piccarda Donati whether she does not desire to
become even better so that she might rise to a higher sphere,
nearer to the love of God. Piccarda deprecates the idea,
explaining that "God makes us will only what we possess, and
nothing beyond .... It is inherent in this state of blessedness
to keep ourselvs within the Divine Will," and summing up in
the famous line: "And in His Will is our tranquillity." This
is beautiful; but it is also a relinquishment of moral initiative.
Further evidence is found in Dante's conversation with a
composite eagle made up of the souls of just ruleis in the
sphere of Jupiter. He asks them a question that has troubled
him since he passed through Limbo, where he found the
souls of good pagans: What justice is there in excluding from
heaven persons who wish to go there, are worthy of it, and
are prevented only by the accident of having been born before
Christ? The souls reply that this question shows Dante's in-
sufficient deference to God's will. It is true that human reason
can see no justice in such a decree; nevertheless we must
assume its fairness, because God has ordered it, and because
the Bible says that God is justl Circular reasoning of this sort
is ruinous of Christian ethics because it condones an obviously
non-loving act by advocating a blind absorption in something
we assume to be perfect. Thus easily is an ethic of freedom
distorted into one of slavery.
The second question is a consequence of the first. What
is the moral effect of the "absorption principle"? Too often it
turns out to be self-defeating, subversive of the real Christian
a'm of a society based on sympathetic good will. The saved
souls in heaven, integrated and morally satisfied, absorbed in
their own fruition, become ethically sterile because they have
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lost touch with humanity and therefore have no sympathy or
sorrow toward sinners. When Beatrice descends to Limbo to
instruct Virgil how to be Dante's guide, she remarks apropos
of the fact that being in hell causes her no uneasiness, "I am
made by God so that no pity of your misery touches me."
Dante, however, is less fortunate. Seeing the painfully racked
soothsayers in the eighth circle of hell, he weeps for pity.
Virgil rebukes him, because such pity implies disapproval of
God's justice: "Who is more criminal than one who feels
emotion against a Divine judgment?" Yet, strangely enough,
this emotion of pity for suffering is one which Christianity
particularly fosters. Thus, treated as an allegory, the poem
loses ethical effectiveness.
If, on the other hand, it is interpreted as symbolic or
semi-literal fact, reflecting some kind of immortality governed
somehow by what a person has done morally, then it is more
effective, but also more questionable as an illustration of
Christian ethics. To many people it is repugnant, not only as
false to the ethical ideal of Christianity, but as ethically harm-
ful by any standard. Hardly Christian are its emphasis on
motives like fear and vengeance; the fact that many of the
punishments, such as those for gluttony and for bad temper,
are unfairly great for the crimes; and especially its lack of
sympathetic love shown in the fact that it disregards complex
personalities and punishes any unrepented sin. For example,
the admitted virtues of the Florentine philosopher and states-
man Brunette Latini count for nothing; he is condemned to
the seventh circle of hell on the sole ground that he was
homosexual.
It is not only by Christian principles, moreover, that the
system is questionable. The essential difficulty lies in the fact
that it regards both good and evil as fixed after death.
Whether in heaven or in hell, though existence goes on,
initiative is gone. Even purgatory is motivated by the desire to
reach the static perfection of heaven. And from the standpoint
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of ethics this cancellation of initiative has serious conse-
quences. Punishment continued forever, with no chance for
reform, is useless to anyone except for revenge. And even as a
bait or a lure for sinners, it is questionable what moral good
can be found in an eternal frozen perfection, an inactive
absorption in absolute motionless tranquillity a torm of
death rather than eternal life.
We have now examined one of the pitfalls that beset
Christian ethics. The second one is a psychological difficulty
based on the familiar fact that strong emotions tend to reverse
themselves by a subconscious mental process. Sincere Christian
love involves humility and self-denial, forgiveness and sacrifice.
Yet the farther these qualities are stretched, the more likely
they are to rebound like an elastic band. Many self-sacrificing
Christians have been startled to discover how proud they are
of their self-sacrifice and how much pitying contempt they
feel for their more selfish neighbors. Many forgiving Christians
are perplexed because the neighbors whom they forgive seem
to find that fact a special reason for disliking them. Love has
an affinity for hatred, asceticism for lust, forgiveness for
revenge.
To illustrate these obvious facts, we turn from Dante's
famous poem to a little-known modern book called The Re-
turn of the Hero by the Irish author Darrell Figgis. Though
it has never been a best seller and is now hard to obtain,
everyone who is privileged to read it falls under its spell.
8 In
his style, Figgis has an unusual gift for combining terseness
and humor with imaginative beauty. His touch is light and
sure, his mood always on the borderline between mockery and
sincere feeling, his sentences often epigrammatic. "To flatter
and to abuse," he writes, "it is all one; for it is the one kind of
man that is capable of both." Again: "To die is good, and can
never be done again, but to regret is to be sick many times."
And again, for the barb: "Merchants are people who stretch
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their hand between the standing corn and the empty belly till
they have first built a house with a different room to sleep in
for each night of the year."
The material of this story is an episode from the series
of Irish legends known as the Fenian Cycle, recounting the
adventures of the hero Finn or Fingal, a third-century
chieftain of a warrior band. These are known through a
number of ballads supposedly sung by the bard Oisin or
Ossian, Finn's son. After Finn was finally defeated and killed
in battle, Oisin was transported by Niamh the Beautiful to
the fairyland of Tir-na-nOg, where he remained for two
hundred years. Then, lured by memories of his home and his
friends, the Fianna, he was allowed to return to Ireland on
condition that he must never touch the earth. All went well
until his saddle-girth broke and he put his foot to the ground
to keep from falling; then the beautiful hero was transformed
into an incredibly old man. In Tir-na-nOg time had passed so
swiftly that he had been unconscious of it, and now the
changes which two centuries had effected in Ireland filled
him with dismay. Not only had the Fianna disappeared and
the inhabitants shrunk to the size of pigmies, but a strange
new faith had entered the land. For during his absence St.
Patrick had arrived in Ireland, and Christianity had replaced
the old pagan ethics.
In the ballads Oisin is a defiant, contemptuous pagan,
and Patrick a stupid fanatic. But Figgis portrays both as
sincere, intelligent, and attractive men, honestly admiring each
other but separated by the gulf of two centuries of history.
Most of the book is a confrontation of paganism and Chris-
tianity as Patrick strives to convert the hero and Oisin
scrutinizes the strange religion to find what is good and bad
in it. Both are treated fairly; Figgis reserves his hatred for the
group of narrow and petty bishops who surround Patrick and
whose constant interference destroys the possibility of a
mutual understanding. It is this distortion of Christianity that
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the book attacks, and it is men like the severe Iserninus and
the zealous Auxilius who illustrate the psychological reversal
referred to above. Acquaintance with them under Oisin's
steady gaze makes the reader uneasily aware of the peculiar
dangers to which Christianity is subject.
For example, they all preach the doctrine of forgiveness
and think they practice it. Yet in them it is warped into such
an instrument of malice that they would have been ethically
better had they never heard of this Christian idea. Better in
Oisin's mind would have been a wiping of the slate by a clean
revenge and a new start. He soon has an experience of how
forgiveness works. Soichell, the steward of Patrick's household,
brings him every morning a breakfast of "stirabout and whey-
water," which at first Oisin accepts courteously, but against
which his heroic appetite shortly revolts. When Soichell
implies that a desire for food is of the flesh and a sign of
wickedness, Oisin claps the bowl of stirabout on his head and
propels him out of the room at dizzying speed. The next
evening Soichell, looking pious and self-satisfied, brings his
supper and then announces: "I forgive you, O Oisin, for
lifting your foot against me."
Oisin remarks that people should tell the truth, and,
when Soichell looks puzzled, utters this pointed critique of
the forgiveness-revenge confusion: "It seems to me that you
do not forgive me at all. If you did, you would act as if that
little scene had never occurred. Instead of this, you come to
be revenged on me by seeking to assert a superiority over me.
To say that you forgive me is to exult over me, and to exult
over me is to be revenged on me. ... I will not permit myself
to be debased by your humility. I will not be enslaved by your
meekness."
Forgiveness, however, is a minor instance of such
distortion. Figgis goes on to unmask the shams in the bishops'
asceticism and humility, showing them as over-compensations
for lust and pride; he has Oisin make a kind of psychiatric
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diagnosis. When Oisin tells of his idyllic life in Tir-na-nOg
with the lady Niamh, both Auxilius and Iserninus are
shocked, and hint that he should have had a chaperon. "The
desires of the body," they say, "are devils that must be choked
back into their lair. By the grace of God alone can this be
done." And with a faint smile Oisin answers: "Perhaps the
devils you create of old and simple things may be choked in
the lair; but they will not be killed they are too old and they
are too young. They are eternal as birth and renewal. They
will come out again; but they will come out cold and lean
and cruel toward men. I did not think of that before, but I
see that it is so now." And he "looked at Iserninus in a
significant way that caused the pale episcopal face to be
covered with the faintest flush of anger."
Most significant of all is the passage describing the vision
which each churchman has during the night of wakefulness
and prayer that precedes the great debate between Patrick and
Oisin. These visions reveal the subconscious desires of the
bishops. Iserninus, for example, whose Christian humility is
a mask for his pride, sees God sitting on a Great White
Throne, attired as a bishop, with a severe, cruel face like
Iserninus' own; and this God, who is himself, finds satisfaction
in casting Oisin into hell. But Patrick, the true Christian, sees
God as the sun breaking through the clouds over the eastern
horizon, a light-hringer to the earth and an awakener of all
men, Christian or pagan, to good actions. As for Oisin, he
slept sweetly all night; consequently he was refreshed the next
morning when the others were tired and confused.
At the climax of the book, Christianity is defeated by the
same sad element in it which we analyzed in Dante: the
inconsistency between an ethic of love and a religion of hell.
Patrick, outvoted three to two by the Council of Bishops, is
forced to tell Oisin that God has condemned Finn to eternal
torment because he was born too soon to be saved by Christ.
To this Oisin replies calmly that he has had enough, since, if
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God wishes or even permits Finn to suffer, then He is more
evil than Finn. After Oisin reassumes his original heroic
proportions and vanishes, the reader is left with a sense of the
ironic inability of two great men to understand each other
because of the network of distortions and hypocrisy in which
Christian ethics was entangled in the process of institution-
alizing itself. It seems particularly tragic that a moral standard
with possibilities more rewarding than any we have yet
examined should seem inevitably exposed to more pitfalls
than the others.
For the third danger confronting Christianity we must
consult another Irishman, Bernard Shaw, who expresses
challenging opinions on almost every subject. Many people
regard him as either a conceited trifler or a wild iconoclast.
He is neither. His style of writing is based on the theory that
people will pay no attention to you unless you first irritate
them, and his vanity, his exaggeration, and his monkey-shines
are part of the irritation. If by these means he can attract
your attention, he then hopes to insert some ideas into your
mind while you are preoccupied with resenting him; and the
method sometimes works. It is never safe to dismiss him
lightly; for on many occasions he has been many years ahead
of the times, and we now are habituated to ideas which he
advanced as revolutionary in the eighties or nineties. Ideas on
Christianity are scattered widely through the plays, prefaces,
and essays.4 Usually he upholds Christian ethics against the
Christian Church, on grounds slightly different from those we
have already seen. The best place to examine his approach is
the Preface to Androcles and the Lion.
Readers are both fascinated and repelled by this essay,
fascinated by the lucidity, boldness, and logical cogency of the
argument, but repelled by some of the specific conclusions to
which it comes. One of them, for example, is that a pre-
requisite for the success of Christianity is a socialist state.
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Yes, of course, we say; Shaw, being a Socialist, would naturally
ride his hobby everywhere. If we happen to be ardent
capitalists, we tend to discount the whole essay because of
this one point. But to do so would be a mistake. Though
many of the issues Shaw raises are controversial, his main
contention is sound and important. It is this: The spread and
adoption of Christian ethics is the one hope for human society,
because the central Christian idea is the only one under which
civilization can endure; yet its success has been vitiated
because at the very outset its practitioners lost sight of this
central idea and went in pursuit of a will-o'-the-wisp. To some
extent, indeed, Jesus himself was enticed into the same error.
The core of the ethic is summed up in the fact that every
individual is -equally important as a human soul, and is
responsible for the welfare of other human souls. A man is
his brother's keeper whether he likes it or not. This fact is
clear whether we accept literally or figuratively Jesus' state-
ment that all men are brothers because they are children of
the same father. We cannot injure our neighbor without
injuring ourselves in the process. If so, then it follows that a
man's every action must be judged primarily by its effect on
all other men. This is the essence of Christ's social teaching.
Now, Shaw asks, what has stood in the way of this
doctrine for two thousand years? Why has it never been
practiced on a really large scale? His answer is that, along
with this valuable essence, Christianity has deeply embedded
in it another, and a disastrous, element. This he calls
"Salvationism." Its danger is the greater in that it sprang
sincerely from Christian love. Jesus himself sympathized so
deeply with erring humanity that he desired to take all their
troubles on himself, to assume their sins and draw away their
suffering to him, to permit them to pay for their mistakes
vicariously by transferring them to his shoulders. Thus he
became the Redeemer, a figure already familiar in racial
folklore because man has always dreamed of escaping the
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consequences of his own acts through some divine interven-
tion. This folklore background Shaw analyzes at length. Its
details are less important than its fatal results. For ever since
Jesus died, his followers have emphasized the folklore at the
expense of the ethics, and have always begun an attempted
conversion by asking first, "Are you saved?'* and only secondly,
"Are you sincerely interested in the welfare of other men?"
And this stress on personal salvation has undone much of the
good in the whole system. For the opportunity of vicarious
redemption is a selfish, not a Christian, motive. How con-
venient to have a scapegoat to suffer for us! How exciting to
have the emotional experience of conversion and cancel all
our debts! So pleasant is it that many people try it a second
and a third time just to get the thrill. Thus Shaw reaches his
conclusion that the real danger of salvation is that it puts a
premium on sin, and ironically reverses Christ's original
intentions.
We have now examined some of the traps that lie in wait
for one who would construct ethical behavior on the motive
of Christian love: the danger of heaven and hell, the
probability of emotional reversals, and the facile Salvationist
escape from the consequences of our actions. Why is Christi-
anity so particularly subject to these distortions? The answer
seems to lie in the fact of its being based on emotion, that
most wayward and unreliable of human faculties. Christian
ethics presupposes a sincere feeling of love or active good
will, and such a feeling cannot be forced or synthesized. It
comes or not, depending on one's own temperament. A con-
scious attempt to create it is likely to destroy it. A son who
does not care much for his mother may feel a sense of guilt
and so strive to make himself love her; the result usually is
that he dislikes her even more strongly than before, feels still
more guilty, and makes both of them miserable. The process
is intensified when it is a brother or sister for whom one tries
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to force affection. And when we decide that we ought to love
everyone because all human beings are our brothers and
sisters, the normal person either balks entirely or deceives
himself by giving lip service to this duty and then quietly
continuing in his likes and dislikes. It is no wonder, then,
that Christianity has succeeded better as a formal creed than
as a living motive of conduct.
If so, why has it survived and flourished for two thousand
years? Partly because it has been associated with a powerful
religious institution. Partly because it has remained an ideal
which people admit ought to govern conduct even though it
often does not. Partly because no more successful or promising
ethic has yet been found. But beyond these reasons lies the
further fact that it has proved to be harmonious with a
recurrent human need, a need so vital that it outlives all
attempts to stifle it and reappears just when it seems to have
been stamped out. This is the need for moral freedom, which
asserts itself against every attempt to reduce human conduct
to a pattern even when it is the Christian Church that makes
the attempt. Christianity at its best upholds this freedom and
our discussion may be concluded by an illustration of this idea
in literature.
The Russian novelist Dostoevsky is known for his
portrayals of intensely emotional persons. His characters live
in a world of feverish passion; even their sleep is filled with
such vivid dreams that they awaken exhausted. Often this
emotion is morbid and evil; many of his characters are
criminals, sadists, or wastrels. But along with this interest in
the abnormal and unhealthy, Dostoevsky had a strain of reli-
gious feeling which led him to describe religious emotion as
vividly as he did the depths of depravity. He was a writer of
extremes. While he was picturing creatures like the distorted
Svidrigailov in Crime and Punishment or the demonic
Stavrogin in The Possessed, one of his constant ambitions was
to create the character of a real Christian that would satisfy
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him as showing everything that a Christian might be. This
he tried several times, never succeeding as he hoped to, but
moving gradually closer to his ideal. Four examples will show
his progress.
In Crime and Punishment appears a preliminary sketch
of the perfect Christian in the young girl Sonia Marmeladov.
Characteristically, Dostoevsky startles the reader by making
her a prostitute and then showing her possessed of humility,
forgiveness, and altruism. Her father is a drunken good-for-
nothing, unable to hold a job, who spends his time in an
ecstasy of remorse, self-pity, and pious resolutions for the
future. Her stepmother, an hysterical woman of some educa-
tion, who marries Marmeladov in desperation as a means of
supporting her three children, taunts Sonia with being as use-
less as her father in providing for the family, and suggests that
she might as well get a "yellow ticket" as continue to be a
parasite. One night when the children are crying with hunger
she quietly follows this advice, entering the life of technical sin
without bitterness or an impression of martyrdom, and from
the most altruistic of motives. The ill treatment of her parents
she repays only with love and care. She is so devoid of rancor
and self-will that her deliberate sacrifice of worldly pride
convinces even a skeptical reader that her temperament is
sincerely Christian. The same conviction grows in the mind
of the student Raskolnikov, who, having committed murder
to discover whether or not he is a superman above the
necessity of moral standards, is now trying to stave off remorse
by intellectual self-justification. She is the only person whom
he instinctively trusts and confides in, and her reaction to
knowledge of his deed is so straightforwardly horrified and
yet sympathetic that she is a major influence leading to his
final confession of guilt to himself as well as to the world.
With all this she is not sentimentalized, and seems in most
respects a successful portrait of a Christian. There is only one
drawback: she is so pathetic and helpless, that though
admirable, she gives the impression of Christianity as some-
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thing weak and passive. Therefore she did not satisfy
Dostoevsky.
He tried again on a larger scale in the character of Prince
Myshkin in The Idiot, a much more elaborate attempt to
analyze a complete Christian. In trying harder, however,
Dostoevsky accomplished less; though it contains vivid scenes
and flashes of insight, the novel is chaotic and unconvincing.
This time the Christian is the central character. He is regarded
as a madman, partly because he is an epileptic and partly
because his actions are, by conventional standards, silly. He
is more complex than Sonia because he is conscious of having a
combination of base and noble motives for what he does; but
in the main he is actuated by direct Christian love, often
being fond of people in the older sense of foolish, and
especially loving children and animals. His associates both
like and ridicule his innocent, childlike charm, his naive
seriousness, his tactless but disarming frankness. Most of his
activities do good to the people around him, as when he
induces a group of children to play with a timid consumptive
girl instead of ostracising her. His avoidance of the forgiveness
pitfall is seen when Ganya Ivolgin slaps him. Instead of
forgiving, Myshkin exclaims impulsively, "Oh, how ashamed
he will feel tomorrow!" Thus his sorrow is only because
Ganya may have to suffer for his action. In addition to such
evidences of his Christlike nature, he is directly compared to
Christ by other characters, and utters such echo speeches as
"let us be servants in order to be leaders." And yet a reader
sees at once why he did not satisfy Dostoevsky's ambition: the
character never really comes alive, never convinces the reader
that he could have existed. Instead of being a person, he is a
combination of traits illustrating an idea.
The other two attempts are in Dostoevsky's last and most
powerful novel, The Brothers Karamazov. One is Father
Zossima, Elder of a monastery, whom Dostoevsky says he drew
directly from life; the other is the youngest of the brothers,
Alexey Karamazov.
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Not only is Zossima an important influence in the whole
novel, but the story is interrupted by a fifty-page section
(Book VI, "The Russian Monk") devoted to an account of
his life and character. Born of an aristocratic family, he is
educated for a military career, which he abandons for the
priesthood after a sudden conversion to Christianity. His wide
influence and the devotion he inspires in all types of people
result from the sympathetic understanding which enables him
to allow for every variety of temperament. For him the best
proof of God's love is active, energetic experience in loving
others, which will come into any person's life when he realizes
that the fact of his being born human makes him responsible
for the welfare of every other individual. The emphasis is on
experience, for love is at least partly a matter of practice,
becoming easier and more natural the more it is tried. This,
one of the most fruitful of Zossima's ideas, is extended to
explain his interpretation of hell. If a person fails to practice
an attitude of loving thoughtfulness of others, the habit be-
comes atrophied until he is no longer able to feel any generous
impulse at all and that unhappy state of mind is hell. One
may ask wherein Dostoevsky fell short in this portrayal of a
Christian; and the answer must be, only in the fact that
Zossima is not in secular life. His monasticism might lead a
reader to say: though this is all very well for a man segregated
from the temptations of the world, it does not show the
Christian ideal to be attainable by people in ordinary life.
Consequently Dostoevsky's final portrait is of a young
man who, on Zossima's own advice, withdraws from monastic
life to practice Christianity in the world. Alexey Karamazov
is the most successful Christian and the most attractive char-
acter in Dostoevsky; his peculiar sweetness and strength
cannot be described, but must be sensed in reading the novel.
Like Sonia, he repays a selfish father with unselfish devotion,
but he has none of Sonia's pathetic helplessness. JLike Myshkin,
he wins the trustful affection of children, not by being a child
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himself, but by treating children with matter-of-fact serenity
and easy friendliness. He is loved by both his brothers, the
impulsive worldling Dmitri and the brilliant psychopath Ivan.
From his school days he impresses everyone as a boy having
no resentment, no sullenness, and no fear. Dostoevsky's
description of him sums up several of the novelist's conclu-
sions about the perfect Christian:
He seemed to put implicit trust in people; yet no
one ever looked upon him as a simpleton or naive
person. . . . He would never take it upon himself to
criticize, and would never condemn anyone for any-
thing . . He was never afraid of anyone, yet the boys
immediately understood that he was not proud of
his fearlessness. . . . He never resented an insult. It
would happen that an hour after the offence he
would address the offender or answer some question
with as trustful and candid an expression as though
nothing had happened between them. And it was
not that he seemed to have forgotten or intention-
ally forgiven the affront, but simply that he did not
regard it as an affront. 5
And the novel ends with the group of boys who have been
won over from hostility to enthusiasm for Alexey shouting,
"Hurrah for Karamazov!"
These repeated attempts to draw a Christian character
reflect something of Dostoevsky's own recurrent struggle to
understand the meaning of Christian ethics. Such a struggle,
if successful, cannot follow any ready-made paths, but must
fight its way through the jungles which lie all about it. For
its essence is a free moral choice, a voluntary feeling of good
will that cannot be made up for the occasion. This is what is
meant by saying that its value as an ethic is inseparably
connected with the dangers that confront it. Few men can
endure freedom; they are afraid of it because it takes away
their supports and confronts them with responsibility.
6 They
must escape from it in submission to some creed, church, or
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external authority that will force them to conform. Christian
ethics is a daring attempt to regain man's necessary sense ol
security, not by force, but by spontaneous co-operation.
Book V of The Brothers Karamazov contains a fantasy
written by Ivan, called "Christ and the Grand Inquisitor," in
which Jesus returns to confront the head of the Spanish In-
quisition, the institution which most completely distorted the
ethic of love to one of force. The Inquisitor points out that
Christ's fatal mistake lay in his rejection of the Devil's three
temptations, and that the object of the Church is to rectify
this error. The first temptation was, turn these stones into
bread that men may follow you sound wisdom, says the
Inquisitor, since man is so depraved that he will act only for
the material rewards of bread and games. Then the Devil
suggested that Jesus cast himself from the tower to be rescued
by angels, in order that men should be astonished into
following him and man is so credulous that he must be lured
by the supernatural. Finally Satan urged Christ to gain control
of the world by unscrupulous means, because man longs for
authority to relieve him from responsibility.
But Christian ethics at its best rejects bribery, miracle,
and power politics in favor of voluntary co-operation. It
chooses the democratic method instead of the dictatorial or
totalitarian. Thus it shares the strength and the weaknesses of
democracy. While it satisfies the human need for freedom,
at the same time it runs counter to the human desire to be
told what to do. Freedom, as the twentieth century has re-
discovered, makes people feel lonely and insecure; they are
sometimes ready to sacrifice it for a firm, if irksome, set of
rules. Christian ethics, then, would not be better if it could
rid itself of its dangers of distortion. It would lose its identity,
and must be accepted along with them or not at all. The
value and the dangers are parts of a single organism.
CHAPTER SIX
THE NATURE OF THINGS
LONG as a philosopher con-
fines himself to problems of ethics such as we have been
discussing, his audience may stay with him, hoping to find
some help in improving their conduct. But when he moves
into the realm of metaphysics, the number of empty seats
suddenly increases. This is too much for us, many students
decide, now that he has both head and feet in the clouds and
is posing questions which not only are unanswerable but
don't greatly concern us even if they could be answered. Just
now, life in the world is quite real enough for us. When we
have made our money and retired on our annuity, then perhaps
we shall have time to consider the nature of reality. Not that
there is much to it after all certainly it is far simpler than
the philosopher tries to make it with his high-sounding words.
The world lies all about us for anyone to see; our senses
promptly teach us that fire burns, rain wets, and sunshine
ripens the crops. As an old shepherd remarked to a court
jester who asked if he knew any philosophy: "I know the
more one sickens the worse at ease he is, ... and that a great
cause of the night is lack of the sun."
*
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So goes the popular reaction to metaphysics. The reader
has probably noticed how contradictory it is. One objector
accuses metaphysics of being too hard, another of being too
easy; the questions are unanswerable, but the answers are
obvious; the subject loses itself in a vain attempt to penetrate
the inscrutable, but merely deals with commonplace matters
be covering them with philosophical jargon. Yet, despite this
inconsistency, both halves oi the objection have truth and
common sense in them. Metaphysics is indeed too abstract
for daily consumption, and the metaphysical mountain has
labored hard to bring forth many a mouse. As we enter its
domain we must not forget either of these facts, and must
try to associate it as closely as possible with the practical world
and the life of the senses. This will be all the easier in that
our highroad is literature, the art which excels in uniting the
abstract idea with the concrete person and event.
The question asked by metaphysics is, what is the real
nature of the universe? What is it made of? How is it put
together? Is it as it seems to be, or quite different? Though in
a sense these are restatements of the same query, they
represent different angles of approach to it, and suggest to us
some of the principal metaphysical problems on which
philosophers are divided.
The first and most inclusive one is the problem of appear-
ance and reality. The ultimate aim of metaphysics is to
separate what is true from what merely appears to be true, a
distinction which, far from being impractical, is necessary
even for survival. The poisonous toadstool may appear to be
an edible mushroom, but is not. The diplomat may appear
to be seeking peace, but is really preparing a Pearl Harbor
attack. A bee that gets into the house and tries to escape to
the garden may fly confidently toward an apparently open
space in the wall, only to stun itself against the glass. The
bee has made a metaphysical error. So proverbial wisdom is
filled with commonplace expressions of the fact that we cannot
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always trust our senses, for "things are not always what they
seem skim milk oft masquerades as cream."
The difficulty is that, though everybody admits this fact
regarding specific situations, most people refuse to apply it to
the universe as a whole. When the metaphysician takes that
simple and logical step, he is laughed at and pitied as a
dreamer. Yet what has he done? Nothing but this: Granted,
he says, that things are not what they seem in this and that
specific instance, then perhaps nothing at all anywhere is what
it seems. Perhaps we should distrust all the evidence of our
senses and admit that our ability to see or touch something is
no proof of that thing's existence. Perhaps, in fact, the
material world does not exist at all, and the great globe itself
is no more than a dream. Dreams seem real while we are
experiencing them, sometimes more vividly so than our
waking life. Or, if the philosopher is a metaphysician of
another stamp, he may reach an opposite conclusion. Starting
again from the deceptive character of appearances, he may
reason that our strongest inner feelings are without basis in
fact; that mind, emotions, spiritual values, are nothing but
chemical processes in the brain; that only matter is real, and
the so-called immaterial world an illusion. These are the two
principal answers to the question of appearance and reality.
A believer in the first is called an idealist; a believer in the
second, a materialist.
The next problem is that of unity and diversity, which
asks whether reality, if one penetrates far enough into it, is
all alike, or whether there are two or more different kinds of
reality. Metaphysicians have been hounded by a teasing desire
to find unity at the heart of things, to simplify the endless
diversity of the world into some one inclusive formula. The
world is so full of a number of things; but philosophers are
far from being as happy as kings about it, and cannot sleep
at night until they have discarded all but one, or at least a
very few. One reason for this is our minds crave orderliness
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and reject chaos; since we feel that unity would be much
neater and more economical, we keep hoping that the
question of the one and the many may be decided in favor
of the one. Some philosophers have so decided it; others, not
quite able to reach one real substance, have been satisfied
with two; a few have accepted the world's apparent diversity
as being real. The first group are called monists; the second,
dualists; the third, pluralists.
Still another main problem has occupied the metaphysi-
cian: the question of organization. That the universe should
be organized at all is rather surprising. The existence of a
chaotic, unrelated mass of phenomena would be just as likely.
Yet the physical world is on the whole so trustworthy, science
has discovered so many reliable laws which govern its actions,
that the possibility of a logical organization of every kind of
phenomenon is entertained by philosophers without too much
skepticism. If so, the problem of how to account for this fact
takes its place beside the two others. Whatever reality is,
however many parts it has, those parts apparently bear some
relation to one another. Why? What has molded them into
this particular relationship? Is it something in their inherent
nature, or is it intelligent planning by some outside power,
or is it perhaps mere chance? This disagreement creates the
rival schools of pantheists, theists, and atomists.
In these paragraphs we have described in their simplest
terms the meaning of eight technical labels applied to meta-
physicians, all ending monotonously in -ist. It is evident that
there can be all sorts of permutations among them, produced
by combining labels from two or three groups. Thus, a
philosopher may be a pantheistic monist, like Spinoza, or
even an atomistic materialistic monist, like Epicurus. The
technical terms are useful only for the purpose of describing
someone's views briefly and definitely, in a kind of philo-
sophical shorthand; what is important is the meaning behind
them. As was said above, literature is one of the best methods
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of conveying that meaning. As in our discussion of ethics, we
shall not attempt to cover systematically all the metaphysical
theories, but shall choose a few examples; first, one which
vividly points up the problem of appearance and reality, then
several which illustrate the problem of organization.
Habit is our enemy when we first enter the field of
metaphysics. As babies we were free from preconceived
notions about the nature of the world; our minds were
confused whirlpools of impressions, sucking in every random
piece of evidence that floated past us, engulfing a new
phenomenon every minute. Most of our childhood was spent
in learning to interpret and use these sense impressions, so
that we eventually came to trust them as being our normal
criteria of reality. Though we have needed to revise this
standard to fit new facts, we have not seen it seriously chal-
lenged until now, and therefore we find it hard to understand
a philosopher who tells us that all this evidence of our senses
may be quite untrustworthy. The first step is the hardest.
Once we become aware and acknowledge to ourselves that
perhaps reality is not as it seems, we are prepared to embark
on the study of what it might be.
A person taking this first step will find the creations of art
very helpful to him. In a work of art one accepts unusual
ideas at which he would cavil in real life. The artist's
imagination simultaneously interprets the present world and
builds a new one; and this new creation is mysteriously both
like and unlike the world of sensations. The emotion aroused
by a poem or play, by releasing a reader from his customary
thought patterns, helps him to accept the artist's intuition
that alongside or beyond the physical universe there may
possibly be a different kind of reality.
This power of art to free the mind is evident in a poem
that we have already examined in another connection: Keats's
Ode on a Grecian Urn. Its verbal music and vivid imagery
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make a reader susceptible to thoughts and feelings which he
does not ordinarily have. He sees that one test of the reality
of anything may be its power to endure, to outlast other
transitory phenomena. If so, he may also accept the conclusion
that this test casts suspicion on the whole sensory world,
because that world is in a state of constant flux, one sensation
yielding rapidly to another. The actual people and events
portrayed on the urn are long dead; their reality is dim and
shadowy. Yet the ideas and emotions which they represent or
symbolize have lost none of their power; they still exist, and
their survival attests their reality. The flute-payer, the lovers,
the Bacchantes, the villagers leading the garlanded heifer to
the altar these are gone. But music, love, religious devotion,
and beauty are not gone; they are ubiquitous, as impressive
in one age as in another. And all of them are non-material,
existing in spite of any changes in the physical world. Thus
the poem not only embodies what we have called a meta-
physical idealism, but helps to make such a philosophy less
unthinkable to its readers. It is the source of the poem's
peculiar power, its elusive quality, and its difficulty.
This difficulty is inherent in the nature of the problem,
which is to express a non-material idea in terms of matter,
of the concrete imagery always found in literature, and by
doing so to give the reader a vivid sense that the world of
apparent matter is not necessarily the real one. Perhaps it can
be accomplished better in the drama, with its use of actual
characters on the stage, than in the less familiar symbols of
poetry. Suppose the lovers on the urn should come to life,
walk on stage protesting that their author had deserted them
after giving them artistic birth, and demand the fulfilment
of marriage. Such a situation would startlingly force the idea
on the minds of an audience.
Naturally a play of this sort is uncommon. Most play-
wrights would never think of it, and if they did would discard
it as unfit for stage presentation. To give it audience appeal
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would require boldness, originality, freedom from conventions,
and enough humor to allow for and counteract the inevitable
ridicule that it would arouse. Only one modern dramatist
has ventured it and has met with remarkable success: the
Italian writer Luigi Pirandello, who received the Nobel Prize
in 1934.
The background of Pirandello's life gave him both the
inclination and the ability to dramatize metaphysical prob-
lems. The ability was developed by an extensive philosophical
education culminating in a doctorate at the University of
Bonn; the inclination resulted from a series of disillusion-
ments with the world as it is, ranging from disappointment
at the failure of Italian unification to the personal tragedy of
his wife's long insanity. After much experience in teaching
and fiction writing, he turned to the drama late in life.
In temperament Pirandello was skeptical but not cynical.
He once said, "I think that life is a very sad piece of buffoonery
because . . . we need to deceive ourselves constantly by creating
a reality which from time to time is discovered to be vain
and illusory. . .My art is full of bitter compassion for all who
deceive themselves; but this compassion cannot fail to be
followed by the cruel derision of destiny which condemns
man to deception."2 He was always on the lookout for self-
deception, convinced that things are not what they seem. In
philosophy he was a kind of apologetic and tentative idealist,
not certain of anything, but regarding it as likely that reality
is non-material rather than sensory. He was sadly discouraged,
not so much because mankind could never understand this
fact (that was natural enough) , as because mankind could
never even perceive that there was anything to be understood.
He is often called a grotesque writer because his work is so
strange and startling, as it must be if he is to shock people
into realizing that the world is not as it seems.
That Pirandello's emphasis is on deception appears even
in his titles. Our curiosity is aroused by stories and plays
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called Right You Are (If You Think So), Each of Us His
Own Part, or Better Think Twice about It. In his works
personal identity is seldom certain, even on the part of the
person himself. His characters seem chronically uneasy lest
they turn out at any moment to be somebody else. The whole
action of Right You Are (If You Think So) concerns the
townspeople's attempt to discover whether Mrs. Ponza is or
is not the daughter of Mrs. Frola; and the audience never
does find out. In the novel The Late Mattia Pascal, the hero
masquerades for years as another person, then returns to live
quietly in his home town and pay frequent visits to his own
tombstone. Opinions and beliefs are no less changeable than
identity. In the play Each in His Own Way two characters
argue violently about the motives for a suicide; by the next
morning each has been so convinced by the other's arguments
that they still quarrel, but on reversed sides. Sanity alternates
rapidly with insanity. A young nobleman in the play Henry
IV, driven insane by a blow on the head, lives under the
delusion that he is a medieval emperor. Several years later he
recovers his reason, but continues to play his role because he
is having too good a time to give it up. Then reality proves
too much for him; he is impelled by jealousy to commit a
murder, and to avoid the consequences of the crime is forced
to retire forever into the world of insane fantasy. Thus again
the realms of illusion and reality equivocally overlap.
The idea is most effectively presented, however, in the
play Six Characters in Search of an Author, written in 1921,
and mainly responsible for Pirandello's reputation and his
winning of the Nobel Prize. Here the problem of reality is
dramatized with a directness, subtlety, and irony that leave
the audience breathless. The scene is the bare stage of a
theater, on which a director and his cast are perfunctorily
rehearsing a play. Pirandello catches the attention of the
audience by at once satirizing himself and his philosophic
drama: the play in rehearsal turns out to be one of his own,
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and the actors are grumbling at its obscurity and silliness.
If only someone would write them a decent play, they would
never bother with Pirandello's. Their wish is soon granted in
a manner they never suspected. Six strange people file on
stage and entreat the director to hear their story. They are, it
seems, not living persons at all, but literary characters
created in the mind of an author and then left unrealized
because they were never put in a work of art. Now they are
wandering homeless in search of fulfilment. If the company
will hear their story and produce it as a play, then the char-
acters will live forever like Hamlet or Don Quixote. At first
the director, a commonplace person who is impatient with
such folly and eager to get on with his work, brushes them
aside intolerantly. But as they begin arguing among them-
selves about whether or not they should have come, his
interest is caught by some hints of drama revealed in their
recriminations, and he consents at least to listen. From then
on the action proceeds on two parallel planes: one the
situation among the characters, the other their interaction
with the living people.
It is a strange story, morbid yet psychologically con-
vincing, that the characters unfold with mingled reluctance
and impatience. The six are unnamed, and called merely
Father, Mother, Stepdaughter, Son, Boy, and Child. The
father, seeing his wife in love with another man, had
allowed her (even urged her, she says) to elope with him.
Possibly he was sacrificing himself for her happiness; possibly
he was led by a mania for experimenting with other people's
lives. At any rate he has taken a keen interest in her three
illegitimate children, and years later after her lover's death
receives the whole family back into his home, to the chagrin
of his legitimate son. The atmosphere in the household,
especially after the stepdaughter falls in love with the father,
is thick with resentment and suspicion, from which the two
sensitive young children particularly suffer. So involved does
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this situation become that the actors gloomily conclude it
must be a play by Pirandello also there is no escaping the
man. Most dramatists would have been content to base their
whole play on this story, but in Pirandello it is only a starting
point. The author, having created his people to fit it, had left
the play unfinished and the characters hanging in the void
from which they insist on being rescued.
In this way arises the problem toward which Pirandello
has been working. What is the relation between these char-
acters and living people? When we speak of a literary creation
as being real, do we mean it or is it a figure of speech? And
incidentally, what is reality? When the director assumes, as
most people would, that the characters are non-existent, they
reply with the main paradox of idealistic philosophy: Granted
that they do not exist physically, yet they are more real than
the director himself because they exist in the mind, and
mental or non-material truth is the only truth that matters.
While the director is still too befuddled to resist, the father
launches three arguments to support their position. First,
they never die as living people do. Second, they are timeless,
not restrained by a sequence of events, but eternally repeating
the same emotions that their creator gave them. Third, they
are changeless, a quality in which living people cannot com-
pete with them at all. You say we are illusions, asserts the
father. Very well, look at a photograph of yourself taken
twenty years ago and see if you are the same person now as
then. If not, were you real in the past, or are you now, or
were you at neither time? So regarded, living people are like
patterns in a kaleidoscope, changing from the moment of their
birth. Only non-material creations of the mind are stable and
lasting.
All this, though baffling to director and audience, is
quite recognizable to the metaphysician. It is merely the old
problem of appearance and reality dramatized to show the
conflict between unthinking materialism and philosophic
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idealism. The extent to which Pirandello is serious about it
must be decided by the reader. The ironic mingling of moods
is startlingly driven home by the ending. As the various scenes
are described and re-enacted by the characters, the unfinished
play takes form and finishes itself in a climax of mad horror.
Crazed by the morbid events taking place in the household,
the little boy drowns his younger sister and shoots himself.
As the actors rush to him, some exclaiming that he is dead,
others that it is merely pretence and make-believe, the father
cries in anguish, "Pretence? Reality, sir, reality!" And the
distracted director answers, "Pretence? Reality? To hell with
it all! Never in my life has such a thing happened to me. I've
lost a whole day over these people, a whole day."
Thus reality and illusion are merged, and the average
man washes his hands of the whole thing. Yet, deride it as he
may, the director will be left with a troublesome feeling that
the nature of things may be quite different from what our
senses tell us it is. He will not forget the experience, and
neither will the audience; for, whether they know it or not,
they have looked in the door of metaphysics.
When a person has once opened that door, he finds it
hard to keep from entering. Inside he discovers some difficult
labyrinths and some pleasant though unfamiliar rooms. Our
own visit will be confined to one three-room apartment which
almost everyone passes through at some time in his mental
life. This apartment is the problem of organization, pre-
viously mentioned. It is a favorite subject of controversy
because at least three quite understandable cases can be built
up, clear arguments can be adduced for each of them, and
none of them can be finally proved or refuted. At the same
time the choice which a person makes among the three may
have considerable influence on his conduct.
A discussion of this problem begins with the assumption
that the various parts of the universe are in some way
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connected. Some are near each other in space, some occur
before or after others in time, some are said to have a causal
relation that can be foreseen and relied on. If the temperature
falls below 32 fahrenheit, then water will freeze; if a spark
falls into gasoline, an explosion results; if a person's heart
stops beating, he will die. If these assumptions are correct,
then the question arises, how can the relationships of space,
time, and cause be explained? To this question three famous
answers have been given. The organization of the universe
has been brought about (1) by chance, (2) by intelligent
planning, or (3) by an inherent constructive power. The first
answer was upheld by the Greek school of atomists; the second
is the belief of theists; the third is characteristic of pantheists.
The atomists argue that the apparent unity of the world is an
illusion created by the chance combination of myriads of tiny
independent particles. Theists, accepting the apparent unity
as real, believe that it results from the activity of an external
constructive intelligence. Pantheists, likewise accepting unity
as a fact, deny that it is anything added to reality, whether
by chance or design, and assert that it is part of the very
definition of reality itself, one being impossible without the
other. Though each theory has many complications, it is our
purpose to simplify them as much as possible. Before looking
at examples in literature, it may be interesting to see how
cogent and attractive a case can be presented for each of the
three points of view. Let us imagine our three philosophers
appearing before us in turn.
First comes the atomistic materialist, a man of reas-
suring common sense and sincere desire to relieve our minds
of worry. I can see, he says, that you are a little ill at ease
about the nature of things. As you look about you at the
world, you observe many wonderful events going on, some
pleasant and some terrifying. The seasons come and go, grain
ripens in the field, hurricanes knock down your houses,
people are born, grow old, and die. All these things give
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evidence of great powers working all around you, powers
which you only half understand and can make only feeble
attempts to control. What makes the objects of the universe
exhibit such energy? What can explain their power? One
answer soon presents itself to you. In your normal experience
nothing can move about and exert force unless it is alive;
inanimate objects are passive, only animate ones active.
Therefore you argue by analogy to a plausible but mistaken
conclusion: since the universe appears active and energetic,
it too must be alive, must have a brain or several brains to
plan and execute all that takes place. You personify it, and
either fill it with gods and spirits or else decide that there
must be one overruling mind that set it in motion and keeps
it going. Then, having created such a god, you spend your
life trying to decipher his purposes, maneuvering to propitiate
his anger, and worrying lest this powerful deity may punish
you either now or after you die. Truly, I am sorry for you;
yet I cannot help smiling a little, as I would at a child afraid
of bogeys that his own imagination brings forth.
You see, there is one thing you have forgotten. The
great power you seek is there before your eyes all the time,
constantly producing phenomena no less remarkable than
the events of nature. It is the power of time and chance. You
see it all around you and never think of questioning its
potency. Suppose you toss ten pennies into the air several
times. If they fall half heads and half tails you are not
surprised, because the chances are in favor of that division;
if they fall six and four or even eight and two, you accept the
fact that chance might produce that result, and don't assert
that somebody must have planned it, or that the coins must
be alive. And then, if you toss them often enough, sometime
or other they will fall a$ ten heads or ten tails. Still you say,
remarkable as this is, chance was bound to bring it about
some time. Every day incredible coincidences happen in a way
that precludes any possibility of planning. Then why not
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accept the logical implications of this? Increase your ten coins
to countless tiny particles moving around in space; increase
your time to infinity; and at some point in this endless flux,
any conceivable combination of particles is easily possible
without anyone's having planned it at all. At this particular
cosmic moment the whirling atoms happen to have fallen
into the pattern of our universe; but no conscious design is
necessaiy to explain this. Sunset clouds may resemble fiery
dragons so precisely that the effect strikes us as intentional;
but it is only particles of water vapor drifting by chance across
the sky. For your own peace of mind, then, don't peer behind
the clouds in search of a god. He is not there. Relax, live
without fear, and let the credulous ones have all the gods
they want. So saying, the atomist retires, his good deed done
for the day.
He is followed by the theist, a person less jaunty and
more intense in nature, with composure of face and pene-
trating eyes that regard us with a comforting yet slightly
unnerving certainty. Speaking of credulity, he begins, we have
just been treated to an astonishing example of it. We are
asked to believe that some billions of particles floating around
aimlessly in space could have formed, by pure chance devoid
of intention, our universe as we know it. This is a very
different matter from tossing ten, or a thousand, coins in the
air and having them come down all heads (and the atomist
accuses us of arguing by analogy) . Suppose that events could
occur by chance (which, as I shall explain to you, is ques-
tionable), still there is no logical analogy between the coins
and the universe. For the ten coins merely come down ten
separate heads; there is no connection among them. But the
particles forming the universe interact with one another to
produce organisms with mutually dependent parts, capable
of motion and the functions of life, beautifully calculated to
perform purposive activities. These are no cloud shapes of
drifting vapor, but independent living beings, able to
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maintain their life by absorbing other particles into their
bodies, to adjust themselves to their environment by absorbing
ideas into their minds, and to reproduce their kind by co-
operating with other similar individuals. We are asked to
believe that a chance concurrence of atoms has produced, all
at the same time, hundreds ot male and female animals with
the ability to propagate. It is by pure chance, I suppose, that
the offspring of a lion happens to be another lion and not a
duck. In any given case chance would decree that the atoms
which fly together to make a young animal would produce
something quite unlike its parents, if not unlike anything
ever seen before. How much more remote, then, is the chance
that all progeny should be of the same species as their parents,
which is actually the case!
Moreover, continues the theist, I do not admit that
chance plays any part in the matter, even with the ten coins.
Whether a coin falls heads or tails depends not on accident,
but on all the physical forces exerted on it the force with
which it is thrown, the angle of its flight, the rate of revo-
lution around its axis, the air pressure exerted on it, any
irregularities on its surface. All these are definite ascertainable
causes, the like of which are discoverable for the vast majority
of events in the world. If for some things we have not yet
discovered a cause, that does not prove that none exists. Even
assuming a chance universe to be possible, which I don't, I
yet insist that it is highly and wildly improbable. Examine
yourselves to see if you believe that a heap of stones and
steel, shaken by an earthquake for milleniums, would fall
into the shape of the Empire State Building, or that a pile
of letters tossed repeatedly into a box would take the order of
a Shakespearean play. If you do, that is an act of faith indeed,
beside which mine is insignificant.
For my view is in every way simpler and more natural
than the atomist's. It is only in detective stories that the most
unlikely explanation is the true one. Here the answer lies
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patently before us. The Empire State Building was first
planned in the mind and on the blueprints of an architect;
before King Lear was written, it was planned in Shakespeare's
mind. The universe exhibits similar evidence of someone's
intention to have made it as it is. Why not conclude, then,
that earth, stars, lions, and men are likewise products of a
cosmic mind? Whenever we see anything organized, we assume
that the organization is intentional. Why not assume the same
thing for the greatest of all organizations? The purpose which
created the universe must exist in an intelligence which is
more inclusive than that universe or any of its parts in the
external constructive intelligence of a God. That is why I am
a theist.
Many of us might be willing to rest the case at this point,
for our last speaker was eloquent and convincing. But before
we can find our hats and depart, a third character appears in
the room and stops us with his very first sentence. He is an
impressively intellectual man, with dreamy eyes and a fur-
rowed brow. I wonder, he begins, if my friend the theist will
tell us who or what created the God that he believes in? I
wait eagerly for the answer he never gives me, for I too should
be glad to believe in that God so much, indeed, that I have
adapted the theist's name by adding a syllable to it. I call
myself a pantheist, indicating my conviction that God is not
a separate being, but is the sum of everything in the universe
taken together. I heartily sympathize with my friend's scorn
of the atomist who would make chance the author of all
things. There is more than chance in the universe. But it
seems equally unwise to go to the opposite extreme by
asserting that it was all planned by an omniscient being who
created it. For, I repeat, who created God? I do not profess
to answer that question, but I do insist that my belief does
not force me to answer it, while the theist's does. He says that
the universe is too purposive and too beautifully organized
to have created itself; therefore an external mind must have
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done so. Very well; let us move his argument one step ahead.
An external mind capable of creating the universe is likewise
so purposive and so beautifully organized that it could not
have created itself either. So we must postulate a second mind
that planned the first one, and a third that planned the
second. There is no place to stop, and we have explained
nothing. This predicament my mathematical friends call an
infinite regress, and, sorry as I am to say so, the theist is in it.
The sad part of it is that he could easily escape from the
dilemma, as I have done, by making one small change in his
metaphysics. I agree with him up to the point where he says
that God created the universe; but by that statement he
involves himself in a contradiction. The universe includes all
reality. If God is real, then he is a part of the universe; and
if he is part of it, then he did not create it, but he and the
universe together must have been created by a greater God
who includes both of them. The theist's error lies in placing
his God outside the universe. The remedy is simply to bring
him inside or better, bring it inside, for God is not a person
but a concept. We are trying to explain the nature of reality,
and one essential part of reality is intelligence, coherent
organization, just as another essential part is matter to be
organized. You cannot separate the two, any more than
Shylock could cut out his pound of flesh without taking
some blood at the same time. Reality is not inert chaotic
matter that took on form when an external mind was
inserted into it; it is, and always has been, matter and mind
interfused and inseparable.
At this point the pantheist hesitates, perceiving that we
are not quite following him. My friends, he says almost
querulously, why is it that I never seem to make myself clear?
Whenever I say that God is inside of and equal to the uni-
verse, people think I am being enigmatic. To me it is so
simple and satisfying. Let us see if an analogy will help.
Instead of the universe, think of an individual person and
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the impression he makes on us. He is physically and mentally
mature. His body is muscular and graceful, his conduct
intelligent, efficient, consistent, and purposive. He makes
plans and carries them out. How are we to account for this
remarkable creature? The atomist says that his consistent
behavior is an illusion, and that everything he does is mere
chance; but no one takes that seriously. The theist says that
his behavior must be planned and governed by an external
mind somewhere in the void, for which he is a sort of remote-
control station; but we never think of such a thing in
connection with any individual. Why not admit, as we all
naturally do, that the governing mind and nerves are in the
person and a part of him, inseparable from his personality?
And as this is the simplest explanation of an individual, so
is it of the whole universe. The planning mind is part of
reality, and the whole universe taken together is God.
As the pantheist departs, there is a short silence in the
apartment of metaphysics where we are sitting. This is a
little more than we bargained for when we came in, and we
wonder if Pirandello is laughing at us at the front door. He
at least was entertaining, and we should prefer one of his
plays to these dealers in abstractions, for we are seeking
illustrations of philosophy in literature. It is good, then, that
each of our three theorists has a poet to speak for him.
The Greek scientists came to many wrong conclusions,
which seem as laughable to us as our mistakes will appear a
thousand years hence. But sometimes they were startlingly
right. Handicapped by having no instruments of precision
and no technique for carrying on controlled experiments,
they nevertheless made some intuitive guesses which antici-
pated by more than two thousand years the conclusions of
modern science. One of these flashes of intuition was the
atomic theory, a conception now so improved and brought
up to date that we are able at any moment to destroy a large
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part of the human race by means of an atomic bomb. True,
few people now accept the theory as a metaphysical explana-
tion of the whole universe; but it is now indisputable that at
least the material part of that universe is composed of atoms.
For a long time the early Greek philosophers flirted with
the notion that everything must be made of some common
substance. Perhaps it was water, which can dissolve other
substances and can itself assume the form of a solid, a liquid,
or a gas. Perhaps it was fire, more powerful than water in
melting down hard objects, and existing even in air and
earth, as lightning and volcanoes testified. But it was difficult
to derive either of these substances horn the other, so great
is their mutual antipathy. Water, when heated, disappears;
fire, when doused, vanishes. The first recorded resolution of
this quandary was made by a pre-Socratic philosopher named
Democritus, who had the brilliantly simple idea that the
primal substance must be quite different from anything
known to our senses, must be simply little pieces of raw
material capable of being combined to form objects just as
stones are combined to form a house. He called these particles
atoms, and argued that they might be used to construct the
most diverse kinds of substance, exactly as stones may be the
raw material for a massive pyramid, a graceful archway, or a
picture in mosaic. By imagining a world made up entirely
of atoms moving around in space, now uniting in clusters
and now falling apart, he explained everything more satis-
factorily than it had been explained before. Among his later
converts was Epicurus, who adopted atomism as the meta-
physic best suited to his hedonistic ethics.
Thus far the theory had been in possession of the
philosophers. Soon, however, it got into literature as the
subject of a famous poem: De Rerum Natura, "Concerning
the Nature of Things," written by the Roman poet Lucretius
in the first century B. C., and one of the main sources of our
knowledge of the whole idea. This poem is truly literature,
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not merely a treatise in verse. Lucretius makes the atomic
theory vivid and concrete, and inserts emotion into it. Inspired
by the vision of a universe of swirling atoms, he creates a
panorama of all nature with its parts dissolving and regroup-
ing themselves like patterns in a kaleidoscope. When we
speak of a nature poet, we think of one who describes land-
scapes; but perhaps Lucretius was the only real poet of nature
as a whole. After noting first his professed reasons for writing
and a special symbol on which he bases much of the poem,
we shall see how obsolete and yet how modern his meta-
physical theory is.
In explaining his purpose in writing the poem, Lucretius
faces directly the conflict between science and religion. The
priests, he knows, will be sure to disapprove of his poem, will
declaim against him for writing it, and will threaten his
readers with damnation for reading it. This is only natural,
for it is intentionally directed against them and meant to be
a challenge to their power. Too long have they held men
under the subjection of fear by teaching them that all good
and bad fortune comes from the gods and that those gods
must be continually propitiated by prayers and sacrifices. His
object is to make men free of this shadow of the supernatural,
so that they can live their lives in peace, reassured by
knowledge of the real nature of things. This is all the more
necessary because the priests, besides enslaving men's minds,
have even killed or tortured their bodies. Remember, for
instance, the fate of Iphigeneia, the young daughter of Aga-
memnon. When the Greek army was about to embark for
Troy, it was delayed for many weeks at Aulis because its
leader Agamemnon had angered the goddess Artemis, who
sent contrary winds that held the ships in port. Finally, when
the priest Calchas asserted that the only way to assuage
Diana's wrath was to sacrifice Iphigeneia at the altar,
Agamemnon consented to his own daughter's death. Such evil
deeds are the fruits of religion, and Lucretius avows his firm
hostility to it.
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The gods, however, have their use if only we do not take
them seriously. They are the subjects of many interesting
tales that enrich poetry and legend. They are convenient
personifications of nature; it lends color to our enjoyment of
the world to pretend that the sun is Apollo, a lightning flash
Jove's thunderbolt, or a field of wheat Mother Ceres. They
are useful as symbols in art and literature, just as long as we
remember that the symbols have no reality in themselves,
but merely illustrate forces of nature. To show this, Lucretius
makes recurrent use of an Olympian analogy to picture his
conception of the universe. In mythology the gods Mars and
Venus were represented as having an ambivalent relation to
each other. In character and function they were contraries:
Mars the god of war, treachery, sharp weapons, brute force,
destruction; Venus the goddess of love, beauty, spring,
fertility, growth. Yet, though their tastes were opposite and
their activities counteracted each other, they nevertheless fell
in love. A pleasant story, somewhat improbable but what
does it mean? It is merely a poetic way of stating a truth of
nature which many philosophers have observed: that the
world involves a continual alternation of constructive and
destructive forces. Vegetation, killed by the brute force of
winter, is reborn in the spring. A rushing river erodes the
mountain soil, but creates new fertile fields in its delta. The
body itself is subject to a process of building up and breaking
down which we know as anabolism and catabolism. And the
point is, only through this process does nature function at
all. At first glance such an alternation seems as wasteful as the
Duke of York marching his ten thousand men up the hill
and then marching them down again; but in nature, construc-
tion and destruction unite to create the life process. Venus
and Mars fall in love.
This symbol runs through the poem as a basis for Lucre-
tius' atomistic philosophy, as one kind of evidence that should
have revealed the nature of things long before men thought
of the notion of atoms. For everything is always losing part
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of its substance and gaining new material to replace it. Since
objects could not do this if they were solid or uniform in
construction, it follows that they must be made of small,
separate piecesthat matter must be discontinuous. The fact
that it looks solid should not deceive us; a tree looks solid, but
has enough space in it for sap to run. As soon as this simple
notion of discontinuity is once grasped, evidence for it appears
on all sides. Many things act on the senses and yet are
invisible: heat, cold, wind, odors. Since they are clearly
physical things, they must consist of material particles which
are quite real but are too small to be seen. To make a visible
object, many such particles must cluster together in a compact
mass, and must constantly be replenished as some fly off the
surface. This is almost the whole story, but not quite. If the
world were composed of nothing but particles, none of the
particles could move, since each would be adjacent to another.
Therefore, to permit motion, void or empty space must exist.
Thus the atomist's simple explanation of the whole universe
is that it consists of countless material, physical atoms moving
around eternally in empty space, and of nothing else what-
soever.
What set them in motion in the first place? Nothing at
all, Lucretius says, because they have always been in motion
and always will be; since there is no beginning and no end,
the question is meaningless. What has caused them to assume
the form of the present universe? Pure chance. Neither inside
nor outside the atoms is there any purpose which plans their
motions or controls the results. Just as motes in a sunbeam
float back and forth, up and down, so do the atoms swirl
through the universe, now widely separated in space, now
entangled with many other atoms. Such a temporary entangle-
ment may be a star, the earth, or a man, all of which last
only a short time and then dissolve into their original
particles.
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It was no design of the atoms that led them to place
themselves in order with keen intelligence, nor did
they make an agreement what motions each should
produce. But because many atoms, struck with blows
and carried along by their own weight from infinite
time to the present, have been accustomed to move
and meet in all manner of ways and to try various
combinations, therefore, being spread abroad
through a vast time, by attempting every sort of
combination and motion, at length those meet which
become the raw material of great things, of sea and
sky and the generation of living creatures.
3
In thus basing his world on chance, Lucretius, following
his master Epicurus, modifies the original atomic theory.
Democritus had assumed that atomic motion is mechanical
and predictable, governed by an external Fate, or, as we
should put it, natural law; the particles are pictured as
moving in straight lines, like raindrops. Epicurus and Lucre-
tius found two objections to this picture. First, if the atoms
march in straight parallel lines, how can they come in contact
with one another? To say that some move faster and overtake
others will not explain the continual accretion and dissolution
of bodies, for atoms evidently flow into and out of bodies all
the time in every direction. Secondly, die notion of a fixed
mechanical fate did not coincide with the rest of Epicurus'
philosophy. As a hedonist he was impressed by the many
random desires of man, the variety of ways in which he seeks
happiness or avoids trouble. A planned universe would
deprive him of freedom and give him a job to do. Conse-
quently Lucretius describes what he calls the "swerve of the
atoms." For the straight parallel lines he substitutes a picture
in which individual atoms frequently cut across the line of
march as Broadway cuts across Manhattan Island. When this
occurs, eddies and cyclones are formed which send the atoms
off in all directions and make them collide violently. For the
1 56 PHILOSOPH Y IN LITERATURE
original swerve there is no reason; it is as unaccountable as
the vagaries of free will in human nature, of which indeed
it is the explanation. It rescues man from fate, and puts him
in a universe of chance.4
But how, we may ask, can the countless objects in nature
and the intricate processes of life come about merely by a
conglomeration of moving particles? This question Lucretius
takes delight in answering. He has at least one explanation
for everything, often two or three; which one is correct is not
really important, since all of them are based on chance atomic
motions, and the reader may take his choice. It is a strange,
half fascinating and half ridiculous picture of the world.
The atoms are microscopic solids, tiny pieces of matter
that are hard, indivisible, indestructible, the ultimate build-
ing blocks of nature.
5 They are perfectly solid, containing no
void and no internal motion. We first begin to visualize them
clearly when Lucretius shows how they vary in size and shape.
There are big slow atoms and tiny darting ones. Some are
spherical, some conical, or square, or flat, or bent like fish-
hooks. We may picture a flotilla of dignified battleship-atoms
moving through the void in close formation, with clouds of
tiny atoms whisking about them like PT boats or dive-
bombers. Nearby a rough, shaggy particle blunders through
a shoal of little hooks and needles, gathering sticky atoms as
a spaniel gathers burs in the autumn woods. The general
activity tosses the particles about, throwing the heavier ones
toward the outside of a whirlpool, shooting the light ones
rapidly upward as when a spurt of flame roars up a chimney.
The number of atoms is infinite, the motion never ending.
The triple variation of size, shape, and speed can explain
any phenomenon in the world. Rock is composed of large,
heavy atoms, so rough that they remain closely packed; the
atoms of water are equally large and heavy, but smooth and
easily sliding; air contains light, smooth particles. Sensation
is caused by atoms emanating from the surface of an object
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and coming in contact with the sense organs. If the atoms are
smooth, the sensation is pleasant, like music or fragrance; if
very rough or angular, it is painful, like the taste of quinine
or the sound of a squeaking axle; if slightly rough, it titillates
rather than hurts, like strong spices or the sensation of a
rough blanket.
Thought and emotions are as atomic and material as
anything else. The mind or soul is composed of minute,
spherical, slippery particles that roll about in the body like
ball-bearings in a machine and move faster than light. Their
relative size may be illustrated by enlarging the whole picture
of the body several hundred times until the atoms of flesh
and bone become about the size of potatoes, and those of the
bodily fluids like blood and lymph about the size of peas. If
now we imagine a quantity of plumbago lubricating powder
dusted in among the peas and potatoes, we have a notion of
the way soul-atoms permeate the body. Though some of them
are present in all parts of the body, they congregate in larger
crowds in the head and heart, where their vibration produces
thoughts and emotions. During growth and maturity, while
the body particles are firmly compacted, the soul remains in it
because the soul-atoms rebound from the solid framework,
and fewer of them escape than can be replenished by new
ones entering from the air. But when age begins to render the
tissues wide-meshed and flabby, more and more of the soul
escapes; the old man may lose his memory along with his
teeth, and when most of the soul atoms are gone may sink into
second childishness and mere oblivion. When the framework
can no longer retain any of the tiny particles, death comes;
and at that moment the soul disperses into the air like water
from a broken pitcher, never to reunite in a single organism.
Though the atoms themselves are immortal, the consciousness
which they build up dies with the body.
It might be thought that such a materialistic universe
would have no room at all for gods; yet here they are, the
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whole Roman pantheon. Perhaps it was a gesture of appease-
ment to the state religion of Lucretius' time. If so, it was an
ironical one, for he deprives the gods of all creative and
governing functions and reduces them to the role of idle
spectators. Even the gods are atomic, created by chance like
everything else and as transitory as the rest of the universe,
larger anthropomorphic beings remote from and indifferent
to human life, neither creating nor punishing, existing
pleasantly in the upper air like good epicureans. If we leave
them alone they will not trouble us; there is no need to
worship or fear them.
Let us look in conclusion at some of the guesses that
Lucretius makes to explain many common phenomena. His
attitude is disarming. Admitting that there is no certainty
about such things and that alternative explanations are pos-
sible, he is still never afraid to try, and always sure that the
real cause is some form of atomic motion. Thus he tri-
umphantly explains the effect of a mirror by showing that
every object throws off from its surface a continual series of
thin films consisting of a layer one atom thick forming an
exact copy of the object. If such a film strikes an opaque
surface, it is wrecked and dispersed in the air; if it meets a
transparent surface, it passes through unscathed; but a mirror
causes it to rebound in the same shape as before, only reversed
from side to side. This plausible explanation satisfies him,
but of some others he is less sure. The motions of planets are
probably caused by air currents turning their celestial
spheres; thunder and lightning may be due to clouds crashing
together and squeezing out fire-atoms like flint and steel. He
is uncertain about the phases of the moon, which may result
from the sun's reflected light, but may equally well be due to
the revolution of a body with a light and a dark side, or to a
dark satellite revolving around the moon, or even to the
moving atoms' forming a new and differently shaped moon
every day. At any rate, it's done by atoms. His most brilliant
THE NATURE OF THINGS 159
guess concerns the cause of magnetism. A magnet, he says,
discharges atoms more rapidly than do other objects; this
discharge creates a vacuum, into which iron particles are
pushed by the air behind them. And why are not particles of
wood similarly propelled toward a magnet? They are! But we
don't notice the fact because the loose texture of wood permits
it to throw off a few surface particles, whereas tightly woven
iron must move all at once.
Obsolete as this whole cosmology now seems, Lucretius'
poem is still good reading. Knowing nothing of chemical
processes, not distinguishing between atoms and molecules
or elements and compounds, even less suspecting the existence
of electrons, he nevertheless makes many surprisingly accurate
conjectures. His writing is attractive for its homely concrete
details and for its friendly desire to explain everything which,
left unexplained, might frighten his readers. Often his naive
confidence of having reassured them is hardly justified.
Whether or not the fear of death is allayed by regarding
death as the end of all consciousness must remain a matter
of opinion. But his amiable desire to be of service is beyond
question, and he remains the one literary artist who has
transformed the metaphysics of materialism into poetry.
It is not hard to find objections to atomistic materialism.
A principal one, the improbability of an organized world
having been formed by chance, has already been discussed in
our imaginary debate. There is also difficulty with the nature
of atoms themselves, and with the assumption that they ex-
plain anything. They are regarded as physically existing
objects which are indivisible, being the smallest conceivable
units of matter. But that statement is self-contradictory.
There is no such thing as a smallest conceivable unit of matter
because whenever we imagine any unit of matter of any size
whatever, it is then possible to conceive of half of it. The
only end of this process is to leave the physical realm entirely
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and pass over into some non-material entity like energy, as
modern science seems now to be doing. At that point we
have abandoned materialism in favor of some form of
idealism.
Aside from this logical refutation of atomism, there is
a further question about its value as a metaphysic. As such
its object should be to explain the nature of reality, and this
it fails to do because it arbitrarily breaks up the universe into
parts which have no relation to real life or real phenomena.
The analysis of something into its parts may be very useful,
provided the parts are logically related to the purpose for
which one does the analyzing; otherwise it is of no value.
For example, suppose we are studying the word "planet" to
discover its meaning. Examining it, we find that it consists
of six units which we call letters; pulling these apart and
setting down on the paper P-L-A-N-E-T, we find that we are
no nearer our goal than before. If our object had been to
spell the word, we should have achieved it; but the analysis
has not helped us to interpret its meaning. That meaning, or
the reality of the word, lies in the whole of it taken as a single
unit, and has nothing to do with the letters as such. It may
similarly be argued that atoms, though interesting as separate
segments of the universe, give no clue to its total reality and
therefore beg the metaphysical question. That the analogy of
atoms to letters of a word is a fair one appears from the fact
that Lucretius himself uses it, naturally without perceiving
that it tells against his theory. "Through these very lines of
mine," he says, "you may see letters common to many words,
though you must confess that lines and words differ from one
another in both meaning and sound. So much can elements
do, when nothing is changed but their order." 6 True enough,
but just as the elements fall short of explaining the meaning
of Lucretius' lines, so are atoms inadequate to explain that
of the universe.
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As a result of these objections and in revolt against the
exaltation of chance to be the leading power in the world,
theistic philosophers build their case that a transcendent
deity has planned, created, and governed everything. Don't
stultify yourself, they say, by concentrating myopically on the
letters of a word or the atoms of a universe. If you look at
the whole, you will find that it is the expression of a personal
cosmic intelligence. The man of real insight sees through
nature to the god that is behind it. "The heavens declare the
glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork." In
his poem The Hound of Heaven, Francis Thompson pictures
man as trying in vain to escape God by taking refuge in
nature, only to be tracked down by the inexorable pursuer.
He begins:
I fled Him, down the nights and down the days;
I fled Him down the arches of the years;
I fled Him down the labyrinthine ways
Of my own mind; and in the mist of tears
I hid from Him, and under running laughter.
Unable to escape anywhere in human life, the fugitive seeks
fellowship in nature, but finds it inadequate:
I knew all the swift importings
On the wilful face of skies;
I knew how the clouds arise
Spumed of the wild sea-snortings ....
Against the red throb of its sunset-heart
I laid my own to beat,
And share commingling heat;
But not by that, by that was eased my human heart ....
Nature, poor stepdame, cannot slake my drouth.*
To the theist, physical or material nature is always
insufficient, and that for a reason suggested by the word
"stepdame." The theist feels himself orphaned in the im-
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personal universe, with nature around him at worst a cruel,
at best an indifferent, stepmother; and he will not rest until
he finds a father. With Housman, he says,
I, a stranger and afraid
In a world I never made.
But it did not make itself, as the atomist asserts; and the
power that created it and all the persons in it must be himself
a person the maker of the human mind must be a greater
mind, and the author of human emotions a being capable of
deeper emotions. Therefore the benevolence, fatherhood,
provision, and power of God are celebrated in theistic poetry,
and theistic philosophy is closely associated with religious
feeling. In examining them, then, we must distinguish be-
tween these two elements of rational argument, emphasized
in philosophical writings, and imaginative projection, found
mostly in poetry.
Let us look first at the rational basis for the metaphysic.
Philosophers have tried repeatedly to find a convincing proof
of the existence of God. In general, their attempts may be
reduced to three types of argument, each of which has been
labeled with an impressive name. They are called the
ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological arguments.
Each has had its day in the history of philosophy, but each has
proved insufficient to satisfy the majority of thinkers over
long periods of time; and man's belief in God still remains
a matter of faith rather than logic. Instead of observing them
in historical order, it may be interesting to proceed from the
most abstract to the most concrete and practical of the
attempted proofs.
Typical of the subtlety of medieval scholasticism is the
ontological argument, first set forth by Anselm, Archbishop
of Canterbury in the eleventh century, and repeated in
modified form by Descartes in the seventeenth. It is based
ultimately on Plato's doctrine that ideas or concepts have
an objective rxisrenrp indenendenf nf thr mind that contains
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them, and on the extension of this in the school of medieval
realism, which held that universals are real and not mere
names. The simplest statement of the argument, assuming
this doctrine as a premise, runs as follows: Everyone has in
his mind a concept of an absolutely perfect being, able to do
anything and never in the wrong, free of all limitations of
space, time, and finitude. If concepts have an actual existence
of their own, then such a perfect being must exist; for if he
did not, then we could never have had such an idea. Thus
the argument is summarized: the existence of an idea of
God in the mind proves the existence of God himself in the
universe. In this form it is not very convincing. By the same
reasoning we could prove the existence of a devil, a hippo-
griff, or anything else that we are capable of imagining. What
right have we to assume that our minds are important enough
to guarantee a real objective existence for whatever happens
to pass through them? Our first impulse is to dismiss the
argument as silly.
This common statement of it, however, obscures the real
point, which Anselm expressed more subtly and plausibly.
There are two angles of approach to it. First, if we have in
our minds a concept of a perfect being who possesses every
possible attribute, then we may assume at least that the idea
has a mental reality, that it actually exists in our consciousness.
The question is, does it also exist in the universe outside our
consciousness? Suppose it does not. In that case we can easily
imagine another being who does so exist, and our new con-
cept will be more perfect than our original one, because,
given two beings exactly the same in every respect except that
one has absolute existence while the other has only mental
existence, the one with absolute existence is the more perfect.
Consequently our first idea was not of a perfect being at all.
If we really do have a concept of a perfect being, then he
must exist, because anything which exists is more perfect
than something which does not. Existence is a necessary at-
tribute of perfection.
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The second approach is the one adopted by Descartes.
Every person who thinks, says Descartes, is aware that there
are some things his individual mind cannot do that it is
limited, finite, and therefore imperfect. But how can we
know this? Only by having an idea of perfection with which
to compare our own limitations. Without such an idea we
could never know them as limitations. And one of the in-
separable attributes of perfection must be existence, for
nothing which does not exist can be perfect. Finally, Descartes
associates the argument with mathematics, and reasons that
the proof of God is essentially the same as the proof of a
mathematical concept. If you define a Euclidean triangle as
a figure bounded by three straight lines, then it follows
inevitably that the sum of its angles is one hundred eighty
degrees. Similarly, if you define God as a perfect being, then
it follows inevitably that he exists.
Though some theists find the ontological argument quite
convincing, most modern students regard it with feelings of
resentment and frustration. It seems to them too smooth;
they feel unaccountably cheated, as by a sleight-of-hand trick,
but are at first unable to locate the difficulty. Usually the first
clear objection that presents itself is an emotional one. To
equate God with the concept of a perfect being fails to satisfy
the human craving for a father. This ontological abstraction
is not a person; it is simultaneously everything and nothing;
it is more like a pantheistic than a theistic conception. Even
if this god exists, what is to prove that he created the uni-
verse? And the question of his origin remains untouched.
Either he has existed infinitely or has created himself; and
both suppositions are equally applicable to the atoms of a
material universe. Such are the initial objections that come
to mind.
In addition, however, we may meet the ontological
argument on its own ground and accuse it of two logical
fallacies. The first is that, although the argument claims to
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begin with a concept in the mind and then pass on to an
objective fact, it really never gets out of the mind at all. It
does not compare idea and fact, but merely two ideas: one
of a being perfect in every respect except that it does not
exist, the other of a being equally perfect and also existing.
Of these two ideas, the second is unquestionably greater and
more meaningful. But it is still in the mental realm, and
does not prove at all that there is an external metaphysical
reality to correspond to it. Thus, though the argument proves
something, it does not prove the question at issue, namely the
actual existence of God.
Still more serious is the second fallacy. The argument
assumes that everyone does have a concept of absolute per-
fection. Is this true? If we examine our minds, we may find
that any being which we can possibly imagine has some flaw,
or is in some way limited, perhaps by time or space, perhaps
by logic itself. For example, is it possible for God to die? If
so, then his non-existence is conceivable. If not, then that
impossibility limits him, and he is no longer a perfect being.
This fact would seem to destroy the very basis of the onto-
logical argument.
Is the cosmological argument any more satisfactory? To
the extent that it is more straightforward, less abstract and
subtle, the answer is yes. It has a plausibly scientific rather
than a scholastic air about it. After the groundwork for it
was laid by Aristotle, it was developed by St. Augustine as a
Christian theological doctrine, and employed by some later
philosophers such as John Locke. The initial assumption is
that all phenomena in the universe are connected by a chain
of cause and effect; there are no fortuitous or unrelated
events. Though the atomist would not accept this, even a
materialistic scientist would admit that it seems to correspond
to the facts of experience, and that at least it has not yet been
disproved. Every event, then, has a cause, which in turn is
the result of a preceding cause, so that the universe is a series
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of cause-effect relationships. But at some point this series
must have begun. There must be a first cause behind which
we cannot go, an initial impulse that set all the rest in
motion; and this first cause is God. Aristotle called it the
unmoved mover, because, while it acts upon everything in
the universe, nothing ever acts upon it. All other beings are
both active and passive; it is never passive.
Despite the fact that this reasoning seems more practical
and less irritating, it is easier to refute than the ontological
argument because it involves a more glaring assumption not
the original postulate of a causal chain, which may be reason-
able enough, but the conclusion which we immediately drew
from it. At some point, we said, the series must have begun.
Why must it? Merely because our minds cannot envision the
concept of an infinite series, but can easily conceive of a
first cause? If so, this is only the ontological argument restated
in another form: the fact that our minds demand a begin-
ning of the series proves that such a beginning exists.
Moreover, we do admit the existence of an infinite series in
the field of mathematics. Though we may be unable to
imagine it concretely, we do not deny its reality. There is no
beginning or end to a variable approaching a limit or to the
path of a hyperbolic curve or to an irrational number. Why
might not the causal chain of phenomena be such a curve?
Consequently the proof turns out to be only an assertion that
a first cause necessarily exists because we say it must exist.
When we come to the teleological argument we are on
familiar ground, for it is the one adopted by the theistic
speaker in our debate, and the one most commonly heard in
religious arguments. Briefly, it is the argument from design
or purpose. If we see an orderly mechanism such as an auto-
mobile or an efficient factory, we infer that it must have been
created by an intelligence with a specific purpose in view; it
does what it is designed to do. Therefore, seeing evidence of
coherent organization in the universe, we infer that a cosmic
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intelligence designed it. Our evidence consists in the relia-
bility of natural law; nature can be trusted to do the same
things in the same circumstances. Somebody must have
arranged it that way. This is the most immediately appealing
of the arguments. Even the beautiful structure of a single
living body seems convincing proof of a creative mind in the
background. A mouse, said Walt Whitman, is enough to
stagger sextillions of infidels. Yet enough infidels have
remained unstaggered to throw grave doubt on the validity
of the argument.
In the first place, it is an argument by analogy, always
a dangerous kind of reasoning. An event that occurs under
certain circumstances will not necessarily occur under other
similar circumstances, because we may have ignored some
unseen but vital difference that changes the whole situation.
Finding by repeated experiment that water boils at 212 F.,
we conclude that water will boil at that temperature on top
of Mt. Everest. Though the water, fire, and receptacle are the
same, the analogy does not hold because we have forgotten
the factor of atmospheric pressure. Likewise, when we ascend
from human affairs to the cosmic realm we are not safe in
drawing analogies. Though from our limited point of view
the two are apparently similar, they may be so radically
different that nothing true of the one is necessarily true of the
other.
Furthermore, even if we grant that the analogy may be
valid, the theist who uses it often finds it turning against
him. When he is asked what is the apparent purpose that he
sees in nature, he usually answers, the welfare of living beings
or the development of personality to the highest degree
possible. He can scarcely avoid this answer, for otherwise the
creative intelligence of God would have as its aim something
foreign to its own nature, would become indifferent or
malevolent toward its own creatures, and would relegate
human life to the position of a useless by-product. The theist
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dare not thus lose his personal God. If, however, he does
define purpose in terms of human value, then he must face
the fact that the universe seems unsuited to that end, except
in the case of a few people. God cannot be less efficient than
man; yet no trained and intelligent man would carry out a
purpose as inefficiently as nature does. Nature is wasteful and
random. A carpenter building a house starts with a blueprint,
orders materials, cuts them to the proper size, and fastens
them together. He does not throw thousands of wooden
blocks into a hole, in the hope that eventually the right
ones will land on top of one another, and then boast that his
success jusified all the waste of materials. But nature does.
Thousands of seeds are thrown to the wind before one finds
fertile ground and creates a tree. More destruction than
preservation appears in nature. Indeed, the existence of one
species is often contingent upon the destruction of another.
Is this the mark of a purposive intelligence?
At this point a common reply is that the hidden design
of the system is the process of evolution, that the real blue-
print is the survival of the fittest, which necessitates the
destruction of the unfit. If we wonder whether the fittest
always do survive, we are met triumphantly by the apparent
truism that their survival is itself proof of their fitness.
Whether or not this is true of species, it is patently false when
applied to human individuals and a personal God must be
interested in individuals. Judged by any physical, mental, or
moral standard, does a tornado kill the unfit and spare the
fit? If a gun accidentally discharged into a crowd kills one
man, is that man biologically least suited to survive? This
the theist must assert if he relies on the design in nature; yet
he is troubled to see that, for the development of human
personality, the result of the process is often unfairly destruc-
tive rather than purposefully constructive. If he insists that
all things work together for good he is relying on faith, not
reason.
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Thus far we have been analyzing the rational arguments
for theism. Most theists, after trying one or another of them,
revert to the emotional side of their philosophy and base it
on the need of the human heart. The belief that the central
reality of the universe is a powerful and personal God, a
protector and creator, brings to them the peace that passeth
all understanding; and they gladly sacrifice the understanding
for the sake of the peace. Their metaphysical belief is no
longer abstract, but gains intensity by being associated with
definite concrete images. God becomes fully a person, with
the mind, emotions, and purposes of a magnified human
being; at the same time he is a symbol of all constructive
power and moral goodness. From this personification of God
arises religious poetry, which attempts to fuse in imagination
God as a metaphysical entity and God as a personality.
Because it deals with two different realms, the human and
the spiritual, and tries to express one in terms of the other,
it is very difficult poetry to write. While it may rise to an
imaginative splendor greater than that of any other art, it
may easily sink into ludicrous imagery or lose itself in abstrac-
tion. We observed something of this in Dante's Paradiso,
where God is robbed of living moral value by being made a
motionless center of adoration and blind absorption on the
part of the blessed souls in a static empyrean. Let us see how
the opposite difficulty appears in another great religious poem,
Milton's Paradise Lost.
With the main portion of this work, the story of the
Garden of Eden where Adam and Eve were tempted by Satan
into man's first disobedience, we are not here concerned.
Like most epics, however, this one begins in the middle of
the story and then brings the reader up to date by means of
a special episodic section called the epic digression. In Books
V, VI, and VII of Paradise Lost the Archangel Raphael visits
Adam and Eve in the garden in order to warn them against
temptation and explain why Satan is particularly eager to
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ruin them. As this explanation involves an account of how
and why the universe was created, it is a good example of
theism turned into poetry, with all the poetic strength and
logical weakness of cosmic forces personified.
If a theistic God created the universe, he must be outside
that universe and separate from it. Milton pictures this situ-
ation by making our universe a small, self-contained unit in
a vast infinity of space. Originally this space was divided into
two parts: a spiritual realm called Heaven and a surrounding
nothingness called Chaos. As yet no cosmos or physical
universe existed anywhere. Heaven was inhabited by God
and a concourse of angels, who were eternal and uncreated.
Thus Milton avoids the postulate of a first cause. Though
God and the angels are non-material beings, Raphael describes
them in physical terms because the human mind has no
conception of spiritual facts. They have bodies, filled not
with blood but with celestial ichor. They eat and drink (Eve
furnishes Raphael with a good lunch) , are subject to pain
but not death, make use of mechanical devices and weapons,
and feel all human emotions. Had they not been thus per-
sonalized, God would never have had a motive for creating
the universe.
The trouble began, as troubles often do, over a question
of precedence. Hitherto all the angels had been equal under
God and contented with their lot, but when God announced
that his only son would now be his vicegerent and lord of all
Heaven, one of his most effulgent angels, Lucifer, was stung
to pride of rank and resentment at the new appointment.
This is likely to happen whenever any leader appoints an
assistant leader, but how such an evil feeling could enter the
heart of an angel Milton does not explain. At any rate
Lucifer, in a vigorous fascist oration, communicated his own
vexation to thousands of other disgruntled angels, declared
war on God, and even won a battle by inventing and manu-
facturing a new secret weapon overnight. The divine armies
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rallied, however, overwhelmed the new weapons by piling
uprooted mountains upon them, and drove the rebels off the
parapet of Heaven to fall through Chaos. As they fell, God
created hell far below to receive them; and there Lucifer,
now named Satan, lay,
Hurled headlong flaming from the ethereal sky,
With hideous ruin and combustion, down
To bottomless perdition, there to dwell
In adamantine chains and penal fire.
8
Thus God's first motive for creating anything was revenge.
His next one was something very like pride. Since the civil
war had removed about a third of Heaven's population,
Satan might well exult in the hope that the celestial realm
was now understaffed. This God could never allow; he must
demonstrate immediately how little the loss meant to him.
I'll show that renegade what I can do, he says in effect:
Lest his heart exalt him in the harm
Already done, to have dispeopled Heaven
My damage fondly deemed I can repair
That detriment, if such it be to lose
Self-lost, and in a moment will create
Another world.9
God therefore stood on the rim of Heaven and looked out
over "the vast, immeasurable abyss, Outrageous as the sea,
dark, wasteful, wild." Turning to his divine storehouse, he
brought out a pair of golden compasses and marked out the
great circle of the universe. Milton describes the act of
creation in this wonderful passage:
One foot he centered, and the other turned
Round through the vast profundity obscure,
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And said, 'Thus far extend, thus far they bounds,
This be thy just circumference, O World!' . . .
Darkness profound
Covered the abyss; but on the watery calm
His brooding wings the Spirit of God outspread,
And vital virtue infused, and vital warmth,
Throughout the fluid mass, but downward purged
The black, tartareous, cold, infernal dregs
Adverse to life; then founded, then conglobed
Like things to like, the rest to several place
Disparted, and between spun out the Air,
And Earth, self-balanced, on her center hung. 10
Here is a picture to thrill the heart and stir the blood.
As such it may fittingly represent the emotional and imagina-
tive approach to theism. It is only after Milton's sonorous
pentameters have ceased to resound in our ears that we realize
how completely he has created God in man's image. Perhaps
we are disappointed in this, but it is inevitable that a poet
should use whatever method he can to arouse the basic
emotions of his readers in this case the sense of awe and the
feeling of reassurance and confidence in a cosmic creator who
is also a father. The reason cannot prove the truth of this
concept; the imagination cannot picture it in any but human
terms. Yet of these two roads to theistic metaphysics, the
poetic and imaginative proves for many people the more
satisfying.
The distinction between theism and pantheism is less
easy to draw than that between theism and atomism. We are
still explaining reality by means of a god, but he is a more
abstract and elusive being than the creative father of Milton
and the Bible. The god of the pantheist did not create reality,
but he is reality. He is not the maker of nature, for he and
nature are the same thing called by two different names.
Every object, event, and thought is a part of God, and taken
together they make up the whole of God. Neither nature nor
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God was ever created; both have existed simultaneously and
inseparably from all eternity. To distinguish between them
is like distinguishing between an object and its properties.
If you hold an apple in your hand, you recognize it as an
apple because it is round, smooth, firm, red outside and white
within, furnished with a stem and black seeds, provided with
a fragrance, taste, and texture characteristic of an apple. Now
suppose you separate all these properties from the object
itself, placing on one side the shape, color, smell, taste, and
texture, and on the other the apple; then assume that the
apple created all these attributes of itself. When you have
taken away all the properties, what do you have left? That is
the question which the pantheist asks of the theist. Just as
the apple consists of its properties, so God consists of all the
phenomena of the universe. The universe was not made by
God; it is God.
Perhaps the transition to this idea will be clearer if we
read two more poems, companion pieces to those we observed
under theism. One makes use again of the legend of Lucifer,
the other of man's attempt to escape from God. In the first we
pass from a long poem to a short one, from an epic to a
sonnet. George Meredith's Lucifer in Star-Light, written two
centuries later than Paradise Lost, assumes that the reader
knows the story, alludes to it without explanation, and
recounts a later episode in it of which Milton had never
heard.
On a starr'd night Prince Lucifer uprose.
Tir'd of his dark dominion swung the fiend
Above the rolling ball in cloud part screen'd,
Where sinners hugg'd their spectre of repose.
Poor prey to his hot fit of pride were those.
And now upon his western wing he lean'd,
Now his huge bulk o'er Afric's sands careen'd,
Now the black planet shadow'd Arctic snows.
Soaring through wider zones that prick'd his scars
With memory of the old revolt from Awe,
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He reach'd a middle height, and at the stars,
Which are the brain of heaven, he look'd, and sank.
Around the ancient track marched, rank on rank,
The army of unalterable law.
Here is a significant change of philosophy from Milton's poem.
We have the same rebellious Lucifer subject to the same fit
of pride and trying once again to assault the parapets ot
heaven. We have the same result in Satan's discomfiture and
return to his dark dominion. But where is God, and where is
his host of armed angels piling mountains on the pretender
to power? They are simply not there. Nothing is there to
impede Lucifer's progress. Or rather, on closer inspection we
see that everything is there, and Lucifer cannot fight against
everything. What defeats him is not a personal antagonist, but
the universe; and once he realizes that fact he gives up in
despair, and sinks back to hell untouched by any theistic
vengeance.
Symbolically the poem may be interpreted in this way:
Lucifer represents the spirit of rebellion in man, the proud
energy and ambitious vitality that lead him to chafe against
all restrictions. He is irked by things as they are, and deter-
mined to change them. Believing himself free to do as he likes
and forgetful of past reverses, he tries again to destroy all
obstacles to his liberty. He symbolizes not necessarily evil, but
independence and individualism bursting the bonds of tradi-
tion or fate. Thus he is a personification of a certain attitude
common in human life: the feeling of wilfulness, revolt,
proud impatience of restraint. The force which opposes
him, however, is not a person but the entire universe. It is
symbolized, not by a legendary character, but by the starry
sky, one of the most impressive and convincing evidences of
the orderliness of nature. Nothing disturbs or interferes
with the stars. A conjunction of two brilliant planets,
occurring at the exact moment and the precise angular
distance that have been mathematically foreseen, is an awe-
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inspiring sight. Individual will and ambition are insignificant
in the face of such a natural order. Pride shrivels when it sees
this eternally rational system. Thus the stars represent the
brain of heaven, the principle of reason in the universe,
which admits of no disorderly conduct on the part of an
individual. Satan retreats, not before an army of persons, but
before the force of the unchanging cosmic order, "the army of
unalterable law."
Once before we found the stars being used as a symbol
of the cosmos, in Arnold's poem Self-Dependence. There they
illustrated the Stoic ideal of following natural law by per-
forming one's function as faithfully as possible. At the time
we were concerned with ethical conduct, but we should now
notice a further connection between the symbols. For the
Stoics were pantheists, identifying God with the universe. It
seems, then, that the pantheistic belief naturally expresses
iself in images from nature, and conversely that a tendency
to exalt natural law often leads to pantheism.
We may now examine the second poem, which offers a
different contrast with theism. Though, as the title indicates,
Emerson's Brahma is based primarily on the type of pan-
theism found in Hindu philosophy, it may apply to the
belief in general. Two stanzas will reveal the idea:
If the red slayer thinks he slays,
Or if the slain thinks he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again.
They reckon ill who leave me out.
When me they fly, I am the wings;
I am the doubter and the doubt,
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.
The reader should note that the universe itself (that is, the
pantheistic god) is speaking. This is confusing, because if he
expresses the emotions of the poem he must be thought of as
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a person with human or superhuman feelings, and no longer
consistently as a natural order. In this respect the poem
illustrates the difficulty of keeping the careful distinction
between theistic and pantheistic metaphysics.
But we are not concerned with the poem as a complete
expression of the philosophy. Let us rather contrast it with
Thompson's Hound of Heaven to reveal a striking difference
from theism. In both poems we have a human being trying
to escape from God, to find a way of life that need not include
him. Thompson takes refuge in nature (that is, becomes a
pantheist) , only to find that nature is no substitute for the
real theistic God, who insistently demands his attention and
will not give him up. This God is separate from nature, and
appears in the poem as an eternal pursuer whose footsteps
the fugitive must always hear behind him. Now the image in
Brahma again exemplifies an essential change in philosophy.
Here likewise we have a skeptic trying and failing to escape
from God; but he fails for a different reason. The skeptic is
no longer pursued by God, but surrounded by him still
more, he himself is part of God. God is the wings with which
he would fly, he is the doubter himself, he is even the doubt
which exists in the man's mind, because God includes all
non-material as well as material things. A mere pursuer might
be outdistanced, or at least evaded for a time; but the all-
embracing universe is inescapable for even a moment.
These two poems reveal, in the form of concrete images,
something of the difference between the two philosophies. We
are now ready to investigate pantheism as we did theism,
first from the rational and then from the emotional point of
view. The one is found in the writings of a famous philoso-
pher, the other in a group of poets who indulged in nature
worship.
Any student who wishes to give himself a stimulating
intellectual experience while he is learning about pantheism
should read at least the first book of Ethic, by Baruch Spinoza,
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published after his death in 1677.
11 The reading will be
arduous and will require the closest attention, but the reward
will be commensurate with the effort. Though the volume
as a whole concerns ethics, Book I, entitled "Of God," builds
a metaphysical background for Spinoza's views of human
conduct, and this metaphysic, among other things, is pan-
theistic. 12 In his time he was considered a dangerous radical,
and his works were suppressed as blasphemous by Catholics,
Protestants, and Jews alike.
In reading Spinoza, the best place to begin is the
Appendix to Book I, which helps explain the ill repute of its
author by giving a refutation of the prevailing theism of his
day. It is a convincing but irritating essay, written with some
acerbity and in a lofty condescending tone, brushing aside
his opponents as ignorant children who had never taken the
trouble to think clearly about anything. The old prejudices
about God, he says, "can easily be rectified with a little
thought by anyone." This Appendix is also a logical place
to begin because it is easier reading then the main part of the
book, and because it clears the ground by explaining the
errors in theism.
Those errors we have already discussed earlier in this
chapter. Spinoza concentrates mainly on the folly of trying
to personify God and the weakness of the commonly used
ideological argument. To regard God as a person is an inter-
esting exercise of the imagination, he says; but all proofs
based on such an assumption "do not reveal the nature of
anything in itself, but only the constitution of the imagina-
tion." He traces the psychology of a theist to show how
naturally the error originates. From childhood everyone is
accustomed to view the objects around him as means of
advancing his own welfare, and since he did not create them
he decides that another person exists who prepared them for
man's use and who likes to be thanked for them just as the
man himself likes to have his good deeds appreciated. But
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unfortunately many of the objects in nature are injurious
instead of useful. Therefore man must have angered God by
sinning. When this in turn becomes doubtful because of the
obvious fact that injuries attack indiscriminately the pious
and the sinful, then man concludes that the ways of God are
incomprehensible anyway and the attempt to fathom them
impious. Thus the course of theistic metaphysics has led
man to a voluntary acceptance of ignorance and superstition
in which he might have remained forever had he not been
rescued by the most potent of all intellectual influences
namely, the rigorous discipline of mathematics.
This leads us to the main body of the book and to its
close connection with mathematics. Spinoza belonged to the
large group of philosophers who have been ardent mathe-
maticians, extending from Pythagoras and Plato through
Descartes and Leibniz to Bertrand Russell. Mathematical
processes have seemed to them closer to pure reason than any
other human activity; the axioms of geometry have been
models of self-evident truths, of the kind of assumptions
that a rationalistic philosopher had to make. 13 Accordingly
Spinoza takes over the method wholesale trom one field to
the other. Do not be surprised to find that the Ethic is
arranged like a treatise on mathematics, beginning with
definitions and axioms, then listing propositions, with formal
proofs, corollaries, and scholia. Be sure not to miss the scholia
or comments; they contain some of the most interesting
material and the most biting remarks.
Among the many ideas expressed in Book I of the Ethic,
we are concerned with Spinoza's pantheistic conception of
God. What sort of God does he conjure from the realm of
mathematics? In the first place, he need not worry so much
as the rational theist does about proving the existence of God.
He does prove it, in three different ways, but the demonstra-
tions are given brusquely and rapidly. This is not surprising,
for the pantheistic God does exist, in proper mathematical
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terms, by definition. He is defined as the sum and inner
essence of everything, as synonymous with the universe.
Therefore he must exist if the universe does, since they are
two names for the same thing. Indeed, it is not even necessary
that we grant the reality of the whole universe, for if anything
whatever exists, that thing is what the pantheist means by
God. We cannot deny the existence of everything without
denying our own reality; and this is impossible because we
have clear and distinct evidence of our own existence in the
process of thought through which we are now going. If we
deny our own reality, the very process of denial proves that
reality. And God is also undeniable, because he is the sum
of all reality.
In trying to formulate a clear concept of this God, it is
important to avoid personifying him. The difficulty involved
is shown in the preceding sentence, where we erroneously
said him instead of it, but perhaps this is pardonable inas-
much as Spinoza also does it. At the same time he is insistent
that no personal attributes should be ascribed to God. God is
not composed of a body and a mind as man is, nor is he either
body alone or mind alone. If he were any of these, or in any
sense a separate entity, then he must somehow have been
created, either by himself or by an external force; and this
would simply move the metaphysical problem back one step
to account for that creative force. Instead, he includes in
himself all matter and all mind, a totality of substance which
has never been created, but exists in infinite time. Spinoza
refers here not to separate objects or individual minds, but
to the essence of mind and matter, which he calls substance.
Nothing created substance because there is nothing else in the
universe that could create it; if anything else existed, it too
would be a part of substance. Therefore it pertains to the
inherent nature of substance to exist, and this existence is
necessarily infinite. To Spinoza this fact is so self-evident as
hardly to need proof. His close reasoning and his impatience
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may be seen in this sentence:
If anyone were to say that he possessed a clear and
distinct, this is, a true, idea of substance, and that
he nevertheless doubted whether such a substance
exists, he would be in the same position as if he
were to say that he had a true idea and nevertheless
doubted whether or not it was false (as is evident to
anyone who pays a littel attention) 14
This infinite substance, then, includes everything there is.
If it manifests itself in the mental or spiritual realm, it is
called res cogitans (substance thinking) ; if in the physical
realm, it is called res extensa (substance extended in space) ;
but it is all the same primal stuff. And the totality of this
substance, consisting of an infinite number of attributes, is
God.
It is therefore inaccurate to speak of God's will or God's
decrees. He does not decide that something shall happen and
then make it happen. It comes about inevitably because of
God's nature, that is, the nature of the universe. The theist
says, God's will be done. The pantheist says, God's will is
done, because whatever occurs is necessarily his will. He has
no free choice, could not have changed his decrees, and the
world as it is is the outward expression of his nature. 15 He
has no intellect or will in our sense of the words, though he
includes all intellect and will as part of himself. He is the
inherent essence of all phenomena and all thought. He is
everything. And when understood in this way, Spinoza
insists, God is greater, more exalted, and more satisfying than
any theistic image of a creative father.
Spinoza sets before us one example of the rational formu-
lation of pantheism. His approach is completely intellectual,
distrustful of emotion and imagination. When he entitles the
fourth book of the Ethic "Of Human Bondage," he means
slavery to the passions; when he calls the fifth book "Of
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Human Liberty," he means the power of the intellect to free
us from the passions. Beware of the imagination, he warns
us; it will deceive you with false pictures. We may find this
distrust vindicated when we now turn to the emotional inter-
pretation of pantheism. As with theism, poets have often
sacrificed logic to fulfil their emotional needs, and in doing
so have distorted the philosophy while apparently accept-
ing it.
The best example of this is the group of English poets
called Romanticists, who flourished between 1790 and 1825,
a little more than a century after Spinoza. Their typical
attitude was partly a reaction against a period of coldness
and lack of emotion in both literature and social life. Though
it is unsafe to generalize about a whole period, these poets
were convinced that the eighteenth century, in its formal
manners and polished urbanity, had evaded or slurred over
the fundamental human feelings, had relied on a superficial
type of common sense, and had been guilty of self-satisfaction
in regarding itself as the ultimate era of enlightenment. They
were repelled by the eighteenth-century view of both religion
and nature. The Established Church had shown a tendency
to become formalized, worldly, and perfunctory. A fashion-
able new faith called Deism had arisen, which held that God,
after creating the world like a skilful mechanic and then
providing a set of laws to keep it going and the human race
to run it, had sensibly gone away and left it in our care.
Though of course we should give God credit for what he did,
we need have no further concern about him. Nor need we
have any particular interest in nature, except to grow enough
crops to maintain society, or in moments of relaxation to
look out the window at an artificially pruned formal garden.
Few people thought of contemplating landscape in its native
state, because doing so might arouse feelings that would
disturb the beholder's equanimity. Both these attitudes
seemed to the Romanticists intolerably arid.
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The change was precipitated by the upheavals that
occurred at the end of the century. The American and the
French Revolutions, followed by a world war, shook English
society out of its complacency. The new group of writers
possessed unusual lyrical genius and unstable nervous tem-
peraments which made them easy prey to disillusionment
and despair. They needed a comfort which the established
religion did not provide, and most of them found that
comfort in the beauty of nature. As a refuge from the sad
state of the world and the misunderstanding of their fellow
men, they fled to mountains and forests, the grandeur of
thunderstorms and the silent ministry of frost at midnight.
In beautiful poetic imagery they idealized nature, and from
this it was a short step to worshipping the natural world,
feeling the mystic unity of all creation, and finally identifying
every part of it with God. Though they were not avowed or
rational pantheists, the implication of their poetry is
pantheistic.
An interesting evidence of this tendency is their choice
of words to express their own relation to nature, which they
desired to make as close and intimate as the relation of the
parts of nature to one another. They did not wish to observe
the world; they wished to be completely absorbed in it as a
garden is absorbed in moonlight or a seed in the earth. The
mysterious emotional union for which they longed was
extended into the complete union of all nature to form God.
Byron, watching a thunderstorm on Lake Geneva, exclaims,
"Most glorious nightl
Thou wert not sent for slumber I Let me be
A sharer in thy fierce and far delight,
A portion of the tempest and of thee!" la
and expresses his relation with nature thus:
"I steal
From all I may be, or have been before.
To mingle with the Universe." 17
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Shelley, sitting for hours on a hillside in northern Italy,
gradually feels creeping over him that sense of mystical unity
with the world which brings peaceful relaxation in the midst
of trouble, and creates from it poetry of unusual beauty:
And the plains that silent lie
Underneath the leaves unsodden
Where the infant frost has trodden
With his morning-winged feet,
Whose bright print is gleaming yet;
And the red and golden vines,
Piercing with their trellised lines
The rough, dark-skirted wilderness;
The dun and bladed grass no less,
Pointing from this hoary tower
In the windless air; the flower
Glimmering at my feet; the line
Of the olive-sandalled Appennine
In the south dimly islanded;
And the Alps, whose snows are spread
High between the clouds and sun;
And of living things each one;
And my spirit, which so long
Darkened this swift stream of song,
Interpenetrated lie
By the glory of the sky. 18
Leaves, flowers, mountains, animals, and poet all are merged
in the single body of the universe. When God is made part of
the picture, he and nature are similarly amalgamated. "But
'tis God Diffused through all that doth make all one whole/'
writes Coleridge; and Wordsworth, in the period before he
abandoned his early philosophy, writes an unusually overt
expression of pantheism:
That interior life . . .
In which all beings live with god, themselves
Are god, Existing in the mighty whole
As indistinguishable as the cloudless East
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At noon is from the cloudless West, when all
The hemisphere is one cerulean blue. 19
The words which have been italicized in these passages
speak for themselves: portion, mingle, interpenetrated,
diffused, indistinguishable. Let us add finally the most famous
of all, when Wordsworth, revisiting a beloved valley after a
five-year absence, sums up all that nature has come to mean
to him, from sensuous pleasure up through moral inspiration
and emotional quietude to the climax of
A sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.20
A sublime something interfused in man and nature alike can
be none other than the pantheistic God.
It is evident that these emotional expressions of pan-
theism possess a force and beauty entirely lacking in the
rational approach; it is evident also that they considerably
change the philosophy in ways that Spinoza would not
approve. He would lament the substitution of imaginative
revery for mathematical rigor, and would protest that the
Romanticists worshipped the external sensory manifestations
of nature, the mere modes of the universe, instead of its
essential substance. And nature as a refuge would not appeal
to him. Especially Shelley and Byron demand that nature,
while absorbing them into its bosom, should exclude the rest
of mankind an egoistic attitude very different from philoso-
phic inclusiveness. Equally unphilosophical is the Romantic
reiteration that nature is perfect. When Byron says, "I can
see nothing to loathe in nature," or Wordsworth asserts that
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"Nature never did betray The heart that loved her," they are
expressing personal feelings quite alien to real pantheism,
in which the sum total of the universe, good and evil alike, is
accepted as constituting the essence of God. Thus, as with
theism, the imaginative approach to pantheism involves both
strength and weakness.
Pantheism has never been a popular metaphysic.-
1 It is
vaguer and more difficult than the other two we have studied.
The power of chance and the power of intelligent planning
are clearly understandable, whether we accept them or not;
but the pantheist can never quite explain just what he means
when he says that God is the infinite essence of the universe.
The theory has the advantages and the disadvantages of all
compromise. It is open to attack from both sides. Theists
consider it humanly unsatisfying. Better have no god than
an impersonal force of nature of which you are supposedly
a part but with which you can have no real association.
Materialists call it a weak compromise with religion, a partial
but hesitant deification of the scientific world. Yet there
remains the possibility that its vagueness may be due, not to
loose thinking but to profundity; that it is difficult because
it sets its sights higher than the others; and that there may
be an advantage in refusing to accept the simplification of
either theist or materialist.
CHAPTER SEVEN
OPTIMIST AND PESSIMIST
WHTHEN a reader sees these two
words, he may conclude that in the present chapter at least
we need not spend time defining terms. Everyone knows what
an optimist and a pessimist are, and has heard as many jokes
about them as he has about Pat and Mike. The optimist sees
the doughnut, the pessimist the hole (and calls it the whole) .
To the pessimist the glass is half empty; to the optimist it is
half full. The pessimist says, "I suppose there is no more milk
in that pitcher." The optimist says, "Pass the cream, please."
The contrast is universally recognized as typical of two
kinds of personality. In the Middle Ages, when tempera-
mental traits were thought to be caused by the preponderance
of one or another bodily fluid or humor, two of the four
common types were the sanguine and the melancholy. A
sanguine person, whose character was governed by an excess
of red blood, was ruddy of complexion, hearty and genial of
manner, always hopeful that things would turn out for the
best. In the melancholy person or malcontent, whose body
contained more black bile than any other fluid, hope was
blasted before it could take root, and only misfortune was
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anticipated. The two types delight in reviling each other,
and epithets like sourpuss, knocker, and wet blanket are
exchanged for Rotarian, backslapper, and Pollyanna.
But if this is what a reader first thinks of when he sees
the title of the present chapter, then the need to define our
terms is even greater than usual. How is tjie subject connected
with philosophy at all? Is not the contrast one of habit and
emphasis, perhaps a mere physical difference, hardly referable
to external facts? Obviously every person or group meets with
both good and bad fortune, and so is justified in expecting
either. All of us are subject to regularly alternating moods of
elation and depression, due perhaps to an excess or exhaus-
tion of chemical energy in the body or to the action of
endocrine glands whose functioning is little affected by our
philosophy of life. Knowing this, how can we say that any
choice is involved or that one attitude is preferable to the
other? In fact, as we think about the matter we fall into an
absurd dilemma. Which way should we want to feel, when
either attitude is likely to yield to the other in a short time?
When we are happy, then we may soon expect depression;
when we are most downcast, relief is in sight. Therefore it
seems that no one can be really hopeful or foreboding,
because either attitude is tempered by the knowledge that it
will shortly change
Though this dilemma is ridiculous enough, it is less so
than it sounds at first. An attempt to philosophize about
hope and despair must take it into account along with
everything else, but must not stop with it. Such an attempt
is a legitimate philosophic problem, and is often found in
literature. To see more clearly what the problem involves, let
us first clear the ground by excluding certain ideas and
showing what the two terms, philosophically considered, do
not mean.
In the first place, the difference between optimism and
pessimism is not the same as that between happiness and
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unhappiness. The paradoxical nature of the problem appears
in the fact that an optimist is frequently sad, while a
pessimist may thoroughly enjoy life. This is explainable in
two ways. There is an inevitable discrepancy between what
a person expects and what he gets. If his hopes are high, they
are sure to be disappointed; if they are moderate, he may be
pleasantly surprised. Therefore it is not strange that a
person's happiness may vary inversely as his optimism. More-
over, the gap between reason and emotion plays a part here
just as it does in ethics. Happiness or the lack of it is an
emotional matter, and the most carefully reasoned system of
philosophic pessimism may emerge from the brain of a man
with a happy temperament that remains unaffected by his
thinking. Such a happy pessimist was the poet A. E. Housman.
Conversely, his predecessor Tennyson, whose avowed philoso-
phy was one of progress upward and onward forever, was a
melancholy person who tormented himself for years over the
premature death of a friend and who, when he was his
natural self, wrote lines like "Break, break, break On thy
cold gray stones, O sea." Optimism may have little to do
with happiness.
Nor is the distinction the same as that between self-
satisfaction and discontent. Our lack of clarity about this
appears in the twist given to the word booster by the American
service-club legend. Logically, if a person needs a boost, he is
not so high as he would like to be and wants someone to
help him climb; the word implies a need for improvement.
But when the Zenith Chamber of Commerce uses the word,
they don't really mean boost; they mean flatter. They want
to be told that Zenith is the best little old town in the good
old U.S.A., and any suggestion for improvement is knocking.
Then they make the confusion complete by calling themselves
an Optimists' Club. Such an attitude represents a false and
shallow optimism. Most of the time it is a cover for little
understood feelings of inadequacy or unacknowledged guilt.
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The rational optimist need not assert that present conditions
are good, but only that improvement is possible and attain-
able; and it is this that the pessimist refuses to admit.
If these contrasts represent inaccurate use of the two
terms, what is their real meaning? From the point of view of
philosophy, what are optimism and pessimism? For our first
clue we must refer to our original definition of philosophy
and recollect that it must always be inclusive, must take
account of everything, must view the universe as a whole.
Our judgment, then, must not be limited by time or space.
Pessimism does not mean merely that the outlook is dark for
oneself as an individual, for his nation or his race, or for any
particular period of history. It must refer to the structure of
the entire universe and must conclude that that structure is
such as to nullify the possibility of attaining ultimate good.
Thus it follows logically our discussion of metaphysical
theories. Having asked what is the nature of reality, a
philosopher may next inquire whether reality is good or bad.
If he concludes that the total sum of actual and potential
good outweighs the sum of actual and potential evil, he is a
philosophic optimist; if he comes to the opposite conclusion,
he is a philosophic pessimist.
But what does he mean by good and bad? By what
standard can he judge the universe? Perhaps reality is so
arranged as to promote the welfare of inorganic matter, or
insects, or gods, rather than human beings. If so, has he any
right to find fault with it? This question the philosopher
must answer in the affirmative. Value is meaningless unless
it refers to some standard; and for a human thinker that
standard must be the development of human personality. If
there is no place for this in the universe, then, from the only
point of view possible to our minds, the sum of evil outweighs
the sum of good. Therefore we must add to our definition by
making human values such as intelligence, love, beauty,
justice, the standard of judgment. Does the universe take
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account of these values? For the human race in general, is
life now worth living or is there some chance of its being
made so? If we conclude that there is inherent in reality the
possibility that human values can maintain and develop
themselves, we are optimists; if not, we are pessimists.
We are now ready to study some illustrations of these
points of view in literature, both in their extreme forms and
in attempts to balance the two. As before, we shall select a
few of many possible examples, but this time shall arrange
them in historical order, because it is interesting to observe
the continual alternation between the two philosophies.
Though every era contains both of them, one usually pre-
dominates enough to give the age its characteristic temper;
and each one gives way fairly soon to its opposite. Sometimes
the cycles have an objective cause such as scientific discoveries
or political crises; occasionally the change comes with no
apparent reason, as leaves fall in the autumn even before a
frost has loosened them. Now and then, to our surprise, we
find that attention to similar facts produces opposite reactions
in different periods. And at all times there is much over-
lapping and uncertainty. With these things in mind, let us
trace some of the fluctuations between optimism and pessim-
ism that have occurred in the last two centuries.
The eighteenth century is a good starting-point, because
it set the stage so clearly for a reversal from one view to the
other, and because it shows how a rational philosophy may
be distorted by wishful thinking. In general outline it repre-
sents a swing from optimism to pessimism. A brief mention of
its character has already been made in Chapter Six. The
proudest boast of the eighteenth-century gentleman was that
he was civilized. He lived not only in an enlightened age,
but in the Age of Enlightenment, the culminating era toward
which all nature had been striving from the beginning of
time, the final exaltation of reason and banishment of super-
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stition and barbarism. He felt sorry for future ages because
they had nowhere to go but down. He hoped that many
institutions of the time could be fixed in their present form.
The English language, for example, had obviously reached
the highest perfection of which it was capable. No tampering
with it was permissible, and the small clique of literary
leaders frowned on new words, syntactical experiments, or
variety in verse forms. The suggestion was made that an
English Academy be created for the purpose of freezing the
language just at it then was.
All this is recognizable as one of the kinds of false
optimism previously discussed: the optimism of self-satisfac-
tion. It gained prestige, however, by adopting a highly
respectable philosophical background, furnished principally
by the German mathematician Gottfried Leibniz. A rationalist
like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz developed a metaphysic
according to which all reality is composed of countless
separate units of force called monads. Each monad is a little
universe in itself, and the infinite number of them are
arranged in order of clearness, beginning with the dullest and
most confused units of inorganic substance and working up
through sentient and rational monads to the perfect super-
monad at the top the omnipotent, omniscient, all-inclusive
unit of force which is God. All monads are eternal, never
created and never destroyed. Thus the universe is a harmon-
ious whole consisting of infinite gradations from lowest to
highest.
Upon this beautifully logical system Leibniz based his
optimistic belief that the universe is so arranged as to take
account of human values. God, the super-monad, is perfect in
purpose as well as in power. His purpose is to produce a
universe which will include the greatest possible variety and
freedom consistent with the harmony of the whole structure,
and so to allow for the greatest possible development of
human personality. This highest development could not come
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about if there were no evil or struggle in the world. To
develop himself, man must have stubborn matter to reduce to
form, obstacles to overcome, selfish impulses to fight against.
Otherwise he might have technical perfection but no human
values. Therefore God's purpose for the world is fixed by the
law of moral necessity. Though, being omnipotent, he might
have brought about various other kinds of worlds, actually
his moral perfection led him to choose a kind in which the
proportion of good and evil is best fitted for the life of human
beings. Therefore Leibniz confidently announced that things
as they are constitute "the best of all possible worlds."
It was an unfortunate phrase. Judged against the back-
ground of Leibniz's metaphysical system it is not an illogical
conclusion and is an example of genuine philosophic optimism
as previously defined. Taken by itself, however, it sounds like
smug complacency. It could easily be interpreted as meaning
that present conditions were already perfect and could not
possibly be improved upon. Since this idea accorded exactly
with what the eighteenth-century aristocrat already thought
of his society, the phrase caught the fancy of the time and was
widely popularized. Moralists, divines, and poets, whether or
not they had ever heard of Leibniz, expanded and distorted
it to demonstrate that everything was exactly as it should be
and no one need worry. The metaphysical optimism was
extended into the realm of morals, and writers like the Earl
of Shaftesbury defended the status quo of human nature as
being the best of all possible moralities. Man is by nature
good, they said, endowed with an innate moral sense similar
to a kind of instinct. If only he would act according to this
instinct instead of trying to reason out problems of conduct,
all would be well, because the graded, harmonious universe
would see to it that his spontaneous emotions were the proper
ones. Not even the satirists denied the perfection of nature or
of man's moral insinct, but rather attacked their contempor-
aries for not following it. By relying on the moral sense, then,
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one could reproduce in himself the harmony and proportion
of the whole cosmos. Unfortunately that moral sense turned
out to be the social customs of eighteenth-century high society,
and the best possible world was one in which the lower classes
were kept properly subordinated. This was not what Leibniz
had meant. 1
Much eighteenth-century literature gives evidence of this
rather shallow optimism. A good example is Alexander Pope's
Essay on Man, written in 1732-1734, which is, as the title
indicates, a philosophical essay in verse. In his preface, Pope
says that he chose verse instead of prose because in that
medium he could express ideas more tersely and pointedly.
This he succeeds in doing; his heroic couplets are clear,
polished, and brilliant, and many lines such as "Hope springs
eternal in the human breast" are constantly quoted. His
object is to "vindicate the ways of God to man," and he
foresees no difficulty at all in the matter, because, to quote
again from the preface, "The science of Human Nature is,
like all other sciences, reduced to a few clear points." This
sweeping confidence is typical of the period. The poem is
written in the form of four Epistles to Pope's "guide, philos-
opher, and friend" Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke. The
four discuss the nature of man in connection respectively with
the universe, himself as an individual, human society, and
happiness. Epistle I, on man's relation to the universe, will
illustrate the common-sense optimism of the time.
That Pope intends it to be true philosophic optimism
appears in his emphasis on the place of human values in the
universe. At first glance it appears that there is no place for
such values in the realm of natural law, and men often
complain of the injustice of their lot; but this feeling results
from too narrow a view of life, and is easily remedied by
looking at the whole picture. In describing God's plan for
the world, Pope makes use of an idea called the "chain of
being." According to it all existence is arranged in an orderly
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sequence, beginning with inorganic matter at the bottom, and
proceeding by imperceptible gradations through the plants,
lower and higher animals and man, up to spiritual beings like
angels and eventually God. This sequence came about because
the benevolent creator, wishing to share the benefits of
existence as widely as possible, must inevitably produce every
conceivable kind of being. At some point in the scale, then,
must appear a being having just the powers and limitations
that man has. To wish it otherwise is logically impossible;
the only sensible course is to accept man's middle state as
harmonious with nature's plan. It is apparent that this chain
of being is similar to but not identical with Leibniz's graded
monads. In Pope's words:
Of systems possible, if 'tis confest
That wisdom infinite must form the best,
Where all must fall or not coherent be,
And all that rises rise in due degree;
Then in the scale of reas'ning life 'tis plain
There must be, somewhere, such a rank as Man. 2
Here is an echo of Leibniz in "the best of all possible systems,"
and the too easy conclusion that man's lot is right because in
the whole system man's lot as it is could not avoid appearing
somewhere. The same argument would prove that all is well
in the lot of an angleworm and that nature takes account of
vermicular values because at some point in the chain of being
there must be an angleworm. Indeed, Pope accepts this by
implication, and goes on to show that nothing should ever
wish to be of a different nature or performing a different
function from the one it actually does.
What if the foot, ordained the dust to tread,
Or hand to toil, aspired to be the head?
What if the head, the eye, or ear repin'd
To serve mere engines to the ruling mind?
Just as absurd for any part to claim
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To be another in this general frame;
Just as absurd to mourn the tasks or pains
The great directing Mind of All ordains.3
Nevertheless the human race will not resign itself to its
lot, and obstinately complains that the misfortunes it suffers
are excessive and undeserved. In answer to this complaint
Pope furnishes several consolations that he hopes will help
reconcile man to his lot. The first is that man's query is
always, why was I created so weak, blind, and finite why was
I not given greater powers and opportunities? It would be
more sensible, he says, to reverse the question so as to ask,
why was I not created even weaker, with still more trivial
powers? Though one is as hard to answer as the other, the
second form of the question makes us optimistically aware of
our blessings. If we still complain, then we should consider
another and stronger consolation:/we are not permitted to
foresee the future. If we could foresee it, we might be over-
whelmed by the suffering that lay in wait for us; but this we
are spared, and are given the opportunity always to indulge
in hopeJThus the lamb, unaware that he is to be led to the
slaughter, plays happily in the meadow up to the last minute.
This argument is so double-edged and gives away the opti-
mistic game so completely that it is hard to believe in Pope's
serious use of it.
Somewhat more effective is the following argument,
which is made a corollary to the "chain of being" idea. In the
total plan of the universe, each animal is given certain
compensations for its weakness, such as size, armor, swiftness,
protective color, or shrewdness. Man alone is given reason,
a gift so great that it makes up for all other deficiencies.
With it he ought to be satisfied, but the possession of reason
has made him so proud that he thinks he should have every-
thing else at the same time, and is never content with anything
short of omnipotence. If he would think impartially, he would
realize that many of the powers he wants would not be good
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for him. Why can't he see or hear more than he does? Simply
because more acute senses would produce pain instead of
pleasure. With a stronger sense of touch, he would "smart
and agonize at every pore"; with more sensitive hearing, he
would be stunned by continual noise. Therefore man should
reconcile himself to the fact that such powers and gifts as he
has are those ideally adapted to his nature.
Who finds not Providence all good and wise,
Alike in what it gives and what denies?
Pope succeeds admirably in summing up and expressing
in aphoristic form the popular, fashionable philosophy of his
day. In the conclusion of his first epistle, he makes use of
another famous phrase which goes to a much greater extreme
than Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds." Summarizing his
contention/that human dissatisfaction must spring from an
imperfect knowledge of the universal plan, he writes:\^
All Nature is but Art unknown to thee;
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good:
And spite of Pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.*
Again, this is not what Leibniz had meant. To him, the world
had been chosen as the best of many possibilities because it
contained a balance of good and evil; to Pope and Shaftes-
bury, it was because everything was as it should be. When
such an attitude makes philosophy nothing but a defence of
the status quo, a period is ripe for reaction, and accordingly
a new point of view opposing this type of optimism developed
shortly after the middle of the century.
It appeared partly as a mere change of fashion in litera-
ture. Poets of the mid-century, forerunners of Romanticism,
began to abandon the conventional life of the drawing room
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and the custom of writing verse essays for more emotional
subjects. As we have seen, they began contemplating nature,
and they did so in a mood of melancholy foreign to the
neo-classic writers. They would sit on a hilltop, in a country
graveyard, or in a moonlit garden, and there ruminate on the
sadness of human life, sentimentalizing on the smallness of
man in the universe. One group of them have even been
dubbed the "Graveyard School," which produced poems like'
Robert Blair's The Grave, Edward Young's Night Thoughts
on Life, Death, and Immortality, or, most famous of all,
Thomas Gray's Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard.
Amid a setting of twilight bells, yew trees, and moping owls
complaining to the moon from ivy-mantled towers, Gray
comments with quiet sadness on the fate of the common
people here buried, who lived their obscure lives like desert
flowers or jewels hidden in ocean caves, with no chance of
developing their talents. This mood of sadness grew in* favor
until it reached the theatrical intensity of Byron's Childe
Harold. However, though it is an interesting symptom of the
change in fashion, it is not in itself pessimistic literature,
because it is too personal and subjective a type of melancholy
to be concerned with the place of human values in the
universe. These poets, reacting to nature with sentimental
dejection, gained fame and considerable pleasure by bemoaning
their lot; but what they expressed was personal despondency
rather than a philosophical point of view. Pessimism and
melancholy are not necessarily the same.
In fact, when the real reaction came it was neither melan-
choly nor sentimental. In the year 1759 appeared two books,
one in France and one in England, which used satire or
rational argument to oppose the optimism of self-satisfaction
and to defend a certain amount of pessimism as being of real
value in the conduct of life. One was Voltaire's Candide, the
other Samuel Johnson's Rosselas. They are typical of their
authors. The former, entirely in the vein of satire, is impish
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and mercurial in style, narrating in an apparently matter-of-
fact manner a series of wild adventures and changes of fortune
which toss its hero from rags to riches and from death to life
every few days. The latter is a serious, deep-toned philosophi-
cal novelette, with an air of authority, in Dr. Johnson's clean,
weighty, Latinized style, bearing down with the pressure of a
literary dictator on the facile assumptions that human life is
good. Both are short; both are interesting reading.
Candide is the story of a candid young man, gentle,
honest, simple-minded, and eager to learn, who is reared in
happy ignorance of evil and of the facts of life in general,
and who experiences more disillusionments than usually
befall a dozen people. That he should find his education
inadequate is surprising, for he has been carefully tutored by
a profound optimistic philosopher named Dr. Pangloss, who
is the oracle in the castle of Baron Thunder-ten-Tronckh
where Candide lives. Pangloss teaches the subject of meta-
physico-theologo-cosmolonigology. He bases his philosophy on
the principle of sufficient reason (a Leibnizian phrase) , from
which he demonstrates that there is no effect without a cause
and that in this best of all possible worlds the Baron's castle
is the best castle and his wife the best of all possible Baron-
esses. Here is his line of reasoning:
'Tis demonstrated that things cannot be otherwise;
for, since everything is made for an end, everything
is necessarily for the best end. Observe that noses
were made to wear spectacles; and so we have spec-
tacles. Legs were visibly instituted to be breeched,
and we have breeches. Stones were formed to be
quarried and to build castles; and My Lord has a
very noble castle; the greatest Baron in the province
should have the best house; and as pigs were made
to be eaten, we eat pork all the year 'round. Conse-
quently, those who have asserted that all is well talk
nonsense; they ought to have said that all is for the
best."
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When Candide logically concludes that the principle of
sufficient reason dictates his falling in love with the Baron's
daughter, he is expelled from the castle and sets out on a
series of travels in which he meets Dr. Pangloss in various
unlikely places, always interpreting everything for the best.
Fpr example, when they are caught in the Lisbon earthquake,
Pangloss consoles the homeless citizens by saying: "All this is
for the best. For, if there is a volcano at Lisbon, it cannot be
anywhere else; for it is impossible that things should not be
where they are; for all is well." For many months, against the
evidence of his senses, Candide faithfully adheres to this
teaching and explains away all human suffering as necessary
in the best of all possible worlds.
Ultimately, however, as the facts which refute Pangloss
pile up in larger and larger numbers, Candide begins to
wonder if he has been deceived. Not only is he himself
unhappy, but his search for social justice and personal
goodness has failed at every turn. "I have traversed half this
globe," he says; "I have seen fraud and calumny triumphant:
my sole intention has been to be serviceable to mankind, yet
I have been constantly persecuted. . . .All must be right,
because Pangloss said so; nevertheless I am the most miserable
of all possible beings." This change of heart is intensified by
the influence of an old man named Martin, an avowed
pessimist who travels with Candide and discusses moral and
physical evil with him. Martin states his philosophy in one of
the phrases which we used above to describe pessimism. "I
have always told you," he says, "that everything is for the
worst; the sum of evil greatly exceeds the sum of good." Any
dispassionate observation of the world, he feels, will confirm
this view. Both good fortune and moral virtue are noticeable
because they appear so rarely in the midst of such ubiquitous
evil. He points out that in nature and in human society strife
and warfare are the rule, and that the world is so constructed
as to place the human values of generosity and co-operation
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under an initial handicap which they seldom overcome.
Every family is suspicious of a neighboring family, every
state of its adjacent states. The strong oppress the weak, who
cower before them while secretly plotting their downfall. The
economic system is so unstable that there is no way to provide
employment except by having a war every few years. When
a man does achieve success, he arouses envy among his friends
and lives in fear of losing whatever he has. Even he who
appears most happy is devoured by secret griefs and disap-
pointments. In short, the possibilities of goodness are denied
to human life by the very terms of its existence.
The combination of Martin's influence and his own
experiences wear down Candide's faith to the point where
he can no longer be optimistic. In Dutch Guiana one day he
comes upon a Negro lying on the road, half naked, his right
hand and his left leg missing. He has worked in the sugar
mills, where the grindstones frequently cut off a laborer's
hand, and when he tries to run away cut off his leg. And that,
he remarks grimly, is the price paid for the sugar white
people eat in Europe. When Candide cries out that this is
too much, and that in the end he will have to renounce
optimism, his valet Cacambo inquires what optimism is.
"Alas," says Candide, "it is the mania of maintaining that
everything is well when we are wretched." Eventually a
curious thing happens. When experience finally outweighs
Pangloss's teaching and forces Candide to admit that he is
now a pessimist, he at once, to his surprise, becomes much
happier than he has been since his youthful days in the
Baron's castle. The evil in the world no longer worries him,
since now he need no longer reconcile it with a preconceived
optimistic theory; and he decides to cultivate his garden and
stop troubling himself about things as they are. The reader
is left with a feeling that this attack on optimism is one of
the gayest and most vivacious of books, and that it is the
optimists themselves who are the sad specimens.
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This is not the effect of our second example, Johnson's
Rasselas, which is a serious analysis of optimism rather than a
satire. Again we have a hero innocent of all knowledge of the
world and confident that anything he discovers will be good.
In order to account for the innocence, Johnson chooses a
setting as remote as he can think of, isolated from European
civilization and protected by impassable mountains from
foreign contamination. Rasselas is the young prince of Abys-
sinia, the "happy valley" where no evil threatens. Had
Johnson lived in the days of bombing planes, he might have
despaired of finding even a Pacific island remote enough for
his purpose. However, Rasselas, dwelling in his Shangri-La,
is not satisfied to stay there; he unreasonably longs to escape
over the mountains in order to find the happiness of the
great world of which he has heard. He has an artist friend
named Imlac (corresponding somewhat to Martin in
Candide) , who has traveled widely and who warns him from
experience that the search is fruitless and that he would do
better to remain at home. Partly through Imlac and partly in
his own person Johnson utters many aphorisms on the
essential misery of life.
There is so much infelicity in the world that scarce
any man has leisure from his own distresses to esti-
mate the comparative happiness of others.
Human life is everywhere a state in which much is
to be endured and little to be enjoyed.
We are long before we are convinced that happiness
is never to be found, and each believes it possessed
by others, to keep alive the hope of obtaining it for
himself.
Nevertheless Rasselas and his sister Nekayah succeed in
escaping from the happy valley, and travel over Europe in
search of contentment. They associate with all classes of
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people, and find everywhere the same cruelty, fear, and secret
grief which impressed Candide. They talk to young and old,
rich and poor, shepherds, hermits, politicians, philosophers,
theologians, and ordinary middle-class families. None of these
people are really happy. They are unfortunate victims, some-
times of an unjust social system, sometimes of their own
neuroses, often of pure chance. Inevitably, then, Rasselas and
Nekayah, admitting their failure and the soundness of Imlac's
views, return with relief to the happy valley, cured perma-
nently of any desire to leave it.
The book is a quiet, dignified protest against the falsifi-
cation inherent in eighteenth-century life. It includes no direct
satire of optimism, and does not counsel despair. Rather it
advocates the realistic acceptance of evil and suffering, the
attempt where possible to mitigate its effects, and where this
is not possible its patient endurance. Dr. Johnson's point of
view is well summed up in a passage from one of his essays
which assumes that the prevailing mood has already changed
and asks how the new pessimistic feelings can best be met so
as to avoid despair.
That life has many miseries, and that those miseries
are sometimes at least equal to all the powers of
fortitude, is now universally confessed; and there-
fore it is useful to consider not only how we may
escape them, but by what means [they] may be miti-
gated and lightened, and how we may make those
hours less wretched which the condition of our
present existence will not allow to be very happy.
The cure for the greater part of human miseries is
not radical but palliative. Infelicity is involved in
corporeal nature and interwoven with all our being
[a resonant Johnsonian sentence!]; all attempts
therefore to decline it wholly are vain; the armies
of pain send their arrows against us on every side,
the choice is only between those which are more or
less sharp, or tinged with greater or less malignity;
and the strongest armour which reason can supply
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will only blunt their points but cannot repel them.
The great remedy which Heaven has put in our
hands is patience, by which, though we cannqt lessen
the torments of the body, we can in a great measure
preserve the peace of the mind, and shall suffer only
the natural and genuine force of an evil without
heightening its acrimony or prolonging its effects.
6
Both this sonorous passage and Voltaire's happy flings at
optimists represent a healthy reversal from the assumption
that whatever is, is right. As the eighteenth century ended,
people's attitudes toward life were violently disturbed by the
French Revolution, the collapse of freedom into Napoleon's
dictatorship, the world war, and the rapid progress of the
Industrial Revolution. In its approach to the question of
optimism and pessimism, the nineteenth century had almost
to make a new start. What its new assumptions were and how
they also proved equivocal and contradictory will be - the
subject of the next section.
The nineteenth century was a more complicated and
contradictory period than the eighteenth. Yet in the midst of
all the intellectual ferment that took place, the age was
dominated by one main idea, an idea so startling and yet so
satisfying and enlightening that it occupied the attention of
almost every writer. That idea was evolution. The notion
that the world is not a fixed structure but a process of
development is now so familiar that it is hard for us to realize
the enthusiasm, horror, and widespread turmoil that it
aroused. This excitement was spread through most of the
century. Though the main impact followed Darwin's publica-
tion of the Origin of Species in 1859, the idea had been in the
air for several decades before and had influenced many
authors. In 1809, Lamarck had proposed a theory of biological
selection of organs to fulfill an existing need, but his views
found little favor. As early as 1819 the idea is found poetically
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expressed in Keats's unfinished poem Hyperion, where the
point is made that every species or organism, after fulfilling
its function, must by nature's law yield to a more advanced
species better adapted to its environment.
7 Since this is set
forth by means of an allegory about the war between the
Titans and the Olympian gods, the clear evolutionary idea
was little noticed; but there is no mistaking it. To Keats the
process was not one to be lamented, however much the
declining species might dislike it. To other writers, however,
the evolutionary theory seemed to remove all possibility of
fixed or trustworthy values in the world. Its influence was
consequently double-edged, with the same concept leading
sometimes to optimism and sometimes to pessimism. In general
and with many exceptions, it may be said that an earlier
optimistic interpretation has gradually yielded to a prevail-
ingly pessimistic one.
We may first examine how the idea led to optimism. It
is well known that Darwin's theory was enthusiastically popu-
larized by Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer, who regarded
it as the key to all knowledge and extended it to cover not
only biology but almost every field of knowledge such as
history, ethics, linguistics, art, and sociology. To these men
the great value of evolution was that it emphasized the fact
of progress in the world, that it was eternally eliminating
errors and finding better adaptations to life, and that it
furnished scientific authority for the belief that everything
was getting better all the time. The period seemed to furnish
much evidence for this view. Science and industry were
rapidly raising the standard of living; soon poverty, overwork,
and unemployment would vanish; new ideals of freedom were
finding justification in the startling material progress of the
United States; democracy and liberalism would soon cover
the world; and it was clear that war was outdated and would
soon be abolished.
Progress, then, was the magic word. But how did it take
place? From the evolutionary point of view, obviously
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through the struggle for existence and the survival of the
fittest; and therefore struggle and competition were hailed
as the great forces for improvement in the world.8 Unlike the
complacent optimism of the eighteenth century, which tried
to peg a perfect civilization at its present zenith, the strenuous
optimism of the nineteenth rejoiced that whatever existed
was constantly being replaced by something better, and that
the struggle was made certain by the nature of things to bring
about a constant series of improvements.
Such a point of view is partly the result of great physical
energy. One of the best examples of it was Robert Browning,
a man of enormous vitality and confidence, who, when he
was forbidden to marry the invalid Elizabeth Barrett, carried
her off to Italy and almost cured her by the contagion of his
personality. Browning's philosophy illustrates the contempo-
rary reliance onfjSevelopment by struggle and endless progress.
His happiness lies in eternally striving without ever reaching
a goal. After man has exhausted his powers in the struggle
of life, then he is merely on the threshold of continued effort
in the life to come. His reach must always exceed his grasp.
Existence, either present or future, is a joyous affair, not
because it lets you win anything but because it grants you
the opportunity of eternal effort. "Struggle is happiness" was
Browning's formula. And the really optimistic element in this
lay in the fact that by the structure of the universe struggle is
everywhere present in it; and since struggle is universal, so is
happiness. As long as a person never arrives and never aban-
dons the possibility of progress, he can be happy.
Life is probation, and the earth no goal
But starting-point of man: compel him strive,
Which means in man, as good as reach the goal.9
This is an idea enticing in its neatness/Human nature is such
that it can win happiness not by fulfilling its desires, but by
striving to fulfill them. Its proper satisfaction comes from the
expenditure of energy.^Though most people are deceived into
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thinking that they put forth effort in order to get something,
they really do the work for the sake of the effort itself. The
more effort, the more happiness. Therefore, since the suc-
cessful overcoming of an obstacle leads them to relax the
struggle and rest on their oars, for the best life the obstacles
should be difficult, even insurmountable. The formula now
becomes: the more failure, the more happiness 1(To struggle
without ever reaching a goal is itself the highest goal of
human life;\best of all, it is a goal which anyone can attain
for the asking. There is plenty of struggle to go around. As
Hotspur said, "Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this
flower, safety," so Browning distills optimism from the very
discouragements of life.
The best poem to read in illustration of this idea is
Rabbi Ben Ezra, an assertion of the satisfactions of old age
in contrast to the follies and dreams of youth, of the building
of a complete life by a long effort to mould those dreams into
a coherent pattern. The characteristic of life which the Rabbi
prizes most is its never-satisfied doubt, its eternally unan-
swered questions, the aspiration toward the unattainable
that distinguishes man from animals. We seldom realize how
fortunate we are in possessing a divine restlessness that never
lets us be content; |or the contentment resulting from a
cessation of effort is illusory and ashes in the mouth. Since
this is so, \
Then welcome each rebuff
That turns earth's smoothness rough,
Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but got
Be our joys three parts pain I
Strive, and hold cheap the strain;
Learn, nor account the pang; dare, never grudge the throe I
For thencea paradox
Which comforts while it mocks-
Shall life succeed in that it seems to fail:
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What 1 aspired to be
And was not, comforts me:
A brute I might have been, but would not sink i* the scale.
We should observe in these stanzas that Browning makes
an extension and a reversal of emphasis in the eighteenth-
century idea of the chain of being. The middle state of man,
said Pope, halfway between worm and God, is cause for our
gratification; instead of complaining that we are no higher,
let us rejoice that we are no lower. While agreeing with this,
Browning goes a step farther and bids us rejoice because, even
though we may fail to rise to a higher point in the scale, we
are at least able by our own efforts to keep from falling
inertly to a lower one. In general it may be said that, whereas
eighteenth-century optimism was static, nineteenth-century
optimism was kinetic. This was undoubtedly an improvement,
although the ordinary person with somewhat less then
Browning's energy tends to feel as if the poet were whipping
up a cheering section at a game. But under this philosophy
the nineteenth century proceeded to evolve with feverish
enthusiasm.
A generation after Browning, when this confidence had
begun to recede, a new and brilliant advocate of strenuous
optimism appeared in the person of Bernard Shaw, whose
view of Christianity we have seen. Since Shaw's life has now
covered almost a century and he is regarded as practically
timeless, it may seem surprising to locate him in the genera-
tion following Browning. It may seem surprising also to call
him an optimist; he has attacked so many existing conditions
and destroyed so much humbug that he must disapprove of
most of the conditions of human life. But the attacks are all
part of the struggle, the existence of which proves that life is
good. Any expression of despair, which he calls the vanity-of-
vanities attitude, makes him impatient. His principal objection
to Shakespeare is that he thinks Shakespeare is a pessimist.
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He opposes the romantic point of view in literature by calling
it the root of modern pessimism.
Shaw's brand of optimism is typically strenuous in that
it welcomes the expenditure of energy as man's highest good.
In the preface to Man and Superman, which he writes in the
form of a letter to Arthur Bingham Walkley, he describes
the greatest joy of life to be the discarding of a hedonistic
desire to be happy in favor of using up all one's energy to
co-operate with nature's evolutionary purpose and throwing
oneself with abandon into the service of this cosmic force. If
one is worn out thereby before he dies, that is better than
husbanding his powers for petty, selfish ends.
10 In one of his
dramatic reviews, he tells an anecdote that illustrates the same
point. Long ago, he says, when he was caught in a crowd at
the theater door, he discovered that the only way to get
through the bottleneck was to dive into the very worst of
the jam. If he was being crushed nearly to death, he was
confident of success; but if the discomfort relaxed, then he
knew he was being forced to one side and would never get
in. Therefore, in spite of its discomfort, the focus of struggle
is the real source of human happiness. Accordingly the worst
sin is indifference, despair, relaxation. In the play Heartbreak
House, old Captain Shotover would be glad to invent a
machine that would destroy the human race, because he sees
his children indulging in indolent and aimless pleasure-
seeking, frittering away their lives without plan or purpose,
and then complaining sentimentally that life has no meaning.
Instead of trying and failing, this society is simply drifting.
But what is the purpose for which man's energy may
profitably be used? This question Shaw answers at great
length in fact, at the length of a hundred pages of preface
and three hundred pages of drama. The play is Back to
Methuselah, published three years after World War I. It
associates Shaw with the idea of evolution which had stimu-
lated nineteenth-century optimism;/man's only hope, he says,
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is to evolve into something better before it is too lat. But
his is not the same evolution that had thrilled Huxley and
Spencer. To Shaw, Darwinism is anathema because it denies
the existence of any purpose toward which an organism may
struggle. He insists that it relies upon chance alone, ignoring
will or consciousness. By chance mutation some new organ is
developed. Perhaps it turns out to be useful to the species,
perhaps not; if it does, then it remains because it has survival
value. Hence the whole process is fortuitous, fatalistic, blind,
indifferent; Shaw will have none of it. An idea which had
seemed excitingly hopeful to one generation may in the next
become a source of pessimism.
Shaw, however, did not abandon either evolution or
optimism. By postulating a change in the technique of the
process based on a hint by Lamarck a half century before
Darwin, Shaw throws his support to a generally rejected
theory called "creative evolution," which means simply evolv-
ing with one's eyes open. Instead of blindly casting about in
all directions and occasionally taking advantage of a lucky
accident,(nature proceeds by both conscious and subconscious
effort to the attainment of a goal.y First a need arises; the
organism confronted with it sets out by deliberate experiment
to meet it; if the necessity is keen enough, the life force incar-
nate in the individual or the species will find the answer.
Co-operating with the eternal life force, then, is the great
purpose for which man can exhaust all his energies and
provide himself with the opportunity for struggle which is his
best chance for happiness. When God is defined as eternally
unfulfilled purpose, heaven is ours for the asking as long as
we strive to promote that purpose, whether or not we meet
with objective success. In these ways the optimism of the
nineteenth century was dominated by the evolutionary theory.
Before observing how the same theory also led to pessim-
ism, let us note the objections which a pessimist would raise
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against the two main optimistic tenets: namely, the value and
happiness of struggle and the argument of progress. Con-
cerning the former, he would begin by pointing out that the
benefits of struggle usually appeal most to people who have
been victorious in it/people of strong vitality and a combative
spirit)
For the value of it to appear, there should be at least
some slight chance of winning the fight. If the odds are
completely against one from the start, the effect produced is
more likely to be hopeless despair than the happiness which
the optimist finds in it. And these hostile odds do confront a
large minority of the human race, who are so hedged about
by lack of ability or social pressure that they have very small
chance of making progress. In the second place, struggle, even
when exhilarating at the moment, is an unsatisfactory basis
for lifelong happiness because it depends on a state of emo-
tional excitement that cannot be consistently maintained. To
depend on it is as foolish as to stake one's happiness on
getting drunk, whereby one may induce first hilarity and then
oblivion, but not contentment. Indeed, to the pessimist the
pleasure of struggle seems a form of intoxication. )\s Hous-
man pointed out, as long as a man can keep excited by means
of liquor, love, or fights he may live pleasantly enough, but
occasionally he is forced to sober up and think. Finally, as the
pessimist's strongest argument, he would say that constant
conflict is not one of the highest human values, which ought
to seek co-operation instead of competition. If the world is so
arranged as to take account of human values, then it dare
not rely on struggle as the central source of happiness. To
idealize conflict is merely to make the best of a bad job.
The second basis of nineteenth-century optimism was the
contention that, whether because of or in spite of the evil
and conflict in the world, the human race is steadily progress-
ing. Things may be bad; but they have improved and will
improve. Naturally this argument seems less convincing in the
middle than at the beginning of the twentieth century: but
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even then it did not satisfy the pessimists. First, the fact of
progress itself is open to doubt, unless one assumes carelessly
that any change is an improvement, which is as illogical as
saying that whatever is, is right. Constant changes occur; but
they are as likely to destroy human values as to foster them,
to enhance evil as to enhance good. Machine technology and
medicine have become more and more efficient; so have wars.
Yet underneath all these fluctuations human nature seems
hardly to have changed at all. It is misleading, then, to assume
progress as a fact. Next, even if progress does occur, it is so
slow that any value it has is only for the distant future, not
for the millions of individuals working toward it and suffering
for it. Furthermore, even reaching whatever far-off, divine
event may be the goal of progress would be a defeat, because it
would terminate the very process on which the optimist bases
his case, and because none of the goals that humanity has
from time to time attained has ever satisfied it. Such argu-
ments warn us that nineteenth-century optimism is not a
self-evident proposition.
As we turn to the positive side of nineteenth-century
pessimism, we find that the foundation for it was laid early
in the century by a philosopher who has been influential ever
since. In 1818 Arthur Schopenhauer published The World as
Will and Idea, which at the time attracted little attention but
grew rapidly in favor during the next thirty years. It is one
of the most readable and interesting of philosophic systems.
We may examine first his metaphysical theory, next the nature
of his resulting pessimism, and lastly an example of his
influence in literature.
The title of Schopenhauer's book implies that his meta-
physic is a form of idealism. Denying the existence of matter,
he believes that the world around us has reality only in the
sense that we perceive it the world is our idea. But beyond
this is another, ultimate reality, the thing in itself which
makes up the essence of all existence; and this reality is will,
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the driving force that not only appears as a phenomenon but
is itself the substance and motive power of all phenomena.
"It appears in every blind force of nature and also in the
preconsidered actions of man; and the great difference
between these two is merely in the degree of the manifesta-
tion, not in the nature of what manifests itself/' 11 Thus at the
bottom of the scale, farthest removed from awareness, are
blind inorganic forces like gravity and atomic energy; next
come the unconscious organic growth of plants, the instinc-
tive and semi-conscious striving in animals and young
children, and the conscious desires of adult man. All these are
the same in that they are various outward appearances of
the same reality: the will to live, to exist for no external or
ulterior purpose other than existence itself. This cosmic will
is the same thing which Shaw calls the Life Force, except that
Shaw regards it as conscious and purposeful, Schopenhauer
as blind and aimless. It is eternal, with no beginning or end,
as any ultimate metaphysical entity must be. It seeks no goal
but its own random striving, and objectifies itself continually
in the sweep of a planet through space, the penetration of a
root into the ground or a stem up to the light, the animal
impulses of hunger and sex, or the gnawing desire to own a
bigger car than one's neighbor. Mind is its servant, to help
fulfill its behests. There is no escape from it, for nothing else
exists.
Though such a metaphysical belief accords well with the
theory of evolution and especially with the emphasis on the
struggle for existence, Schopenhauer draws from it different
conclusions from the optimistic ones we have already seen.
To him the fact that all nature is an eternal conflict of will
seems completely evil and destructive of human values. For
what it amounts to is a civil war, a strife of the universe
against itself and of its parts against one another. "Every
grade of the objectification of will fights for the matter, the
space, and the time of the other." One type of matter struggles
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to impose itself on others through mechanical, chemical, or
organic changes; one species of animal can live only by the
destruction of some other species; human beings fight con-
tinually not only against bacteria, vegetable poisons, or beasts
of prey, but against the wills of other human beings. (Thus
the universe, far from being coherent, is by its inner nature
at odds with
itself.)
From this internal schism of the will Schopenhauer
draws his most pessimistic conclusions. What does it make of
human life? Merely an endless alternation between pain and
ennui, leading to a hopeless end. Many of our desires we never
fulfill. If occasionally we do attain one, then either we find
that it does not satisfy us as we had hoped it would, or we
become bored because life is now empty and meaningless.
Always the restless will drives us out on some new painful
quest. The only definite, positive experience we have is pain;
for pleasure is a negative experience, me temporary deliver-
ance from a painful want. Pain is protracted, but happiness
is necessarily brief because the attainment of a desire is at
once followed by ennuithat is, renewed pain. When nothing
exists but the will, such a sequence is inescapable.
Worst of all, perhaps, is the idea that the will is fore-
doomed to defeat from the outset. No victory can ever be
hoped for. Since death is inevitable, the struggle for existence
is lost before it begins. All the activity of the will in any of
its manifestations succeeds only in frustrating or destroying
some other of those manifestations without saving itself in
the process. To survive, a man cuts down a field of wheat
and kills a pig for food. Since the wheat and the pig were
both growing, striving parts of the universal will, the universe
has negated itself by the act. Yet it does no good, for the man
is unable to preserve his existence for more than a short time.
"The life of our body," says Schopenhauer, "is only a con-
stantly protracted dying, an ever postponed death: ... in the
same way, the activity of our minds is a constantly deferred
214 PHILOSOPHY IN LITERATURE
ennui." His system is typical of the nineteenth century in its
dynamic character, its recognition of change and energy in
the world. But it leads to the picture of all life as a destruc-
tive and futile war, aimless and internecine in character, with
universal pain and defeat as its only possible outcome.
It is true that Schopenhauer makes one small qualifica-
tion in the picture given above. Though escape from the will
is ultimately impossible, a certain measure of temporary relief
can be achieved. When the will developed the human mind
as an instrument for attaining its desires, it overreached itself.
The mind sometimes becomes so efficient an instrument that
it turns against its master and proclaims its own freedom by
denying the will itself. When this occurs, it brings about a
cessation of wishing and striving, and a condition of pure
subjective existence free of desire. It may occur in two ways:
through art and through asceticism. A true artist contemplates
beauty for its own sake, without desire; and when any man
becomes absorbed in looking at a sunset without at the
moment desiring anything at all, he is then an artist, and
feels a sense of peace and relaxation from effort quite different
from the boredom that follows the actual attainment of a
desire. Still more significant is the existence of ascetics, human
beings who deliberately deprive their will of what it wants
and achieve freedom by withdrawing from the struggle for
existence.
In this way Schopenhauer intended to relieve to a slight
extent the extreme pessimism of his philosophy. Whether he
succeeded is doubtful. If we once grant his premise that will
is the one and only metaphysical entity, then any escape from
it would seem to be impossible. The contemplation of the
artist and the self-denial of the ascetic may easily be inter-
preted as fulfilments or sublimations of their unconscious
desires. In that case the pessimism remains unalloyed. At any
rate it is the pessimistic picture and not the exceptions to it
that have been influential on later writers.
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To illustrate this type of pessimism in literature we may
cite the work of Thomas Hardy, whose attitude toward nature
and toward the conditions of human life frequently resemble
Schopenhauer's. The setting of his tragic novels is the Wessex
district of southern England, a region of farmland alternating
with sombre moors. His love of this land and of the farm and
village people who inhabit it appears in all the novels, which
contain many vivid pictures of stars, frosty downs, sheep-
shearings, bonfires on Guy Fawkes Day, county fairs, and
tavern scenes. But this natural setting, whether beautiful or
cheerless, always reflects the underlying indifference and
hostility of man's environment, the manifestation of a blind
force which takes no account of human intentions. As John
Cowper Powys points out in Enjoyment of Literature, Hardy's
view of nature is the opposite of Wordsworth's. The latter
derived comfort, hope, and inspiration from a wooded hill or
a pleasant valley; but Hardy is always aware of the fact that
nature is divided against itself, that in the most peaceful spot
a deadly conflict rages as plants and animals kill one another
in order to survive, and that this destructive energy of nature,
though perhaps merely blind, nevertheless functions just as
if it were a malevolent God hostile to his own creations. 12
Into this struggle for existence, against his better inten-
tions, man enters with the cards stacked against him from
the beginning. He must contend against other men and
against an evil fate which delights in frustrating the best men
just as a hurricane may blow down the tallest trees in the
forest. As long as a person is content to remain a peasant,
close to the level of nature itself, he may live out his life with
no more than the ordinary vicissitudes that come to any
living thing. But let him exhibit intelligence or ambition, let
him develop more sensitive feelings or a more complex
personality, and he is relentlessly cut down. The appearance
of typically human values in Hardy's world leads at once to
their destruction by the life force. This happens, for example,
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to Clym Yeobright and Eustacia Vye in The Return of the
Native, to Michael Henchard in The Mayor of Casterbridge,
and to Jude Fawley in Jude the Obscure. In each case it occurs
through the intrusion of an ironically evil piece of bad luck
into some crisis in the character's life.
A typical instance is the visit of Mrs. Yeobright to her
son in The Return of the Native. Clym, who has married
Eustacia Vye against his mother's opposition, is now working
as a furze-cutter and living in a cottage on the heath. After
a long struggle with herself, Mrs. Yeobright decides to ignore
her pride and show her good will by making the first advances
to her daughter-in-law. Her intentions are thus of the best;
she is acting on the human level of unselfishness rather than
on the natural level of revenge. Walking across the heath on
a hot August day, she arrives exhausted at her son's house,
sees Clym enter, sees Eustacia's face looking out at her from
behind the curtain, and then receives no answer to her
repeated knocks. In anguished humiliation she retraces her
six-mile walk, is overcome by the heat, and dies as a result of
her journey.
In no way could this disaster be regarded as Mrs. Yeo-
right's fault. She did what she could, and drew the only
possible conclusions from the evidence. But what are the real
facts behind so damning an appearance? They are simple,
natural, and fatal; no hostile deity could have planned them
more perfectly. After entering the house tired from a long
day's work, Clym falls asleep in the living-room. Soon an old
friend of Eustacia's, of whom Mrs. Yeobright disapproves,
calls to see her, and while the two are talking the knock
comes at the door. Seeing her mother-in-law through the
curtain, Eustacia hastily takes her friend out the back door;
though she is not responsible for his presence and does not
welcome it, she dislikes to stir up further rancor by letting
Mrs. Yeobright see him. As they reach the door they both
hear Clym move about in the room and say, "Mother." At
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that Eustacia, instead of answering the door as she had
intended, waits in order to give Clym and his mother a chance
to be alone for a few minutes. Then, to her horror, she finds
that Clym, half awakened by the knocking, has merely turned
over, uttered the single word in a dream, and slept on. Mrs.
Yeobright is gone.
18
As Hardy relates this incident, it gives a powerful, even
eerie, impression of malignant fate cutting down human
values. Everyone, with the best intentions, is deceived by
circumstances, and the affair has serious consequences in
leading to an estrangement between Clym and Eustacia. It is
typical of Hardy's view that man is a being caught in the
^wheels of uncontrollable forces.
jAt
the lower levels of his
existence, he may remain so unaware of his predicament that
he can feel some temporary enjoyment of life; but as soon as
he evolves into a fully intelligent creature, he can regardftife
as nothing more than an experience to be endurecf) Despair
varies directly as intelligence, and man's existence becomes
a conflict between the blind will-to-live and the conscious
will-not-to-live. Though the will-to-live, the instinctive tool of
the life force, has thus far prevailed in most people, the
intellect is gaming ground as man becomes more aware of his
dilemma, and will ultimately win. Life will deny itself. Here,
for example, is part of Hardy's description of Clym
Yeobright:
In Clym Yeobright's face could be dimly seen the
typical countenance of the future . . . The view of
life as a thing to be put up with, replacing that zest
for existence which was so intense in early civiliza-
tions, must ultimately enter so thoroughly into the
constitutions of the advanced races that its facial
expression will become accepted as a new artistic
departure ....
The truth seems to be that a long line of disillusive
centuries has permanently displaced the Hellenic
idea of life .... That old-fashioned revelling in the
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general situation grows less and less possible as we
uncover the defects of natural laws, and see the
quandary that man is in by their operation. 14
This pessimism of Hardy's is unrelieved even by the small
qualification which Schopenhauer makes: the possible sub-
limation of the will in the disinterested contemplation of
beauty or its denial in a life of asceticism. In Hardy the
panorama of evolution and the ceaseless surge of the life
force inspire only the reflections that happiness is but an
occasional episode in the general drama of pain, and that
wisdom to do comes only when there is no longer zest for
doing.
Though it has been said many times that the literature
of the twentieth century is predominantly pessimistic, much
of it should more accurately be called disillusioned. The
partial breakdown of the capitalistic system and the occur-
rence within thirty years of two world wars, a serious
depression, and the discovery of unimagined instruments of
destruction have been enough to disillusion any era. Many
writers have emphasized the sordid evils of industrial society,
the maladjustments of man in the machine age, the petty
materialism of modern life, and the unsuspected monsters
which Freudian pscyhology has revealed as lurking in the
subconscious mind. But the fact that the world has fallen into
trouble, though it may lead to pessimism, does not necessarily
do so. Philosophic optimism or pessimism should be inde-
pendent of place or time, above the vicissitudes of an
individual or an era, concerned only with the fate of human
values in the universe as a whole. From the books which have
attempted to take this point of view, we may conclude our
discussion by observing three contrasting examples.
The first is Eugene O'Neill's play The Hairy Ape, pub-
lished in 1922, which is sometimes regarded as a left-wing
production on the struggle between labor and capital, but
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which has much wider implications. Employing a series of
brief contrasting scenes, filled with symbolic and expression-
istic stage devices, it is unusually effective in arousing the
emotions of an audience. Though it contains some incoherence
and some obscure symbolism, it succeeds in portraying one
aspect of what Joseph Wood Krutch called the modern
temper. Modern man, according to Krutch, has evolved too
far beyond the natural world ever to be satisfied to return to
the relative security of nature, but at the same time has dis-
covered no welcome in the universe for his new, typically
human values. He is therefore caught in the dilemma of
having to relinquish those values or perish.
16 In the concrete,
symbolic language of literature The Hairy Ape expresses this
idea with clarity.
Its chief character, Yank, is a physically powerful, un-
educated, but intelligent stoker on a transatlantic liner. The
story relates how, uprooted from a complacent satisfaction in
his job, he is driven on a quest for the meaning of his life and
falls into a state of more and more pathetic bewilderment.
At first he is proud of his strength, contented because he is
doing an important job better than anyone else could do it.
It is he who makes the ship go, he who is the power behind
the steel. Without him the great engines would be inert and
helpless. But when a supercilious heiress, daughter of a steel
magnate, descends to the stokehole on a slumming expedition
and looks at Yank with a face of terrified loathing as if he
were a hairy ape in the zoo, his complacency is so shaken that
he cannot rest until he finds out where he really belongs
among human beings. In the scenes that follow he is ignored
or discarded by various classes of society, repeatedly called an
ape, and imprisoned by steel instead of being its master. In
desperation he finally visits the zoo to see this gorilla of which
he reminds everyone, and is killed by the ape which he has
himself released from its cage.^Jf he ever belongs anywhere,
it is only in death. ^
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It is at first tempting to interpret the play as an allegory
of labor ground down by the machine age. The fact that
Yank is a proletarian treated with contempt by the sneering
rich girl, and the constant use of references to steel as a symbol
of the whole industrial system which turns out to be Yank's
master, lend force to this interpretation. On the other hand,
two pieces of evidence show that O'Neill's intention was not
to make the play one concerned primarily with class conflict.
The first is that Yank never participates in that conflict,
and is prevented from doing so on the one occasion when he
tries to. The character of Long, the communist stoker, is
introduced to show how far Yank is from feeling class hatred.
For Long's soapbox orations against the "Blarsted capitalists"
Yank has at first nothing but contempt. When Long points
out that the rich girl's attitude is typical of her class and then
shows Yank the parade of overdressed, pasty-faced idle rich
coming from church on Fifth Avenue, he is momentarily won
over to class consciousness and sets out to join the IWW and
blow up the steel works. His naive violence defeats itself,
however; the IWW secretary takes him for an inept labor spy
and has him ejected. Thus he is denied a place in his own
class also, and his problem is not that of a laborer fighting
capital but that of an individual shut out from human society.
The second evidence of this fact is the characterization
of Mildred Douglas, daughter of the steel baron. Though her
function in the plot is merely to disillusion Yank by appearing
suddenly in the stokehole, her character is developed more
fully than is necessary for this purpose. Superficially she is
spoiled and unpleasant, intolerably and needlessly rude to
the Second Engineer who is escorting her, sarcastic to her
aunt, untruthful and tricky, demanding to visit the stokehole
for a new thrill to relieve her boredom, flaunting her wealth
by refusing to change her white dress because she has fifty
others and will throw this one into the sea if it gets dirty. Yet
all this is part of a defensive pose, a rather pathetic reaction
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against a world in which she feels out of place. Underneath
it she has a groping sincerity which she lacks the energy to
carry out in action. The intense competition in which her
father and grandfather engaged to make their millions has
sapped the vitality of the stock, and she is burned out by the
blast furnaces, "a waste product in the Bessemer process." If
he had been writing a leftist play, O'Neill would hardly have
taken such pains to show Mildred's complex motives. He is
showing rather that Yank's maladjustment permeates all de-
grees of society, that rich and poor alike are lost in the world,
and that, whether apelike or apathetic, they are all seeking
vainly for a place to belong.
In the final scene, when Yank talks to the ape itself, the
meaning of the play is revealed: uhere is no satisfying place
for man in the universe, either in the world of nature or in
his own human society.) Inarticulate and unaccustomed to
expressing himself, Yank feels this idea dimly but is long
unable to put it into words. As he talks to the ape his mind
gradually clears, the words come to him, and he realizes for
the first time the full extent of the dilemma. The ape is
lucky, he says, because he can't think or talk or look into the
past or worry about the future. Yank pretends to think and
talk, and almost succeeds almost but not quite. That is the
joker in the whole business. And then he says the words
which at last reach the heart of the matter, all the more
effectively because of the crudeness of the expression. "I ain't
on oith and I ain't in heaven, get me? I'm in de middle
tryin* to separate 'em, takin' all de woist punches from bot'
of
f
em." le Slowly and painfully man has worked himself up
from the ape, searching for a life that will have in it values
the ape can never know. In doing so he has cut himself off
from the world of nature and cast aside the security furnished
by unthinking adaptation to nature's pattern. He can never
again find satisfaction in returning to the animal level. But
in the process he not only has failed to reach a fully human
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existence, but has created tensions and maladjustments which
will forever thwart his determination to become completely
human. He is caught in the middle, and there is no place for
his values anywhere. Logically enough, Yank is killed by the
ape:(vainly aspiring
man is destroyed by the nature that he
has unsuccessfully tried to transcend. J
This first example of the twentieth-century point ot view
is a symbolic expression of pessimism. The other two are
somewhat more complicated and introspective. Instead of
affirming a single point of view, they inquire into the causes
of modern pessimism, estimate its good or evil effects on
individuals who are exposed to it, and study the bases which
our contemporaries have for finding meaning or lack of
meaning in life. By coincidence these two novels were both
written just before and at the opening of World War I, and
both published in 1915. One is Joseph Conrad's Victory, the
other Somerset Maugham's Of Human Bondage. Both will
repay many careful readings.
Anyone's first reaction to Conrad's novel may well be,
"Where is the victory?" The story ends with a slaughter as
wholesale as that in an Elizabethan tragedy. With one minor
exception every character dies by murder, suicide, or accident,
and the final quiet verdict is that there was nothing to be
done about it. Whether faithful or treacherous, sympathetic
or malignant, all are destroyed impartially by the situation
into which they have been drawn. It is a conclusion to incite
pessimism; yet somehow it does not do so. Though a reader
may be left breathless and emotionally exhausted, he is not
depressed, nor does he feel that the highest human values
have been ruled out of the universe. For this there are two
reasons. One is that, however subtle and ironic a form it may
take, the victory really is there. The other is the interesting
fact that one of the causes of the catastrophe is pessimism
itself.
It is a habit of Conrad's to combine victory and defeat
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are particularly striving, but in the process gain something
else that is quite unexpected. So it is with Axel Heyst and
Lena, the two main characters of Victory. Heyst is a well-to-do,
highly educated, urbane man who, for reasons we shall see
later, sets out to live a life independent of the world, wanders
aimlessly for a time, and then settles down alone on the little
island of Samburan. Lena, a child of the streets and product
of a broken home, is a player in a cheap traveling orchestra
which happens to be performing in Sourabaya at a time when
Heyst is there. Observing that Lena is being harshly abused
by her employers, Heyst allows his human sympathy to coun-
terbalance his determination to remain aloof from everyone,
and breaks his resolution by taking Lena with him to
Samburan. The elopement engenders malicious gossip about
Heyst, and leads to a further invasion of his independence
when a gang of scoundrels land on the island in search of the
fabulous treasure which they have been told Heyst is guarding
there. When the unarmed Heyst can neither eject them nor
convince them of their mistake, Lena has the opportunity she
has craved to demonstrate her gratitude and win Heyst's full
affection. Having succeeded in estranging the bandits from
each other, she is on the point of securing the weapon which
will win the game when she is killed because of Heyst's
innocent and accidental revelation of her presence. Before
dying, she succeeds in removing the faint doubt of her trust-
worthiness which Heyst has never quite banished from his
mind.
In this situation, let us sift out the respective victory and
defeat. What Lena wants most is to be of some real use to
the self-contained Heyst, to live with him on the island in
complete mutual confidence. In attempting to bring this
about, she loses her life. But at the last moment she succeeds
in overcoming his doubt and aloofness, and dies knowing that
he has given her his absolute trust, that there is no longer a
barrier between them. What happens to Heyst is similarly
equivocal. His aim is to live detached from the world. When
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his emotions overcome his decision, this aim is defeated; the
world invades his detachment and destroys his life on the
island. But likewise at the last moment, he perceives that his
ideal of aloofness has been a false one, and that the giving
of his unqualified trust to another person is a source of
happiness of which he has never dreamed. We should note
that there is a surprising element of philosophic optimism in
this ending. Whereas the defeats are physical or anti-human
(death and the frustrated desire to escape from society), the
victories involve the particularly human values of generosity,
trustworthiness, and mutual faith. In the world which Conrad
creates, these values are victorious.
This is the first reason for not calling so sombre a story
pessimistic. The second one follows from the careful back-
ground that Conrad builds up for his hero. The principal aim
of Heyst's life is to avoid human contacts, to wander from
place to place without striking roots, to remain always inde-
pendent of mankind. What could impel a person to plan and
carry out such a program? In Heyst's case it is the influence
of his father, the only close companion he has ever had.
Through his son's recollections, the portrait in the cabin,
and excerpts from his books, Conrad clearly portrays the
elder Heyst, a pessimistic philosopher whose ideas have a
general resemblance to Schopenhauer's. The three years of
his 'teens during which Heyst lived with his father influenced
permanently his attitude toward life. With pitying scorn for
the fate of mankind, but a stern affection for his son, the old
philosopher taught him too early in life how the nature of the
universe robs man of both hope and dignity. "Man on this
earth is an unforeseen accident," he said, "which does not
stand close investigation."
17 Comparing the world to a factory
and mankind to workmen in it, he pointed out that they are
all paid in counterfeit money. He showed that human beings
have developed values which the universe always frustrates,
and that the character of the world by any human standard
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is infamous. "It excuses every violence of protest and at the
same time never fails to crush it, just as it crushes the blindest
assent."18 Accordingly he advised his son u/avoid some of the
worst tortures of life by keeping aloof from if^\ to mistrust all
action and every human tie, to expect nothing and (never
yield to the temptation of entering the stream of life^j Heyst's
life, therefore, is directly conditioned by the philosophy of
pessimism.
What is the result? After following his father's advice for
several years, Heyst eventually infringes it because his sym-
pathy with people in trouble is too deep to let him ignore
them. At once he is caught in the human entanglements from
which his father had tried to save him. And the important
fact is that the kind of life he has led makes him particularly
unfitted to meet the emergency. If he had had the normal
experience that develops knowledge of human nature, if he
had learned by trial and error to distinguish between those
who can be trusted and those who cannot, then he might have
won the game. But he had always assumed that he should
trust no one at all, and expect nothing from life. The
philosophy of pessimism keeps him from giving to Lena the
confidence that his emotions prompt him to feel; his nerve
centers are so anesthetized by the habit of distrust that at the
moment of crisis he does nothing and has no faith in Lena.
When he becomes fully aware of this fact, he can no longer
live. Just before his suicide he exclaims in anguish, "Woe to
the man whose heart has not learned while young to hope,
to loveand to put its trust in life!"
This paradox may symbolize one phase of the twentieth
century's heritage from the pessimism of the nineteenth. We
have been warned not to expect too much, not to trust a
universe which will certainly frustrate us. The present age
learned that lesson so well that it was almost paralyzed when
the crisis came. The detachment of Heyst bears a real resem-
blance to the pre-war isolationism of America. Neither could
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maintain it, but both were rendered less able to survive
because of it. Thus pessimism generates further and deeper
pessimism by undermining the ability of an organism to
adapt itself to circumstances. And from this point of view
Conrad's tragic novel is a penetrating analysis of the evil
effects of that philosophy.
Having said this, however, we are confronted by another
paradox. Though Conrad demonstrates the enervating effect
of pessimism, he does not deny its truth. Throughout the
novel his attitude is that of a double negative rather than an
affirmative. Heyst says, woe to the man who does not trust in
life. He never says, fortunate is the man who does trust in
life. And this cautious and tentative attitude is evidence of
the depth to which mistrust of life has penetrated modern
thinking. Though Conrad's novel is a more complete and
profound analysis than O'Neill's play, it is permeated by the
same modern temper which feels that man's despair is
rendered more deadly by the very fact that he is conscious of
the paralyzing effect which despair has on his adaptive power.
Still another aspect of this complex twentieth-century
philosophy appears in Maugham's novel Of Human Bondage.
Though it is generally regarded as a pessimistic book, it only
partially deserves the label. Its picture of the changing for-
tunes and opinions of a modern man is marked by philosophic
breadth and inclusiveness, and by a notable endeavor to
avoid a dogmatic attitude. Perhaps it is significant that
Maugham borrowed his title from the fourth book of
Spinoza's Ethic, where bondage means slavery to the emotions,
and that this is followed by a fifth book called "Of Human
Liberty," which means the freedom of the intellect to rescue
man from the passions. By analyzing the bondage, Maugham
is exercising the freedom. That he is in fact portraying his
own personal experiences appears from his account of its
writing in his book of memoirs called The Summing Up.
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Philip Carey, the hero of Of Human Bondage, is a kind
of Everyman. On many a page the reader has an uneasy sense
that Philip is himself, and wonders how Maugham can know
so much of how he feels. In intensified form Philip's emotions
are identical with those which most young persons assume
are unique in themselves, just as Philip is sure he is different
from everyone else. Many people have found the puncturing
of this delusion to be one real value of reading the book. It is
at the same time disturbing and comforting because we are
so close to it. Instead of the imaginative effort required to
put ourselves in the place of a brawny stoker or a detached
wanderer in the South Seas, we find no difficulty in reliving
Philip Carey's life.
The universality of Philip's character appears especially
in his sensitiveness, his naivete, and his romantic ideals, three
traits of which most people possess more than they admit to
themselves. Philip starts life with the handicap of a club-foot.
Serious as this is, the real difficulty is not the lameness itself
so much as its psychological effect in making him feel different
from others and sure that others are always talking about him
and ridiculing him. Everyone has this feeling to some degree:
he is too tall or too short, too fat or too thin, he has pro-
truding ears or a speech defect, and it is obvious that the
world talks about nothing else. Philip unconsciously com-
pensates for this blemish by adopting the pose of
a martyr
and extracting morbid pleasure from inflicting pain on
himself. He finds escape also in reading numerous romantic
novels, preferably those beginning with two solitary travelers
skirting a dangerous chasm, and naively expects the events of
his life to correspond to these romantic situations. When they
do not, he is disillusioned, as the rest of us are. All together
he is a normal, if prolonged, adolescent.
Disillusionments and exploded ideals, if frequent and
severe, may lead to real pessimism; and so they do with
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Philip. He possesses a set of values which he sees disappear
one by one, and eventually comes to feel that the world has
no place for human values. This process we may illustrate
briefly, to show again its universal human character. An early
ideal to disappear is that of friendship. Among the hostile or
indifferent boys at his school, one fellow named Rose treats
him in comradely fashion. Pathetically grateful, he becomes
Rose's chum and anticipates a lifelong brotherhood. Not
realizing that Rose is a happy-go-lucky boy who wants to be
nice to everyone, Philip grows violently possessive, resents
the slightest attention to another, and is desolated by the
inevitable collapse of the friendship. His conclusion, of course,
is that no friend is to be trusted; and he has lost a value.
Another one evaporates when he goes to Paris with romantic
notions of the perfection of art and the picturesqueness of
bohemian life. The young artists whom he meets laugh at his
idealization of Watts and Burne-Jones; in turn their idols of
the moment are soon replaced by new fads. No one dresses
like a bohemian artist except Americans from the Middle
West who have their pictures taken in brown velveteens and
basque caps. The artist's life, far from picturesque, is often
one of sordid poverty leading to suicide.
Though it takes longer to disillusion Philip with religion,
ethics, and philosophy, the process is complete. His first
religious doubt comes when, after he prays with naive faith
that his club-foot be healed, the miracle does not occur. Then
he observes with interest that his clergyman uncle is a selfish
and petty man who practices nothing of what he preaches.
The real break comes when he is in Heidelberg, where he
perceives that a free-thinker can be more kindly and tolerant
than a conventional believer, and so casts off all religion
with a sense of relief. Though at the time it does riot occur
to him to question his moral code, that also goes when one
of his Paris friends, the hedonist Cronshaw, demonstrates that
all ethical systems are relative and man-made, and that indi-
OPTIMIST AND PESSIMIST 229
vidual pleasure is the only standard. Later Philip becomes
interested in philosophy, tries to formulate a tentative code
of his own, and then is doubly disillusioned. The more he
reads the more he is convinced that the great philosophers
are merely projecting their own temperaments into the
universe, and that he may choose at will among them because
none is any more true or false than another. Finally, the
philosophy that he painfully works out for himsell turns out
to be useless to him. When he is caught in a crisis of emotion,
his reason is helpless to guide him. Instead of following his
code, he yields to his passions while despising himelf for
doing so, and becomes just the sort of victim of his aimlessly
striving will that Schopenhauer described most of mankind
as being.
19
From these and many other disappointments, Philip
acquires a strong conviction of the futility and meaningless-
ness of life, the typical bases of pessimism. Passing in review
one after another of the people he has known, he is struck
by the fact that many of them have accomplished nothing
either for themselves or for others, and that it does not matter
to anyone whether they are alive or dead, or whether they
ever lived. This idea is most strongly impressed on him one
night at a public dance hall in Paris, where the crowd of
dancers suddenly appears to him as hideous and pathetic
animals desperately seeking a moment of pleasure to escape
from the overwhelming dreariness of their lives.
20
Against this cumulative evidence of human futility,
Philip persistently searches year after year for a meaning in
life. In Paris, Cronshaw sardonically tells him that if he looks
carefully at a Persian carpet the meaning of life will be
revealed to him. Philip thinks of this occasionally as the years
go on, but can make no sense of it until just after the death
of one of his friends. As he sits one day in the British Museum,
looking at some gracefully carved Greek tombstones, thinking
of the uselessness of his friend's life, and watching the hurry-
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ing crowd of sightseers, the answer suddenly comes to him:
life has no meaning. It may have a pattern just as the Persian
rug has; but the pattern, whether simple or intricate, is not
functional and has no purpose beyond itself. If so, then all
human values and purposes are man-made and have no place
in the universe; Philip has reached a philosophically pessi-
mistic conclusion.
It has been asserted that this is the final meaning of the
book, but such a conclusion is not confirmed by the evidence.
From the form of Maugham's statement of Philip's reaction
to the idea, we may infer that it is not the end of his search.
In deciding that life is meaningless, says Maugham, "Philip
thought ... he was casting aside the last of his illusions."
Yet, though he never abandons the idea, he later comes to
interpret it in a new way, and to qualify his conclusion about
human values.
The reader should not lose sight of the fact that, while
Philip is passing through his disheartening experiences, he is
also exposed to another set of influences which counteract
them. Sometimes the very values which he seems to have lost
forever are revived by some unexpected event. Having
decided that friends are not to be trusted, he proceeds to
distrust them; after he loses all his money on the stock market
and is half starving, he will not appeal for aid to his one
friend Thorpe Athelny because he is convinced Athelny will
discard him now that he is down and out. To his surprise
Athelny, with nothing to gain by it, gives him shelter and
helps him find a job. A lost value has mysteriously come to
life again. This process, which one might describe as dis-dis-
illusionment, recurs several times. Disappointed in the French
art he had followed, Philip awakens to a respect for the
idealistic yet powerful art of El Greco. Certain that chance
governs man's life and that one's decisions are of no im-
portance, he drifts by chance into a profession which suits
him exactly and at which he proves adept; it occurs to him
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that, much as he hates to admit it, he may have found the
right place for himself in life. Instead of the romantic
illusions and depressions of love, he finds in Sally Athelny a
woman with whom he can be, not passionately absorbed, but
placidly happy. Evidence on the positive side of the picture
accumulates.
The final change in Philip conies when he sloughs off
the defensive pose that he has unconsciously kept for many
years: the pose of self-sacrifice and martyrdom. As in Conrad's
novel, this involves both victory and defeat. When Sally tells
him that she fears she is pregnant, he decides after a long
moral struggle that he will nobly sacrifice all his plans for
travel and adventure in order to marry her. Puffed up with
this decision, he learns that she is not pregnant after all. No
sacrifice is needed. But instead of being relieved, Philip is
dismayed. Suddenly it dawns on him that he has been ration-
alizing all the time, and that he has decided to marry Sally
not for noble reasons but because he wants to. The simplest
pattern of life, in which a man is born, works, marries, has
children, and dies, appears to him to have a value to which
he has been blind. To be sure, life has no meaning or purpose
external to itself; that he never ceases to believe. But now he
feels that it may have an inherent meaning within itself, that
the process of living is a self-justifying one. All his life, hedged
about by restrictions, he has longed for freedom. Now he
finds that, without knowing it, what he has wanted all the
time is human bondage.
"It might be," Maugham says of Philip at this point,
"that to surrender to happiness was to accept defeat, but it
was a defeat better than many victories." Again the approach
to a possibility of optimism is tentative and equivocal; yet it
comes closer than Conrad's and from a different angle.
Matter-of-fact and undogmatic, lucid and relaxed, Maugham's
novel has an almost universal appeal. Those who reread it
most frequently find it most comforting. The twentieth
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century has been too severely buffeted to appreciate the
complacency of the eighteenth or the exuberance of the
nineteenth. But it has not yet decided that the sum of evil
always exceeds the sum of good, or that the nature of reality
makes it impossible for human values to maintain and
develop themselves.
CHAPTER EIGHT
VICIOUS MOLE OF NATURE
*N THE frosty night when Ham-
let and his friends mount the platform at Elsinore to meet
the ghost, they are greeted by a burst of noise from within
the castle. Shouts, laughter, the stamping of feet, the blare of
trumpets, and an occasional cannon shot resound through
the tower. Seeing Horatio's lifted eyebrows, Hamlet explains
in some embarrassment that it is just a drinking party of the
King's, common enough, but unfortunate because such a
custom belittles the Danes in the eyes of other nations and
undermines their highest achievements. A small blemish,
perhaps, but enough to infect the whole state. And then,
seizing on this idea with his usual alertness, Hamlet applies
it to the human race. Every man, he says, has in him a
"vicious mole of nature." It may be merely a bad habit or a
quirk of temperament; it may be an inherited streak of vanity,
a petty selfishness, or a tendency to cruelty. But small or large,
it prevents the man from fulfilling the promise of his better
qualities, and cancels out the nobility that exists around it.
The play that follows is a vivid commentary on Hamlet's
statement. The loving gentleness of Queen Gertrude, which
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has led her son to idolize her, bears with it the blemish of
frailty; too pliant, she drifts away to the seductive Claudius,
with consequences devastating to her son. The mole has spread
into an ulcer. The Danish royal family, respected and feared
for its firm administration and uncompromising standards,
breeds in itself a man who shares his brother's political talent
but whose ambition drives him to fratricide and nearly
destroys the state. This time, in Hamlet's own words, the mole
has become a cancer. And in the Prince himself, the hope of
the country, who combines intellectual genius with the most
attractive honesty and social grace, there lies latent the
nervous instability and fatal indecision that render useless all
his noble qualities. Everywhere, in man or nation, "rank
corruption, mining all within, infects unseen."
Sooner or later everyone who thinks about the nature
of the world must face the question raised by this vicious
mole of nature. Why should goodness never be free to work
out its beneficent influence? Why should it be impeded and
nullified by the blemish that exists inseparably from it? What
could be more wasteful than to create high possibilities only
to cancel them out in the next breath? What kind of universe
is it that does things in this way? However the question may
be answered, no honest person can take it lightly. To shrug
one's shoulders at it or dismiss it as merely beyond our com-
prehension is to stultify one's intellect. The existence of evil
is too real to be ignored. From the accidental death of a child
to the intentional destruction of warfare, from the physical
pain of cancer to the torture of poverty, from the natural
ravages of a flood to the man-made ravages of a Buchenwald
concentration camp, human suffering is spread before us in
ferocious intensity. It harasses the world without regard to
justice and without distinction of persons. It is the most
serious and immediate question that philosophy must face.
In philosophic discussion the whole matter is called the
problem of evil. Let us say at once that, despite many
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attempts, no one has ever solved it to the satisfaction of more
than a few other people, and it remains as grimly intractable
as ever. Before we discuss it we should define it more precisely
to see just where the difficulty lies. We must not forget that it
is a metaphysical problem. The question is not, what should
we do about evil? nor even, why does evil exist? Rather it is
this: What is the nature and structure of a universe which
contains both good and evil simultaneously? Since the two
are mutually destructive opposites, can the inclusion of both
in the same world be accounted for on any rational basis?
It is a question of coherence and consistency. An analogy
may help to make this clear. Imagine that a small boy trying
to climb a tree has caught his foot in a fork of the branches
and is crying for help. A man runs up to the tree, disengages
the child's foot with the greatest care not to hurt it, dries the
tears with his handkerchief, offers him a piece of candy, and
at the same moment with his other hand presses a red-hot
iron against the back of the boy's neck. What would you
think? Obviously that the man is insane. What, then, can we
think when the universe treats human beings exactly as this
lunatic treated the child, first taking pains to give them the
means of survival and the possibility of happiness, and
instantly inflicting upon them hideous and wanton torture?
The problem of evil, then, amounts to the question whether,
on the basis of observed facts, we can vindicate the sanity of
the universe.
It might be thought that this problem exists only for
theistic philosophers. If one believes that the universe was
created by an all-powerful, benevolent God, then the place
of evil in it becomes particularly difficult to explain, and an
explanation becomes particularly necessary. It would seem
that God must be limited either in power or in goodness if
He allows His creatures to suffer as they do. If one does not
believe in God, then the problem appears much less pressing.
To a certain extent this is true; as we shall see, theists have
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made strenuous efforts to meet the difficulty. At the same time,
those of other metaphysical beliefs are not exempt from it.
Any metaphysic aims at a coherent explanation of all the
facts; and the simultaneous existence of good and evil seems
to be a striking incoherence, a self-contradiction in any theory
of how things are organized. It therefore is a lion in the path
of materialists and idealists alike.
As we have said, it has never been solved. Our object in
this chapter is first to examine a few of the attempted solu-
tions, to show wherein they are inadequate, and then to
discuss the nature of the contribution which a study of
literature may make to our thinking on the question. This
contribution is unlike any that we have seen hitherto. Instead
of being merely an illustration helping to clarify the idea, it
furnishes a specific attitude toward it. Instead of setting forth
a variety of reactions to the problem, the examples we shall
study are varying expressions of a single point of view.
Though in no sense a solution, it may be that this point of
view is one of the most valuable contributions that imagina-
tive literature can make to philosophy.
Nobody likes the father who says to his son, "This hurts
me more than it does you." A similar feeling is aroused by
many of the theories that purport to solve the problems of
evil. They are too smug, too urbane, too forgetful of the
reality of pain. They give the impression of having been
concocted by persons who find it easy to theorize about evil
because they have never experienced much of it. In fitting
evil into the scheme of things, they lose sight of the individual
who is exposed to it. Speaking of force and natural selection,
they forget the rabbit caught in the talons of the eagle, or
the parents whose child starves to death in a country at war.
Part of this is inevitable because philosophy must generalize,
but it is well to be aware of the danger and do one's best
to avoid it.
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An example of such a point of view is that of the idealists
who hold that physical objects are mere phenomena of ideas,
and that all ideas are united in the Idea of the Good. To
capitalize these words is felt to make the theory more forceful.
In this view evil does not exist at all. It is mere error, a
mistaken interpretation of the facts; if it is anything, it is a
negation or deprivation of good. If one gets in the proper
emotional state, he will no longer believe in it or be troubled
by it. The best answer to this is that, if one wishes to remain
a human being, he had better be troubled by it. According to
physicists, there is no such thing as cold; it is merely the
absence of heat, a negation or deprivation of an active
phenomenon. But to a person freezing to death, absence of
heat is just as bad as if cold really existed. The theory is not
a solution, but a matter of phraseology. Whether we call it
the problem of evil or the problem of the absence of good
does not change it in the least. The question only becomes:
why, in a coherent universe, should good be so often absent?
It becomes the problem of deprivation, and no one has solved
that either.
Laying aside this general type of theory, let us examine
a few of the attempted solutions which have found wide
favor. First, what does science have to say on the matter?
When a scientist considers it at all, he is likely to explain it
away rather than try to solve it. To him, good and evil are
names for human preferences and dislikes, expressions of
emotion rather than objective facts. What pleases us we call
good; what pains us we call evil. These values which we
place on different kinds of experience are entirely man-made,
with no relation to the experiences themselves and no
importance in the universe. Who are we to project our values
upon the cosmos? To wonder at the existence of evil is to
assume that the universe takes account of our pleasures and
pains. Obviously, it does not. The cosmic activity proceeds
by laws complete in themselves, unrelated to our likes and
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dislikes. When we infringe a law of nature, we suffer pain,
which has the function of warning us that we are doing
something illegal. Natural laws are neither good nor bad
except as we ascribe values to them. If our automobile gets a
burned-out bearing, we complain about the fact of friction
and try to eliminate it; but if a child drowns because he
slipped on a wet stone beside a lake, we complain because
there was not enough friction to keep him from falling.
"There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it
so." Regarded in this way, the problem simply disappears.
Or does it? Most people greet this theory with instinctive
repulsion. No less than the idealist view does it seem to avoid
the issue and turn out to be a mere matter of words. It again
ignores not only the individual but the whole human race.
What does it matter if the life of the drowned child has no
cosmic importance, and if the pain involved is only an
emotion of the parents? Why, then, do we have a cosmos in
which life has no importance? What coherence is there in a
universe which tricks parents into valuing their child's life
and then ruthlessly frustrates that value? This is the imme-
diate reply to such a solution. It may be put into more formal
terms as follows. Whether or not human values have
importance in the universe, the cosmos developed those values
and must therefore take responsibility for them. Human
emotions are as much a part of nature as friction is; suffering
is no less germane to natural law than osmosis. Nature
created those values. If they are inconsistent with it, then the
universe has split apart and lost control of itself. The incon-
sistency or lack of coherence is the essence of the problem.
Suppose now we place God in the universe and take the
point of view of the theist. The inconsistency at once becomes
acute, for theists will not admit that their God is evil or can
condone evil. How can they account for its presence and
power? Their answers involve two main arguments.
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The first of them is that God deliberately placed evil in
the world to be used as a method of training and strength-
ening human souls. Meeting difficulties toughens a soul just
as exercise toughens a muscle; without such training the soul
or the muscle atrophies. That is what Browning meant when
he urged us to welcome each rebuff as a spur to effort, and
what Leibniz meant when he praised a world that contained
just the right proportion of good and evil. In defending this
view, theists use the effective analogy of a parent and child.
In his relation to the child, a parent possesses both good will
and power, as God does toward a human being. Nevertheless
a wise parent does not try to shield the child from all pain
or suffering. He may punish the child, deprive him of what
he wants, force him to take medicine or have his tonsils
removed, let him touch a stove to find out for himself that
it is hot. In later years a father may allow his son to get into
trouble so that he may gain maturity by finding his own way
out. To the child such actions seem cruel and heartless
because he lacks wisdom to understand their purpose; later
he may thank his parents for them. Likewise men blame God
for confronting them with evil, because they cannot under-
stand God's infinite wisdom.
It would be pleasant if this appealing argument were as
strong as it first appears, but a little consideration of it
raises doubts both of the analogy itself and of the idea of evil
as training. If he can help it, the parent does not allow his
child to be killed by walking off a cliff. God does. The parent
does not subject his child to sufferings which prevent him
from ever developing into a normal human being. God does
this whenever a congenital idiot is born. In the example of
the accidental drowning of the child, one might argue that
such an event strengthens the character of the parents by
making them endure bereavement; but what of the child,
whose potentialities are blotted out in the process? Like other
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explanations, this one ignores the individual ruined by the
evil, and postulates a God who employs means so ruthless
that no incidental advantage can justify them. Finally, aban-
doning the analogy for the idea behind it, we become uneasily
aware that the argument proves too much. If, as it asserts,
character training by means of evil is a good thing, then we
should not wish to eliminate evil. Indeed, we should foster it.
If it is God's method, let it be ours also. It is not hard to
justify almost any destructive action by finding some theo-
retical good that might ensue for someone. This application
of the argument the theist hesitates to admit but does not
easily refute.
At this point he frequently resorts to a second line of
reasoning. Thus far he has been trying to show that God can
permit evil and at the same time be both omnipotent and
benevolent. Perhaps there is something wrong with the
assumption that God must possess both power and goodness.
Perhaps He does not after all have unlimited power. If not,
then He need no longer be held responsible for the existence
of evil. For this reason the concept of a limited or finite God
has recently been gaining favor among theists. It then becomes
necessary to explain how God's power comes to be limited,
and the theist answers that it might have occurred in any of
three ways. (1) It may be limited by the existence of a Devil
or malevolent cosmic entity whose power is equal to God's
and with whom God continually wars. (2) God, along with
the universe, may lack perfection because He is evolving into
something better, working to eliminate the evil inherent in
a universe of matter, and needing man's co-operation to help
the process along. (3) God may voluntarily have relinquished
a portion of His power in order to endow human beings with
free will, which necessarily includes freedom to suffer and to
make mistakes. Unfortunately none of these explanations
establishes the coherence of the universe, and each is open to
serious objections.
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The first one is the weakest, and is no longer taken very
seriously. If there is a Devil, then either God created him or
he created God or both have existed eternally. If God deliber-
ately created a malignant power, then an omnipotent good
being permitted evil to come into existence, and we no longer
have a limited God at all. This supposition begs the question.
Why an all-powerful Devil should create a force of good to
oppose him is hard to see. No, the only possibility is that both
have always existed and always opposed each other. But as
we examine this theory we see that it makes matters worse
instead of better, for it is merely a symbolic restatement of
the original problem. What sense can be made of a universe
composed of two forces endlessly destroying each other?
Instead of reconciling the apparent inconsistency of the
world, this theory makes its inner character that of a schizo-
phrenic split personality, and fails to vindicate the sanity of
the universe.
Somewhat more logical is the idea of an evolving God,
what Shaw calls an eternally unfulfilled purpose. It is inspir-
ing to feel that the created world can co-operate in this
evolution, and is as necessary to God as He is to it. But the
theory still leaves the original dilemma untouched. Suppose
God is identical with the purpose or energy of the universe;
then we have a pantheistic system governed by a natural law
to which human values are irrelevant, and we are merely
restating the scientific argument that was discussed above.
Suppose God to be a personality separate from the material
universe and attempting to mould stubborn matter to His
good purposes; then God was at some time confronted with
this mass of matter as a scultpor is confronted with a lump
of clay or a mathematician with an equation. Indeed, one
modern theory refers to the world in mathematical terms as
"the Given," the conditions of the problem that God must
solve. Nevertheless we have a right to ask, who or what gave
it? How render coherent a universe which simultaneously
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produces a God and a Given, with the result that in their
interaction human beings suffer untold misery? Was it wise or
righteous of God to accept the gift?
The most commonly used explanation is the third one, that
God intentionally limited Himself in order to give man the
advantage of free will. Having once made this limitation, He
is no longer able to prevent man from choosing evil rather
than good. Thus God's goodness is established, inasmuch as
He even gives man part of the divine power. It is discon-
certing to find that this argument also is merely an old one
stated in different words. Why should man have freedom of
choice? Obviously to develop his personality to the highest
possible point. How can it be said that this aim is accom-
plished by a method which often results in the total destruction
of a personality? A parent gives his child the priceless benefit
of a complete freedom of choicefreedom to go to the
medicine cabinet and swallow a bichloride of mercury pill or
freedom to take a pistol from the drawer and shoot his baby
brother. Would this establish the goodness of the parent?
Rather it would cast grave doubts upon his sanity; and we are
still trying unsuccessfully to vindicate the sanity of the
universe.
The failure of the theistic arguments has been considered
at length because there the problem is most acute and the
lack of success most bitter. We may conclude our sampling
of attempted solutions by noting an interesting psychological
theory about good and evil. It is based on the fact that
nothing can be perceived by the senses except in terms of its
opposite, or at least in terms of a contrast with some different
perception. Light is perceptible only because darkness some-
times replaces it, or because some objects are brighter than
others. If our whole environment were constantly of a single
uniform brightness, we should be unaware of the existence
of light. It would not be part of our experience. If everything
tasted and smelled exactly alike, we should have no per-
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ception of taste or smell. An unchanging, continuous sound
would not be sound at all; we hear something only when it
becomes louder or softer. Perhaps the same is true of good
and evil. If everything were uniformly good, it would cease
to be good, and all values would disappear. In fact, there is
no such thing as good or evil; events are only better or worse
than other events, given value only by contrast. It is conse-
quently impossible to imagine a life containing only good, for
it would not be life. If consciousness exists at all, it must
contain both good and evil. Suffering is the price we pay for
consciousness, and no inconsistency is involved.
Though this idea is a fascinating one and will prove
important in the literary treatment of the problem, the
objections to it are evident. Like some of the theistic
arguments, it would lead to the acceptance and even the
fostering of evil. For if the fight against human misery should
ever succeed in eliminating it, then human consciousness
would cease to exist at the same time. Why, then, should we
carry on the fight with any particular ardor? Moreover, if
consciousness is inseparable from pain, should the universe
have developed it at all? If the choice is to have both good
and evil or to have neither one, is the decision entirely clear?
There is much to be said for nothingness over against an
existence which pays the price of physical and mental torture.
Thus the theory ends by casting doubt on the value of life
itself, and leaves a universe which created it on such terms
still of doubtful sanity. The problem of evil has not been
solved.
It would be too much to expect that literature should
succeed in a field where so much philosophic thinking has
left the problem unanswered. No such claims are made for it.
Literature, of course, frequently portrays the presence and
power of evil in the world, the intensity of human suffering,
and the way in which this suffering is often cumulative as
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one lie is covered up by two more and the vicious mole of
nature eats into the healthy tissue around it. Tragic drama
from Aeschylus' Agamemnon to Ibsen's Ghosts is primarily
concerned with the existence and meaning of evil. Its effects
on individual character are studied in novels such as Dos-
toevsky's Crime and Punishment or Jakob Wassermann's The
World's Illusion. Anyone who likes to reassure himself that
the world is a fairly happy place and that misfortune is
usually a person's own fault should read such books frequently
to keep alert and active his awareness of human suffering.
This is one of the values of tragic writing.
In this chapter, however, we shall not use literature as
a source of illustrations of the problem. Rather we shall try
to demonstrate that art has at this point something to con-
tribute to philosophy, that the artistic and imaginative
approach creates something different from any of the theories
we have discussed. It is not just another solution; indeed, it is
not a solution at all, but an attitude of mind, an emotional
set. If we are to take everything into consideration, we should
examine the problem with our intuitive as well as our purely
logical faculties. Art is the externalizing of an intuition, the
giving of concrete form to an imaginative apprehension of
the world. Occasionally an artist transmits to us an intuition
that does, at least for the moment, seem to reconcile a world
of good and evil with an emotional insight beyond the reach
of logic. It is a few such pieces of literature that we are now
to study.
It is interesting that they appear in the works of the
greatest writers, as one evidence of their greatness. Only those
artists who have unusual powers of expression can put them
into words. It is even more interesting that they are in
essential agreement with one another. However unlike the
personalities involved, no matter how different the modes of
expression they use, the intuition is the same. Though it
includes something of the theistic and of the psychological
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theories already mentioned, it is different from either of them.
In discussing the psychological theory, we found that it
ends by casting doubt on the value of life. It is at this point
that the artist's imagination takes up the idea. His approach
to it is based on the necessity of choosing beween life and
death. If one chooses life, he thereby elects to experience both
good and evil. If he is unwilling to accept this double nature
of existence, he chooses death. It is both or neither, never one
without the other. And this is true not merely in the mind,
as the psychological theory states, but as a matter of objective
fact. For life, by definition, involves a series of organic
tensions, an opposition of forces which maintain the physical
and chemical balance of the body, to say nothing of its
precarious mental balance, a delicate adjustment that is
forever threatened with collapse. This unavoidable danger of
destruction is the evil in life. If we eliminate it, we die. A
living object is in balanced but unstable equilibrium; a dead
one is in stable equilibrium, and runs no more danger.
If, therefore, a person thinks life preferable to death,
consciousness preferable to oblivion, by that choice he achieves
an emotional reconciliation to the existence of evil. That
existence is no longer an inconsistency, but a necessity to the
definition of life. The choice is not an easy one, especially
to a sensitive artist. The seductive attractions of death must
not be underestimated; the will to relax one's hold on life is
strong. Some artists make that choice. But most of them,
especially some of unusual genius, end by preferring life in
the full knowledge that they are thereby reconciling them-
selves to evil and suffering. We shall examine three examples
of this artistic intuition, representing different ages and types
of literature. They are the odes of Keats, the tragedies of
Shakespeare, and the novels of Thomas Mann.
Whatever John Keats felt and wrote about human
suffering was the result, not of theorizing, but of his own
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experience. Though he lived only twenty-five years, those
years brought him more hardships and disappointment than
the average person endures in seventy. The difference
between the poetry he wrote at twenty and that which he
wrote at twenty-three shows an incredibly rapid maturing of
the personality. He is a living example of the development
of a character through the experience of pain. His father and
mother both died before he was fifteen. His favorite brother
George emigrated permanently to America. In the same year
he took care of his younger brother Tom through the final
months of tuberculosis, and was present at his death. When
he fell in love with Fanny Brawne, he felt little hope of
marrying her because of his poverty, his increasing ill health,
and her less than ardent return of his feelings. His attempts
to earn a living by writing were thwarted by a series of
wantonly cruel reviews which went out of their way to
ridicule his youthful faults of style in a tone of inexcusable
sarcasm. Convinced that his life would be short, he fought
against time to overcome his mannerisms and produce poetry
that would last. He died a lingering death, in a foreign
country with only one friend near him, and under the false
impression that he had failed. It would have been natural
for him to feel nothing but bitterness about human life. It is
hard to believe that his later poetry achieved one of the most
impressive imaginative reconciliations of the problem of evil.
Nor did Keats arrive at his conclusion by chance or by
instinct. His letters, particularly those to his brother George,
&how that he had given the matter long and careful thought.
For example, in February, 1819, he began a diary-letter to
which he added at intervals for more than two months. In
one section written in April, he discusses at length the theistic
solution of evil as character-training, suggests modifications
in it, and advances a tentative outline of the psychological
relation between good and evil. It is a mistake, he says, to
regard this world as a vale of tears from which we are rescued
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into the bliss of heaven. Instead, it should be called a vale of
soul-making. By soul he means a unique individual person-
ality. Human beings are born with an intelligence but no
soul. Some never develop one; the few who do must undergo
many difficult experiences to create it gradually in the stress
and strain of life. So far Keats is close to the theistic solution;
now he goes on to describe the process by which soul creation
occurs. It takes place through the interaction of three ele-
ments: the logical mind, the emotions or intuitions, and the
external world to which the first two must adapt. No one or
two of these is enough to make a personality; all three are
necessary. In the letter we can see Keats thinking out this
idea as he writes; his mind is busy with it, but it has not yet
taken a poetic form.
I can scarcely express what I but dimly perceive,
and yet I think I perceive itthat you may judge the
more clearly I will put it in the most homely form
possible. I will call the world a School instituted for
the purpose of teaching little children to read I will
call the human heart the horn Book read in that
School and I will call the Child able to read, the
Soul made from that School and its hornbook. Do
you not see how necessary a World of Pains and
troubles is to school the Intelligence and make it a
Soul? A Place where the heart must feel and suffer
in a thousand diverse ways.
1
This letter gives unusual evidence of the genesis of a
poetic idea, and of the way in which Keats's own personality
was developing by the interaction of these same three
elements of logic, intuition, and painful experience. Less
than a month after he wrote the passage he had transformed
this raw material into poetry. He had seen the necessity of
making the symbolic choice between life and death, had
recognized clearly the alluring attractiveness of yielding to
death, and had rejected that escape in favor of the energetic
continuance of life, no matter how painful.
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This intuitive approach to the problem of evil is revealed
in two poems, which must be studied together to make the
idea clear; it appears in the content of both separately, and
especially in a comparison of the two. They are the Ode to a
Nightingale and the Ode on Melancholy. Though it is certain
that these odes were written at very nearly the same time,
some doubt exists as to the exact interval and as to which
came first. This discussion follows the authority of Sir Sidney
Colvin, who believes that both were written in May, 1819,
that they should be taken together as companion pieces, and
that the nightingale ode precedes the one on melancholy.
2
This conclusion is also confirmed by internal evidence. Assum-
ing it to be true, the two poems seem to exhibit Keats in the
very act of making his philosophic choice between life and
death.
The Ode to a Nightingale opens with a direct statement
of personal suffering: "My heart aches." After our summary
of what Keats was enduring at the time, this needs no com-
ment. His world was filled with evil; yet at the same time his
keen senses and strong love of natural beauty kept alive his
feeling that this world has high possibilities of good. In this
apparently irreconcilable contrast he is specifically facing the
problem of evil. In sorrow he listens to the song of the
nightingale. The inner conflict between beauty and pain has
dulled all his senses. The two emotions so counteract each
other that his mind and body fall into a lethargy. He feels
too heavy to move.
A drowsy numbness pains
My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk,
Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains
One minute past, and Lethe-wards had sunk.
In this state of low vitality, feeling as if the waters of forget-
fulness were closing over his head, he is too enervated to deal
with any of life's problems. Instead he longs to escape all pain
and responsibility into a world of pure happiness. Why must
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beauty be linked with sorrow? Why could there not be a
realm in which only good exists? Perhaps the song of the bird
gives evidence that there is such a realm. The nightingale is so
relaxed, singing with such "full-throated ease," that to im-
agine it experiencing pain is impossible. It must possess the
secret of unalloyed happiness. And so Keats utters the wish
that he might
Fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget
What thou among the leaves hast never known,
The weariness, the fever, and the fret
Here, where men sit and hear each other groan;
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs,
Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies;
Where but to think is to be full of sorrow
And leaden-eyed despairs,
Where Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes,
Or new Love pine at them beyond tomorrow.
Here is summed up the transitoriness of good and the inevita-
bility of evil, made particularly personal by the reference to
his brother's death. The natural reaction to such a world is
the wish to escape.
This wish Keats at once fulfills in a poetic daydream. He
imagines himself out of the world, alone in a forest on a dark
night, seeing nothing around him, but gaining vivid impres-
sions from his other senses. In his face he feels a faint breeze
that brings him the scent of violets and musk-rose, and he
hears louder and clearer than before the ecstatic song of the
nightingale. The perfect world is his, the experience of good
without evil.
Of course, it is only in his imagination; he never deceives
himself by mistaking it for reality. Such a world cannot exist,
and when the dream is over the sorrows of life will again
flood upon him; the paradox of the inconsistent union of
good and evil will reassert itself. Why should he wish to
return? Why not relinquish the brief joys and certain pains
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of life, and sink past Lethe into full oblivion? Why not give
up? It is at this point in the sequence of his emotions that
the tempting death-wish comes to him.
Darkling I listen, and for many a time
I have been half in love with easeful Death,
Call'd him soft names in many a mused rhyme
To take into the air my quiet breath:
Now more than ever seems it rich to die,
To cease upon the midnight with no pain.
Nevertheless, almost as soon as the wish is uttered, his
mind recoils from it. Death is no solution. To give up the
struggle and sink into a state where there is no sensation of
any kind will indeed eliminate pain; but it will also eliminate
beauty and value. The nightingale will go right on singing,
unheard and unappreciated. For the beauty and perfection
symbolized by the bird-song are just as immortal as the evil
and suffering.
Thou wast not born for death, immortal BirdI
No hungry generations tread three down.
And so Keats, overcoming the wish for death which has
momentarily allured him, returns from his dream to the real
world.
It is significant, however, that the mood of his return
to life is a negative one. He does not accept life; he rejects
death. He comes back to himself as one awakens from an
anesthetic, dazed and a little resentful, feeling as if he had
been victimized by the nightingale's song.
Adieu 1 The fancy cannot cheat so well
As she is famed to do, deceiving elf.
Though he has been temporarily taken in, the illusion cannot
last and gives no satisfaction. Again he is alone in the world
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of pain, still lethargic, uncertain whether he sleeps or wakes,
is dead or alive. As the poem ends, Keats has achieved no
true reconciliation to the "vale of soul-making." His mind is
suspended inertly between the struggle of life and the non-
entity of death.
In the days that followed the writing of this poem
Keats's mind must have revolved the problem many times,
until, as his imagination penetrated more and more deeply
into the mysterious relation between happiness and pain, he
made his choice; That choice is the subject of the Ode on
Melancholy. The opening phrase is now not a simple state-
ment of his feelings, but a sudden, sharp warning. The poem
begins: "No, no, go not to Lethe." This line is usually ex-
plained as referring to a preceding stanza which Keats wrote
and then rejected, a stanza which describes the soul as
setting out in a phantom boat in search of melancholy. By
this interpretation Keats is warning the reader that melan-
choly is not found by resorting to superstition and folklore.
This is certainly part of his meaning, but the line is open to
another no less reasonable interpretation. It may be that
Keats's mind was harking back to the nightingale ode, where
he had spoken longingly of sinking "Lethe-wards," and that
he was now announcing his rejection of that escape into
forgetfulness, his new conviction that the music of the night-
ingale had been a siren's song. Therefore he calls sharply,
"No, no, go not to Lethe!" That is the wrong choice, and he
now has a better one.
The stanza following repeats the warning in symbolic
terms, calling up a series of images associated with sleep and
death, of which the human soul must beware: sedatives and
opiates like wolf's-bane and deadly nightshade, funereal ob-
jects like owls and yew-trees, death-symbols like the Egyptian
beetle and the Greek moth. The line "Nor let ... the death-
moth be Your mournful Psyche" is especially rich in
connotation. Psyche was the goddess of the soul, which took
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the form of a moth emerging from the mouth of a dying
person. But for most readers the principal association of the
name is with the love story of Cupid and Psyche. Playing on
this train of thought, Keats means, do not let your Psyche
be the mournful state of a dying soul in other words, don't
fall in love with easeful death, as Keats himself had almost
but not quite done. Thus we have, not a logical, but a purely
imaginative statement of his rejection of the death-wish.
The last two lines of the stanza are puzzling until they
are connected with the new decision which Keats had made.
They give the reason for his exhortation to avoid Lethe. Do
not resort to anything that will dull sensation, he says:
For shade to shade will come too drowsily
And drown the wakeful anguish of the soul.
This is a surprising statement. The very reason people take
opiates is to drown their sorrows, and here is Keats saying
you must avoid them for fear of drowning your sorrows. Do
not wish to stop suffering; cherish it as a value instead of
fleeing from it is an evil. These lines are strong evidence of
the new intuition which had come to Keats between this
poem and the preceding one.
The second stanza parallels the images of the first with
a series of beautiful pictures associated with life and health:
tiny leaves in April, spring flowers, June roses and peonies,
and the iridescence of waves on the beach. The view of
suffering as a value is repeated in the comparison of a mood
of melancholy to an April shower which makes the flowers
grow better. These two parallel stanzas now converge in the
third, which is Keats's final expression of the inseparable
union of good and evil in life, and his joyful acceptance of
that union. Let us read the entire stanza, remembering that
"she" refers to the goddess Melancholy, that is, to human
suffering.
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She dwells with Beauty Beauty that must die;
And joy whose hand is ever at his lips,
Bidding adieu; and aching Pleasure nigh,
Turning to poison while the bee-mouth sips:
Ay, in the very temple of Delight
Veil'd Melancholy has her sovran shrine,
Though seen of none save him whose strenuous tongue
Can burst Joy's grape against his palate fine;
His soul shall taste the sadness of her might,
And be among her cloudy trophies hung.
Here again beauty and joy are as transitory as they were in
the nightingale ode, and pleasure turns to poison in the time
a bee takes to gather nectar from a flower. Keats never ignores
or glosses over human pain. What he does is to transform it
magically from a punishment to a privilege. The experiece of
pain is something of which a man must be worthy. If he does
not experience it he is not fully human, but half dead. For
poignant pain can be felt only by a mind sensitive enough
to experience both it and pleasure in the highest degree.
Otherwise it is not pain at all, but Lethean dullness. If a
man is susceptible to keen suffering, then only is he able to
burst the grape of joy in his mouth and savor it against his
palate. Great good can exist only in the life of a being for
whom great evil also exists. Either alone is impossible. And
Keats has at last reached the place where he is ready to
choose the combined extremes of good and evil rather than
the oblivion that removes both. This ode, then, illustrates
the contribution of art to philosophy for which we are
searching. In the imaginative mood which it creates, good
and evil are no longer destructive opposites, but parts of an
underlying unity. At least during the time that a reader
allows himself to become absorbed in the poem, he feels that
the sanity of a universe which includes both good and evil is
vindicated.
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Having seen the subjective, individual reaction of a lyric
poet, let us turn to a completely objective picture of the
world in the tragedies of Shakespeare. Here we find no
personal choice such as we have just analyzed, no direct
statement of any philosophy. What Shakespeare's attitude
was must be inferred from the nature of the world he creates
for his characters, the kind of evil that surrounds them, and
the relation that seems to exist between it and the forces of
good. This evidence will lead us to the conclusion that there
is implied in Shakespeare's tragedies an imaginative choice
similar to that of Keats, though set forth on a much larger
scale.
When Shakespeare is brought into this discussion, one's
indebtedness to his many commentators is so great that it
cannot be adequately acknowledged. Everyone interested in
his philosophy should read particularly the opening lecture
of A. C. Bradley's Shakespearean Tragedy entitled "The Sub-
stance of Shakespearean Tragedy." Having done so, he will
be unable to stop until he has finished the book, and will
then wish to reread the tragedies themselves. They are, of
course, so rich in material for thought, and offer so many
inviting themes for study, that we must resist the temptation
to stray into bypaths, and remember that our one object is to
discover the relation between Shakespeare's created world
and the problem of evil.
As before, two of the attempted solutions to the problem
appear to a limited degree in Shakespeare, but are insufficient
to explain his attitude. The theory that evil is character
training seems to be confirmed by the example of King Lear,
whose sufferings aroused in him a sympathy and thought-
fulness of others that he had never felt before. But in other
cases ill fortune merely destroys the personality instead of
developing it; for example, Ophelia's bereavement promptly
drives her insane and results in her death. Evil may or may
not strengthen a character; in Shakespeare's world there is no
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inherent tendency for it to do so. The psychological theory
also appears in his plays, but in a somewhat reversed form.
Instead of asserting that evil is necessary to make possible a
conception of good, he gives the impression that, since ex-
tremes of good and evil exist in the world, it is wise to make
use of the evil wherever possible to intensify our awareness
and admiration of the good. This is at any rate the effect of
such contrasts as those between lago and Desdemona, or
between Goneril and Cordelia.
But neither of these ideas explains his point ot view. If
we keep in mind the artistic choice just described, between
the tension and dangers of life on the one hand and the
securely stable inertia of death on the other, we find that his
plays impress us as giving the same answer that we have
already seen: a preference for a life including extremes of
fineness and evil over a state of dull nonentity containing
neither. If it must be both or neither, then boththat is what
one feels in reading the tragedies. This does not mean that
Shakespeare considered life good or happy or just. In his
world virtue is not rewarded, poetic justice does not appear,
and there is no sentimentalizing of the facts. But the point is
that, however unfair and painful it may be, its author pre-
ferred it because its only alternative is passive non-existence.
Moreover, his readers and audiences have confirmed that
choice. Scores of plays which depict a far more agreeable
world than Shakespeare's tragedies do, a world in which
poetic justice reigns and goodness is triumphant, have disap-
peared permanently; but his plays, in which painful feelings
reach an almost unbearable intensity, have gained vitality by
the passing of three centuries. In short, there seems to be
something about Shakespeare's tragic universe that makes
people want to live in it.
Let us now outline its characteristics, and show their
development by referring to three of the plays written during
a period of ten years: Romeo and Juliet, his best early
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tragedy, about 1594; Hamlet, rewritten several times from
about 1598 to 1603; and Othello, played in 1604. In certain
points they are alike; in others they differ so as to exhibit an
evolution in his ideas of a tragic world. Taken together they
account for his preference of suffering life over impregnable
death.
The first characteristic of this world is Shakespeare's
emphasis on the fact that good and evil are inseparable in it,
and that both are present to an exaggerated degree. There
is nothing matter-of-fact or dull about the plays; they are
filled with vitality, with action and emotion on a more in-
tense level than that of ordinary existence. The more of life
there is in them, the more of both 'good and evil we may
expect to find. The presence of these two qualities in unusual
strength is what creates the fatal conflict.
In general terms, Shakespeare's view is this: As long as
any organism remains normal and mediocre, it can survive
for a long time without anything much happening to it. But
as soon as it develops some extraordinary beauty or goodness,
some intense manifestation of life, then at the same time it
creates an evil weakness which destroys that new development.
Any great achievement is so unstable, delicate, and transitory
that it is particularly susceptible to danger and bears with it
the seeds of destruction. This applies to any living thing. A
rosebush can survive a hard winter. From October to May
it has created nothing of importance, attracts no attention,
and is hardly worth looking at. When a flower appears on it
in June, it is admired for having accomplished an extraor-
dinary creative act. But the flower is so delicate that it can
last only a few days and disintegrates in the first rainstorm.
Similarly, among human beings, a genius often has such an
unstable nervous organization that he is unable to adapt to
the normal life around him. When the life force experiments
for improvement, it creates good and evil inseparably. That
the extraordinary cannot survive is tragic, but the important
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fact is that even its temporary existence impresses us as so
admirable that it reconciles us to the character of the world
which produced it. This is what Shakespeare's tragedies
imply.
Each of the three plays we are using as examples
describes such a flowering period in the life of a country or an
individual, in which good and evil are intermingled; the
third one demonstrates their inseparability in an exact and
striking fashion. Romeo and Juliet takes place in a Renais-
sance Italian city, Hamlet at a high point in the medieval
Danish empire, Othello in powerful sixteenth-century Venice.
In the first, the environment of the southern Renaissance
produces strong and sensitive emotions, which result on the
one hand in a murderous feud between rival clans, and on
the other in two people who emerge from the center of this
quarrel to feel nothing but loving absorption in each other.
The close union between good and evil is symbolized in the
character of Mercutio, who is a young man of charm, wit,
and delicate poetic sensitiveness, yet at the same time coarse,
bawdy, and dangerously quarrelsome. It is he who utters the
beautiful account of the dreams that Queen Mab brings to
sleeping humans; it is he also who baits Tybalt into the fatal
street-fight. In the outcome, good and evil are equally in-
separable: the lovers are dead, but their death has ended
the feud.
In the second play, the Danish court has reached an
abnormally high development of wealth, pomp, culture, and
foreign conquest. In doing so it has brought forth two persons
of extraordinary powers, both members of the royal family,
both of intelligence, courage, and sensitive feelings: the
king's son, a courtier, soldier, and scholar, "the expectancy
and rose of the fair state," a youth of brilliant intellect and
imagination whose friendly charm has endeared him to the
whole country; and the king's brother, a man with adminis-
trative talent, fertility of resource, and acute knowledge of
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human nature, whose ambition has led him to murder. Not
only are the two equated as "mighty opposites," but they are
complementary in that each has what the other lacks.
Hamlet's particular weakness is self-deception, the inability
to face facts; Claudius* greatest virtue is his realistic appraisal
of his own deeds, his refusal to pray for forgiveness because
he knows he will not give up the fruits of his crime. The
same mingling of good and evil is evident within Hamlet
himself. Being a genius, he represents at once the highest
development of human life and its accompanying dangers.
He pays the penalty for his greatness by the nervous in-
stability that makes him the prey of moods and the victim
instead of the master of his emotions. The generous idealism
of his nature exposes him to easy disillusionment which
paralyzes his powers of action at the important moment.
Unusual sensitiveness involves unusual suffering.
In Othello Shakespeare not only repeats this idea but
strengthens it by an interesting addition. First, both the
good and the evil are more extreme than in the earlier plays.
Othello excels Hamlet in simple dignity and affectionate
trustfulness of nature; Desdemona is much stronger and more
attractive than Ophelia; Claudius is almost a scrupulous man
compared to lago. But these extremes are made inseparable
for the ironical reason that they help create each other. If
Othello and Desdemona had not been so good, lago could
not have been so bad. He counted on their admirable
qualities to make his plot succeed. Othello is instinctively too
loyal and honest to suspect malice in others. Desdemona will
inconvenience herself to do anyone a kindness. As lago re-
marks with satisfaction,
She is of so free, so kind, so apt, so blessed a
disposition, she holds it a vice in her goodness not
to do more than she is requested. (2:3:325)
Therefore she will earnestly try to have Cassio reinstated in
his office, so earnestly that a little skillful prodding from
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lago will make Othello wonder whether her interest in Gassio
is more than sisterly. This ability to make use of his victim's
most admirable qualities is one of lago's devilish traits. It
greatly intensifies our impression of the inextricable union
of good and evil in Shakespeare's world. The fact that evil
succeeds because of the very existence of good is made clear
to the audience when lago says,
So will I turn her virtue into pitch,
And out of her own goodness make the net
That shall enmesh them all. (2:3:363-5)
This imaginative world, then, is composed of an
indissoluble mixture of good and evil because it contains
exceptional vitality, an intense manifestation of life. Suppose
the persons who inhabit it were less fully alive, more average
and ordinary as they usually are in the real world: would
it still exhibit this union of extremes? Shakespeare takes care
to show that it would not, by including in each play one or
more average characters who feel very strong emotion, whose
reach never exceeds their grasp, who take few risks and are
subject to few dangers. It is they who survive. They keep the
world going, but do not give us the impression that their
lives will be very interesting or will contain much possibility
of development. Like the hardy plant that lives over the
winter, they will remain unchanged for a long time, but
will produce no flower.
Of such a nature is Friar Laurence in Romeo and Juliet,
a well-meaning, comfortable man in whom both Romeo and
Juliet confide. He prevents Romeo from committing suicide,
and then delivers a long lecture on self-control which leads
Juliet's nurse to exclaim that she could stand there all night
listening to such good counsel. To comfort the distracted
Juliet he suggests the device of the sleeping potion, which
he can supply because he is an enthusiastic gardener and
herbalist. When his plan unluckily fails and he finds Romeo
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dead in the Capulet vault, he first rather feebly urges Juliet
to come away and enter a nunnery; then, hearing a noise, he
runs away, is picked up by the police, and tells the whole
story to the rival families. If everyone were as prudent and
cautious as Laurence, society would be less exposed to evil;
yet most readers would prefer to have known Romeo, Juliet,
and Mercutio for a short time than to grow old in a world
filled with Laurences.
In Hamlet the principal surviving character is Horatio,
whom we have already discussed as an example of a balanced
personality. He is a taciturn scholar with a dry wit and an
air of quiet skepticism. Though he would never harm anyone,
he shows no trace of leadership or creative ability. It is an
excellent thing for the effervescent Prince to have a friend so
loyal, so reserved, and so steady. His fidelity even makes him
want to die like an ancient Roman when Hamlet is killed,
and Hamlet's last act is to seize the poison cup and beg
Horatio to live in order to tell his story truly to the world.
No one dislikes him, yet no one is perfectly sure whether or
not he is there. If we had met no one with a great personality
we might feel comfortably satisfied with Horatio; but once
having known Hamlet, with all his irritating moodiness and
instability, we know that a world of Horatios would not
compensate us for the loss of an exceptional human being.
Othello and Desdemona are survived by Cassio, the
young lieutenant who has been the innocent instrument of
lago's plot. The almost universal reaction to him is, nice
fellow but no heavyweight. An amiable and popular officer,
he enjoys being a favorite and finds it hard to say no to
anyone. His manners are courtly, his conversation pleasantly
exuberant with just a touch of flamboyance. When he is
demoted for getting drunk on duty he is naively remorseful
and too ill at ease to face his commanding officer afterwards.
He is ineffective, but attractive in his weaknesses; one can
understand why Desdemona took up his cause and why he
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exasperated the coldly efficient lago. As Governor of Cyprus
he will be honest, genial, hounded by pressure groups, and
deceived by diplomats. Compared to Othello he seems
tenuous, half-existent, an average agreeable man not out-
standing in any way; and now that the reader has known
Othello, Cassio is no longer enough. The life force has done
better than he, at the cost of intense suffering to which
pleasant mediocrity is not subject. They are all very nice,
these surviving characters; but Shakespeare makes most
readers prefer a world containing an exceptional amount of
both good and evil to a world containing neither. This
preference implies a reconciliation of the problem of evil
itself.
It should be observed that Shakespeare makes only
sparing use of the idea of evil as character training, and does
not lose sight of the fact that it is as likely to destroy
character as to strengthen it. This is one evidence of the
clear-sightedness of his outlook. While he shows that Romeo
and Juliet were matured by their difficulties, he also implies
that they grew up too fast and somewhat artificially. Fewer
obstacles and a more natural development would have been
better for them in the end. In fact, the tragic outcome of the
story is brought about partly by their too precipitous matur-
ing. Juliet, at first meekly obedient to her parents, learns so
quickly to think for herself and dissemble her feelings that
she goes too far. Her pretense of eagerness to marry the family
candidate, Count Paris, is convincing enough to lead her
father to advance the time of the wedding and so frustrate
Friar Laurence's plan. In the earlier scenes Romeo is a
sentimental weakling who dallies instead of making up his
mind. At the end he has matured enough to decide instantly
upon a course of action; he rushes back to Verona and kills
himself without even pausing to notice that Juliet is on the
very point of reviving. A few minutes' delay would have
saved both their lives.
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In the other two plays also the effect of evil on character
is not always strengthening. It does have a good effect on
Desdemona, whose endurance of undeserved torment in-
creases her native gentleness and unselfishness, until as she
is dying she tries to save Othello from being accused of her
murder. But it is hard to see how either Hamlet or Othello is
improved by suffering. Before their troubles begin, both are
well-adjusted people, popular and successful; their weak-
nesses are latent, and have caused them no trouble. It is their
contact with evil that brings out these weaknesses. The shock
of his mother's infidelity and his uncle's crime plunges
Hamlet into irresolution and almost unseats his mind. The
painful jealous doubt engendered by lago destroys Othello's
carefully guarded habit of self-control and drives him into
ungovernable anger. At the end, it is true, each recovers
something of his original character; but a reader may justly
ask whether it would not have been better to keep it in the
first place rather than to regain it too late. On the whole, it is
not as a means of improving character that Shakespeare finds
his reconciliation to a world of good and evil.
In this respect the three plays are much alike, but in
another phase of the treatment of evil they are different.
Whatever may be its effect on the good characters, the evil in
Shakespeare's tragedies becomes increasingly self-destructive.
This is one of the most noticeable changes from his earlier
to his later tragedies. It is hardly at all true of Romeo and
Juliet, where the denouement involves a series of ironic co-
incidences. Only indirectly does the feud destroy itself. If
the lovers had happened to escape, as they might easily have
done, the family quarrel would probably have raged all the
more fiercely. The combatants, temporarily sobered by the
sudden death of the two young people, shake hands all
around and agree to call it quits. One may wonder how long
the truce will last. In Hamlet the destruction of the evil
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power is definite enough, and is self-caused in the sense that
Claudius over-reaches himself in plotting the elaborate trap
of the fencing-match. Hamlet, who never acts except on
impulse, is aroused to such fury by discovering his uncle's
perfidy that he does the deed which he has so long postponed.
Yet here the reader never feels the precise, almost uncanny
impression that strikes him in Othello, an impression that the
evil has destroyed itself because it is evil. lago belongs
properly at the bottom of Dante's hell because his chief
characteristic is coldness of heart, a freezing of human feeling
so complete that such things as sympathy and altruism are
to him not only contemptible but unintelligible. His logical
mind concocts an almost perfect plot, but he fails because he
does not understand that anyone could have a purely disin-
terested love for another person. It must have occurred to
him that his wife Emilia might give him away; he takes
the risk of sending her to Othello's room, however, because
he cannot see what she has to gain by betraying him. He is
right she has everything to lose. Yet she reveals the truth
out of sincere affection for Desdemona. The particular kind
of evil in lago's nature prevents him from foreseeing this
possibility, and hence this evil is specifically self-destructive.
A reader's consciousness of that fact powerfully reinforces
Shakespeare's implied choice of a world combining the ex-
tremes of good and evil over a world of lesser vitality.
No reader will feel that Shakespeare's tragedies solve
the problem, or in any way lessen the mystery of a divided
universe. The value of reading his plays does not lie in the
discovery of some easy answer to this problem of philosophy.
It lies in the fact that Shakespeare illuminates for us the real
world by creating an imaginary one, not idealized or falsified,
just as inconsistent as ours seems to be, yet one which most
people would not exchange for a consistent one that included
no greatness, no dangers, and no pain.
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The novels of Thomas Mann may well conclude our
study, because, while reiterating the imaginative choice made
by Keats and Shakespeare, they speak in terms of modern
life and are filled with meaning for the twentieth century. In
Keats the emphasis is on the mental processes of the in-
dividual thinking out the problem; Shakespeare creates a
group of objectively portrayed characters; Mann faces the
problem of evil in civilization as a whole, the endless conflict
of life and death in the course of history. By the use of
certain symbols he is able to show the close amalgamation of
these forces more vividly than either of the others. We shall
first examine some of Mann's characteristic methods of writ-
ing, and then see how these methods enable him to express
the idea which sums up his imaginative choice between a life
containing good and evil and a death containing neither.
His main characteristic is his inclusiveness, a habit of
mind which leads him to reconcile and fuse ideas that appear
to be opposites, to take account of many diverse factors, and
to hold them in suspension until he has extracted and unified
the values of all. Though he has exhibited this philosophic
point of view from the first, it has broadened and matured
in the course of his writing.
Mann's boyhood was spent in the mercantile city of
Liibeck, where his first opportunity to reconcile opposites
appeared in his own family. His father was a strict, respect-
able, middle-class merchant; his mother a Portuguese-Creole
musician; and these hereditary strains of the conventional
and the artistic produced a conflict in his mind. He tried
and rejected a business career; he tried a free Bohemian life
in Italy, and rejected that too. Then a happy marriage com-
bined with successful literary work resolved the problem.
3
He has written four major and four minor novels, numerous
short stories, and several social and critical essays. We shall
consider his reaction to the problem of evil in three of the
great novels: Buddenbrooks (1901) ; The Magic Mountain
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(1924), which brought him the Nobel Prize; and Joseph and
His Brothers (1931-1944).
Buddenbrooks, derived partly from his home experience,
traces the gradual decay ot a nineteenth-century German
mercantile family to its eventual extinction. Its scene is
limited to one region and one class of society; its background
is the strict German social and economic system of Mann's
early years. The Magic Mountain expands its horizon to
include a panorama of European society before World War
I, by presenting a cross-section of it assembled in a Swiss
tuberculosis sanitarium, where the struggle with disease and
death brings out the patients' best and their worst qualities.
It is here that Mann deals most directly with the death-wish,
the temptation to relax forever in the comfortable but morbid
atmosphere of the Berghof. In Joseph and His Brothers, he
again enlarges his field by exploring the remote past, en-
riching the Biblical story by filling in its human details,
connecting it with folklore, and developing it into a philosophy
of history. The three novels show an evolution toward greater
scope and power, more skillful use of symbolism, and richer
philosophical content. They also exhibit a process of self-
discovery on Mann's part, because the second and third
books each develop ideas implicitly present in the preceding
one, so that his whole work is unified by his single point of
view toward the problem of evil in history.
On first reading the novels, a person will probably ob-
serve a characteristic habit of Mann's; he likes to portray his
characters in contrasting pairs the respectable Thomas
Buddenbrook opposed to his flighty brother Christian, the
rebellious Hans Castorp to his disciplined cousin Joachim, a
series of brother-pairs like Cain and Abel, Jacob and Esau,
Joseph and Reuben. Though at first these contrasts seem clear
and definite, we soon find that they begin to dissolve at the
edges into unexpected similarities. The two Buddenbrook
boys, though opposite in temperament, both come to grief in
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the struggle to adapt themselves to family pressure; Hans
Castorp is pleased to find his incorruptible cousin threatened
by the same dangers to which he himself is exposed. All this
is technique of character-portrayal, but we next discover that
Mann uses the same method in his treatment of ideas. Each
idea appears as a contrast between two phenomena which at
first seem direct opposites, but are later partly reconciled
and fused. Three of these pairs we may examine briefly as
stepping-stones to Mann's central philosophy: his contrast
between the artist and the practical man, between democracy
and authority, and between life and death.
The first of these springs from his early experience.
Heredity and environment instilled into him the conflict of
the artistic with the practical point of view, the Bohemian,
eccentric, and experimental attitudes with the solid, moral,
and conservative ones. This is the principal subject of
Buddenbrooks, where it explains the disintegration of the
family. For a ceatury the Buddenbrook fathers have trans-
mitted to their sons a hard-headed business ability. Then in
two generations appears an odd neurotic strain, a shockingly
impractical bent for daydreaming and artistic pursuits, which
saps the family unity and ruins the business. At the same
time, in Mann's usual style of balancing forces, it adds both
interest and human sympathy to the arid Buddenbrook clan.
The same contrast continues, with less emphasis, in the later
novels. Hans Castorp is distracted from his priggish upbring-
ing by the free-thinking radicalism of some of his friends in
the sanitarium; and the brilliant, mercurial Joseph is con-
trasted with his matter-of-fact, farmer-shepherd brothers.
Though the advantage is now on one side, now on the other,
the best development of human life always comes from a
contact and interaction of the two.
More directly connected with Mann's philosophy of
history is his second contrast, that between democracy and
authoritarianism. From the beginning of his work, he foresaw
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that this was to be an important twentieth-century problem:
which is paramount, the efficiency and stability of the group
or the development of the individual? His answer again is
typical. The best results, he shows, come from an interaction
of the two, with the individual stimulated to greater effort
by his struggle with the group. Some such challenge is
necessary for the individual to develop, but if the group is so
powerful as to stifle him society becomes static.
Two examples of this contrast will show how Mann uses
it in the novels. It is implicit throughout Buddenbrooks,
where the authority of the family is pitted against the desire
for individual freedom in the younger generation. Consul
Buddenbrook is shocked when his daughter Tony wishes to
marry a poor student who believes in freedom of the press
and equal opportunity before the law. This will never do;
and the weak-willed Tony is engulfed by kindly but unre-
lenting family pressure until she unhappily marries the
proper person. Her easy surrender turns out badly for the
family, because the proper person proves to be a swindler
seeking refuge in the Buddenbrook wealth. But the opposite
extreme, as usual, is equally bad. Tony's brother Christian,
discarding all family authority, becomes a dissipated indi-
vidualist who never accomplishes anything.
The idea is further developed by a symbolic contrast in
The Magic Mountain. Among the inmates of the sanitarium
are two remarkable men, an Italian named Settembrini and a
Ukrainian named Naphta. Settembrini is a charming friend,
a man of liberal sympathies and earnest public spirit, a sup-
porter of the common man, a believer in orderly democratic
social progress, engaged in writing a book on sociology.
Naphta is a shrewd, truculent upholder of totalitarianism,
advocating a strong state that will keep the masses obedient
by force and torture. Hans Castorp learns much from their
debates. Settembrini is so smoothly eloquent that his words
slide from his mouth like fresh hot rolls from the oven;
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Naphta's speech is incisive and uncompromising, so cuttingly
logical that Hans, whose sympathies are more with Settem-
brini's democracy, fears uneasily that liberalism may be a
little too tolerant to be effective against the brilliant fascist.
He is mistaken, however, in a way that somewhat prefigured
later events. As time goes on, Naphta grows more aggressively
insulting, deliberately baiting his opponent and finally
challenging him to a duel, just as fascism acted toward
democracy in 1938-1939. Then, under the stimulus of crisis,
Settembrini reacts calmly and courageously; Naphta, dis-
concerted by his unexpected efficiency, becomes pathological
and screaming, and eventully shoots himself. That was
Mann's forecast in 1924 of the future of totalitarianism.
The suicide of Naphta leads us to the third and most
important contrast, that between life and death, which is em-
phasized in all three novels. Here Mann's balancing tech-
nique is especially evident. On the one hand, he pictures
death as the destroyer of life's values, and equates it with
all human tendencies to relax or give up. Anything that
saps the energy and weakens the will to live is a manifesta-
tion of death. What really wrecks the Buddenbrook family
is not external necessity but a slackening of their morale,
seen at its most pathetic when little Hanno, the only child,
says to a friend, "I get so tired of things. I'd like to sleep
and never wake up ... I can't want anything . . . Nothing
can come of me, that is perfectly sure." And soon afterward
Hanno dies of typhoid fever because he lacks the will to
fight the disease. Similarly Hans Castorp is almost destroyed
by the insidious impulse to stay in the sanitarium, to sink
into a pleasant lethargy which is moral death.
But this negative view of death is only half the picture.
According to Mann, death is not only a danger but also a
necessity to the highest development of life, just as the death
of a seed in the ground is necessary to the growth of a plant.
To illustrate this he works out the various forms of his most
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important symbol, generally referred to as the symbol of the
pit. The name is taken from the dry well into which Joseph
was thrown by his brothers, but the idea is found in all the
novels. By a pit Mann means any apparent destruction
which leads to a richer life. As an experience temporarily
degrading, but necessary for development, it is closely linked
with the problem of evil.
In The Magic Mountain, for example, Hans Castorp's
easy and respectable childhood has made him rather blas,
so assured of his own comfort and importance in the world
that he becomes indifferent, having no intellectual or human
interests outside his own small orbit. Physical work fatigues
him, and thinking bores him. Never having been fully alive,
he is easy prey to the forces of death which surround him in
the sanitarium. When the doctor informs him that he is a
tubercular type and would profit by a longer stay, he
willingly embraces the hospital regime, takes his temperature
three times a day, "assumes the horizontal" in the deck chair
on his balcony, and gradually loses track of time. If he has
any qualms of conscience, he rationalizes them away by
arguing that it is his duty to stay there and bring consolation
to the dying patients whom he visits regularly. Breaking all
ties with his home, he basks in the freedom of doing nothing.
In short, he sinks into the pit of an intellectual death.
But he does not quite die. At the moment of his deepest
immersion in the pit, mysterious forces of life begin to work
in his mind, forces that would never have emerged if his
career had followed its normal course. One evening as he
lies on his balcony looking idly up at the clear sky, he begins
to wonder about the motions of the stars. Often as he has
seen them before, he has had no time or inclination to bother
about them; and now for the first time he feels the faint stir-
ring of intellectual curiosity. He buys and reads a book on
astronomy; this leads him into mathematics, then into chem-
istry, biology, social science, and philosophy. As he penetrates
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toward the crucial problems of human thought, his blase at-
titude sloughs off and his mind comes alive. All this is made
possible by the same experience which had almost killed it:
his new freedom. For the freedom to sink into lethargy was
also freedom to inquire and think, a process which had
hitherto been stifled by his conservative rearing. Thus the
apparent destruction of the pit proved to be the gateway to
a richer intellectual life than he had ever imagined. Mann
leaves no doubt of his preference for a world that includes
freedom to experience both good and evil over one that con-
tains neither.
In his next novel Mann expands this idea by linking it
with mythology and folklore. One fact of nature most clear-
ly apparent to primitive man was the frequency with which
natural objects die and then revive. Each year vegetation
falls into the death of winter only to flourish again in the
spring. The sun, buried under the earth at night, reappears
in the morning. Hesper, the evening star, periodically
vanishes in the sun's rays and is reborn as the morning star
Lucifer. These phenomena led every primitive race to de-
velop a myth about a being who, after passing through the
underworld, re-emerges a greater hero than before. Such
were the careers of the Greek Adonis, the Hebrew Jesus, the
Babylonian Tammuz, and the Egyptian Osiris; and such a
folklore figure was Joseph, marked out from birth as the
racial hero who must die in order to live better.
It is not that Mann dehumanizes Joseph into a super-
natural being. As usual, he strikes a balance by depicting
a convincingly realistic young man, but .never letting the
reader forget the symbolism behind him. To develop his
full power, Joseph must go to the pit. He goes there because
of his human weaknesses; and those weaknesses are the direct
result of his destined greatness. For Joseph is superior* to
anyone around him; his father and brothers know it, and un-
fortunately he knows it too. So attractive, intelligent, and
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precocious is he that he falls victim to his own superiority.
Discovering that he can induce his father to give him any-
thing by turning on his charm at the right moment, he con-
cludes that everyone must love him and must exist solely
for his convenience. He becomes, in brief, a spoiled brat,
and thoroughly deserves to have his brothers throw him into
a pit. This, the most terrifying and disillusioning experi-
ence he has had, turns out to be the best thing that ever
happened to him. Hitherto he has had cleverness without
the imagination to see how others might feel toward him;
now, being really intelligent, he develops this imaginative
insight and comes out of the pit determined to avoid his
faults in the future. Gradually he attains honest human
understanding; and thus, by passing through the apparent
death of the pit, he achieves a character which later enables
him to save his whole tribe from extinction. Again the forces
of life and death are symbolically fused.
These illustrations show that Mann's typical method is
to hold up apparent opposites against each other, to show
how they often become merged, and to demonstrate that
an interaction of the two has more value than the extreme
of either alone. Creative art, democracy, vitality itself,
cannot exist in a vacuum; such growths are firmly rooted
in the soil of their opposites, conservatism, authority, and
death. Good cannot exist without evil; it is both or neither.
On this foundation, Mann now bases the central idea of his
whole work, by expanding these contrasts into a single uni-
fied philosophy of history, which may be called the concept
of the dualism of life or the balance of forces.
Briefly stated, this concept is as follows. In the perspec-
tive of history any single force, no matter how powerful,
seldom accomplishes much alone. Most progress occurs only
when two opposing forces first conflict, then interact and
amalgamate to produce a new synthesis. In fact, every his-
torical influence is subject to a law of diminishing returns;
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the longer it exerts pressure in one direction, the weaker that
pressure becomes and the greater the necessity that it should
meet the stimulus of a new opposing influence. This law ap-
plies alike to physical, mental, and social energies. The
fertility of a region gradually wanes during the summer until,
though September may be as warm as June, the crops wither,
the leaves turn brown, and the land must endure the destruc-
tive experience of winter before it is ready to produce again.
In nature, the clearest example of this dualism of powers
is the balance between centrifugal and centripetal energies
in the solar system, a balance which makes life possible. If
centripetal force were unchecked, the planets would fall into
the sun and be consumed; if centrifugal force existed alone,
they would fly off into freezing interstellar space. As long
as the two are balanced both are used profitably. In apply-
ing this to Mann's idea, we find that the important question
is, how did this balance originate? Though there is no cer-
tainty about it, according to many modern astronomers a
likely explanation is that in the remote past a wandering
star happened to approach somewhere near our sun, which
for milleniums had existed in a condition of static potential
energy, unchallenged centripetal force. All this energy had
accomplished nothing until the coming of the alien intruder.
Then the star's gravitational pull almost destroyed the sun
for good but not quite. Instead, it disrupted the sun's static
condition, pulled off pieces of it, and turned them into whirl-
ing planets, thus creating conditions in which life could exist.
This is exactly analogous to Mann's idea. Life results from
an apparently destructive conflict; what appeared fatal proves
to be a useful stimulus.
It now becomes evident that Mann's three typical con-
trasts, which we have examined, are alike in being facets of
this one idea, each involving a struggle between an explosive
outward-tending and a static inward-tending force. In the
first one, the explosive energy is the individual genius of the
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artist, which always disrupts the static patterns of conven-
tional society as the star disrupted the sun. In Mann's view,
society will progress most effectively when it contains a few,
but not too many, explosive individuals to stir it to action.
In the second contrast, the democratic idea of individual
freedom is the outward-tending energy which breaks through
the bonds of uniformity and stability that a totalitarian state
tries to perpetuate. Finally and most significantly, the ulti-
mate static repose is death, constantly encroaching upon and
constantly defeated by the most explosive of forces, life.
Thus Mann universalizes the idea, implying throughout
his choice of a life rooted in death, a good growing out of
evil, rather than a passive absence of either. In distinction
to both Keats and Shakespeare, Mann applies the idea di-
rectly to history. According to this idea history proceeds in
a series of recurrent crises caused by the periodic conflict be-
tween static society and some new dynamic energy. It there-
fore falls into alternating eras of repose and violent agitation,
of polished society and sudden upheaval. In a long discus-
sion of this idea in the introduction to Joseph and His Broth-
ers, Mann calls each of these cycles a "time-coulisse" or groove
of history, and shows that they have been repeated as far
back as our knowledge extends. Then he illustrates the point
by projecting our present civilization back four thousand
years and showing its similarity to that of ancient Egypt.
After an original emphasis on the strangeness of this anti-
quity, he gradually inserts little bridges between it and mod-
ern life until their full significance is revealed toward the
end of the volume Joseph in Egypt.
When Joseph arrived in the Nile valley, Egypt was an
old and tolerant civilization, a melting-pot of the Near East,
prosperous and soft, growing careless and relaxing its vigi-
lancein short, sinking into a pit just as Hans Castorp had
done. This contented land did not suspect that it was about
to be torn apart by a social upheaval produced partly by an
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alien invasion and partly by an internal fifth-column who
called the old order decadent and aroused the mob to over-
throw it. The crisis is focussed in a religious conflict. The
old god Atum-Re of the Delta, genial, tolerant, and universal,
runs into competition from the new god Amun-Re of Thebes,
an exclusive, harsh, nationalistic, and violent deity, preach-
ing "an organic and militant unity." As the story proceeds,
the terms used become weirdly familiar, and suddenly we
find ourselves brought sharply back to the modern crisis of
the nineteen-thirties. The new Amun politicians advocate
force and torture for the good of the state; they gather bands
of storm-troopers; they uphold racial superiority and depre-
cate contamination of the pure blood of the Egyptian master
race; they play on the feelings of the mob with catchwords.
They almost kill Joseph and destroy Egypt. But Mann shows
that if Joseph personally and Egypt as a society had not been
forced to meet this challenge, then their easy self-satisfaction
would have buried them in lethargy. It was the conflict
which aroused their latent vigor; it was the existence of evil
phenomena which kept them alive. The creative individual,
the democratic ideal, the forces of life, were stimulated by
the danger to become aware of their own failings and remedy
them before it was too late.
Mann has not always made this imaginative choice as
clearly as he does in the story of Joseph. No one has been
more aware of the strength and attractiveness of the death-
wish, or of the cruel uncertainty of the struggle that main-
tains life. Just as the orbits of many former stars may have
intersected so closely that nothing but devastation has re-
sulted, so in Buddenbrooks the forces of death overwhelm the
family, and in The Magic Mountain Hans is so weakened by
the struggle that his victory is equivocal. But Joseph passes
through the pit and emerges triumphantly. Mann's recogni-
tion of the fact that this result sometimes does occur and that
in no other way can life be preserved at all constitutes his
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intuitive reconciliation of the problem of evil. It is the
more impressive to a reader because it is not a joyful or a
facile reconciliation. The problem is not solved. The in-
consistency of the divided universe is still a dark mystery.
But if occasionally an intruding star can produce a solar
system on which life can appear, and if an experience of
suffering can sometimes increase the vitality of the sufferer,
then the sanity of the universe is to that extent vindicated.
In the first chapter of this book it was said that an in-
troduction to the ideas of philosophy through the medium
of literature is a more concrete approach than the direct
study of philosophic writings. For vivid illustrations and for
the arousing of a reader's interest the novel, the poem, and
the drama are invaluable. In this last chapter we have seen
a still more important contribution that literature can make.
Intuitive perception, when organized and controlled in a
work of art, is not hostile but complementary to pure logic,
and can create ideas which logic alone is incapable of ex-
pressing. Literature, then, has the power not only to il-
lustrate the concepts of, philosophy, but to bring about a
mood of imaginative understanding which carries them alive
into the minds and emotions of its readers.
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NOTES
CHAPTER ONE
i Anyone interested in these early theories should read R. B. Appleton,
Creek Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle. See also the discussion of
Lucretius' poem about atomism in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER TWO
1 This order of presentation is not historical, but for logical convenience.
Historically, 1 and 3 were contemporary, and both preceded 2.
2 Twelfth Night, 2: 3: 123.
3 Compare Eugene O'Neill's use of this fact in Ah Wilderness, where
Richard Miller shocks his family by reading Swinburne and The
Rubaiyat.
4 There are many editions of the Rubaiyat; a convenient one is in Mac-
millan's Golden Treasury Series. The poem is included in "Minor
Victorian Poets," Scribners, Modern Student's Library, in which several
poems mentioned in this book may be found.
5 Stanza XXVII.
e Stanza LXXII.
7 Stanza XV.
8 Stanzas XCVL, XCIX.
9 Epicurus himself is interesting reading. References which follow are
taken from Cyril Bailey, Epicurus, the Extant Remains. See especially the
"Letter to Menoeceus" and the "Principal Doctrines," sometimes called
the Golden Maxims of Epicurus.
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10 Bailey, op. ciL, ## 129, 132. Epicurus's writings are filled with this
idea. For example: "The limit of quantity in pleasure is the removal of
all that is painful." (Golden Maxim III) "If you wish to make Pythocles
rich, do not give him more money, but diminish his desire." (Fragment
C-28). See also Bailey, ## 78, 85.
11 Fragment A-LIX.
12 Fragment A-LVIII.
13 Bailey, Fragment A-XXXVIII: "He is a little man in all respects who
has many reasons for quitting life."
14 Bailey, Golden Maxim XXXIV. Cf. Fragment A-LXX: "Let nothing
be done in your life which will cause you fear if it becomes known to
your neighbor."
15 Point Counter Point, p. 28. Huxley is obsessed with this scientific ap-
proach, on all kinds of subjects. Other striking examples are the descrip-
tion of the embryo in Marjorie Carling's womb (2), the thermos bottle
(182), the complex heredity of Little Phil (290), the passage of time after
the murder (457), the Beethoven Quartet (508), and especially the wonder-
ful passage on the mystery of life and death (459).
16 Point Counter Point, p. 478. This theory, which he calls "balanced
excess," Huxley has developed interestingly in a volume of essays called
Do What You Will.
17 The Falstaff of the Merry Wives is another man of the same name, and
is disrgearded in this discussion.
18 Two analyses of Falstaff 's character to which I am especially indebted
in this discussion are A. C. Bradley, "The Rejection of Falstaft," and J.
Dover Wilson, The Fortunes of Falstaff.
i2 Henry IV, 4: 3: 104.
CHAPTER THREE
i For general discussions of Stoicism, see Gilbert Murray, The Stoic
Philosophy, R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, Chaps. I-1V; Paul Elmer
More, Hellenistic Philosophies, Chaps. III-IV.
The references following are to the edition of Marcus Aurelius's Medi-
tations by C. R. Haines, and to Epictetus, Discourses and Encheiridion,
ed. W. A. Oldfather. A one-volume edition of the Stoic philosophers has
been edited by W. J. Gates.
3 Meditations, Book V, Sec. 1.
* Meditations, IX, 1.
5 Poems of William Wordsworth, ed. H. J. Hall. Ode to Duty, p. 175
Marcus Auerelius, Meditations, VI, 43.
7 Epictetus, Encheiridion, 24.
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8 Epictetus, Discourses, II, V, 24-29.
9 Discourses IV, v, 18-21.
10 Encheiridion 33.
1 1 Discourses IV, i.
12 Meditations, IV, 14.
13 Meditations, IV, 48.
14 Meditations, IX, 3.
10 Discourses, I, i, 32.
16 Meditatwns, II, 14.
17 Discourses, I, xxiv, 20. Compare IV, x, 27-8: "Death is the harbor and
refuge of all men. That is why no one of the things that befall us in life
is difficult. Whenever you wish, you walk out of the house, and are no
longer bothered by the smoke."
18 Compare a statement by John Cowper Powys in Enjoyment of Litera-
ture, p. 319: "The essence of Wordsworth's inmost teaching is a stoicism
that draws its strength from forces outside humanity. It is a stoicism that
endure as rocks and trees and plants and animals endure."
10 Antony and Cleopatra, 3: 6: 82-5.
20 Othello, I: 3: 316-330.
21 Othello, 1: 1: 45-54.
CHAPTER FOUR
1 Convenient editions are The Works of Plato, ed. by Irwin Edman with
a stimulating introduction; Plato, Selections (ed. Raphael Demos) and
The Republic (ed. F. M. Cornford) . There is, of course, a vast amount of
secondary material. To readers of this book, I recommend especially A.
E. Taylor, Plato: the Man and hts Wotk; R. H. S. Crossman, Plato Today,
A. D. Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought; and Alexandre Koyre,
Discovering Plato.
2 Phaedo 90 E. Edman, p. 150. It seems a piece of semantic irony that
Socrates, as the opposite of a misologist, would be a philologist.
3 Of course, this is not true of Sociatcs' main arguments in the principal
dialogues, which are sincere and positive
4 For example, see Lancelot Hogben's attack on Plato in Science for the
Citizen, pp. 64, 96-7. He calls Plato s thinking a
4<
morass of metaphysical
speculation" and a "sterile tradition," and adds: "Unfortunately the
curricula of our grammar schools was designed by theologians and poli-
ticians who believed in Plato."
6 Phaedo 83 A. Edman, p. 141. Cf. from the same dialogue 65 B, C. Ed-
man, p. 116.
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6 His direct interest is shown by his constant references to the leading ot
Plato particularly the Phaedo, Phaedrus, Ion, Symposium, Gorgias, and
Republic and by his translation of the Symposium. See Newman I. White,
Shelley, I, 243; II, 234, 22-25. White remarks that, though the translation
of the Symposium furnishes a good commentary on the poem Epipsych-
idion, "Plato might have been a little surprised at the intense passion
blazing forth from his calm and beautiful philosophy." (11,269).
7 Shelley's theory, which he took over from the writings of William
Godwin, modified from Rousseau, held (a) that human impulses aie es-
sentially good; (b) that they are distorted into evil by the existence of
laws, customs, and social institutions; and therefore (c) that if law were
abolished, the good impulses would be freed to create a Utopian society.
Plato would have abhorred this point of view.
8 His Hymn to Intellectual Beauty shows how close he was to Plato's posi-
tion Intellectual Beauty he addresses as an abstract perfection, including
and transcending all sense impressions. Only this ideal beauty "gives
grace and truth to life's unquiet dream." If man could once apprehend
it, he would be immortal and all-powerful. This Platonic conception ap-
pears also in Alastor, The Witch of Atlas, Epipsychidion and Adonais.
Specifically, the prophecy was that the son of the nymph Thetis would
be greater than his father, /eus intended to marry Thetis, but gave up
the idea when he learned of the prophecy, and married her off to the
mortal Pcleus.
10 Wells does not describe the kind of colleges he would have or the con-
tent of their curricula To make a "college degree" his criterion for an
intellectual ruler is faith indeed.
11 This is not quite fair to Plato, who also was aware of the danger of
extremes. But he did not emphasi/e the point. See e. g., Politicks 284, and
Philebus, esp. 26 B-1X
12 It is inteicsting to compare this to Chinese ideas of the Golden Mean,
found, for example, in the writings of Confucius' grandson Tsesse. See
the discussion in Lin Yu Tang, The Importance of Living, pp. 111-115.
which concludes: "After all allowances are made for the necessity of
having a few supermen in our midst, . . . the happiest man is still the
man of the middle-class who has earned a slight means of economic in-
dependence, who has done a little, but just a little, for mankind, and
who is slightly distinguished in the community, but not too distinguished."
CHAPTER FIVE
1 A good translation is obtainable in the Modern Library. For background
and interpretation, see George Santayana's essay in Three Philosophical
Poets; A. G. Ferrers Howell, Dante; and Philo Buck, The Golden Thread,
pp. 268-298.
2 This system is taken in general from a classification by Plato and
Aristotle, with the addition of the particularly Christian sins of paganism
and heresy.
8 Written about 1918, it was published in 1923 under the pseudonym of
Michael Ireland The American edition was published in 1930 by Albert
& Charles Boni, but is now out of print.
4 See, e g., the prefaces and plavs of Major Barbara, Androcles and the
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Lion, and Back to Methuselah, and Act 3 of Man and Superman; the
essay on "The Church and the State" in Dramatic Opinions and Essays,
Vol. I, p. 318; and "An Essay on Going to Church."
5 The Brothers Karamazov, Modern Library edition, pp. 19-20.
For an interesting discussion of the bearing of this fact on the twentieth -
century social revolution, see Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom.
CHAPTER SIX
1 Corin to Touchstone, Shakespeare, As You Like It, 3:2:23.
2 Quoted in F. W. Chandler, Modern Continental Playwrights, p. 573.
3De Rerurn Natura, Book V, 11.
4 For the atomic swerve, see De Rerum Natura, II, 216-262.
5 This is a main difference between ancient and modern atomic theory.
The word A-tom uncuttable. Now atoms are not only cut they are ex-
ploded.
o De Rerum Natura, I, 825-27.
7 Francis Thompson, The Hound of Heaven. In Minor Victorian Poets,
ed. J. D. Cooke, pp. 569, 571.
8 Paradise Lost, 1, 45-48.
9 Ibid., VII, 150-155.
10 Ibid., VII, 228-242.
11 English translation by White & Hutchison.
12 Writers on Spinoza do not agree on this point. E.g., Richard McKeon,
in The Philosophy of Spinoza, p. 163, regards Spinoza as a theist. But
most historians of philosophy accept him as a pantheist. Wimlelband
speaks of his "complete and unreserved pantheism" (History of Philosophy,
p. 409); Thilly repeatedly uses the term to describe his metaphysic
(History of Philosophy, pp. 293, 295, 296).
is The fact that doubt has been cast on some of the principles of Eucli-
dean geometry does not really affect this issue. All that has happened is
that other geometries have been formed, based on different assumptions
such as curved space. But in the realm of Euclidean geometry, the axioms
still apply.
14 Book I, Proposition VIII, Scholium 2, p. 6.
15 Book I, Proposition XXIII: "Things could have been produced by God
in no other manner and in no other order than that in which they have
been produced." See Scholium 2, p. 34.
ie Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, Canto III, Stanza 93.
17 Ibid., Canto IV, Stanza 178.
IB Lines Written among the Euganean Hills, 11. 294-314.
19 From an unpublished fragment in Wordworth's manuscript notebook,
repeating a passage of The Prelude, Book II, 220-224, and continuing as
given. See The Prelude, ed. Ernest de Selincourt, p. 512.
20 Tintern Abbey, 11. 95-102.
21 An example of a typical attack on it is the following: "The doctrine
that God is all in all and all is God is a confusion of thought that still
survives in literature, theology, and philosophy. It is the theme of some
good poems. ... It is the source of innumerable epigrams and paradoxes
on the identity of contraries, including sometimes the identity of good
and evil and their reconciliation in God. ... As a philosophy or theology,
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it is quite meaningless. It does not alter the universe a particle to call it
God, and it does not make God any more real or bring Him nearer as
helper or consoler to identify Him with the world." Paul Shorey, Platon-
ism Ancient and Modern.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1 For a discussion of this eighteenth-century philosophy, see Basil Willey,
The Eighteenth Century Background. See especially Chap. Ill, "Cosmic
Toryism," and Chapter IV, "Natural Morality.
2 Essay on Man, Book I, lines 43-48.
3 ibid., Book I, lines 259-266.
4 ibid., Book I, lines 289-294.
6 Voltaire, Candide, Modern Library edition, p. 4.
6 Samuel Johnson, Rambler, No. 32.
I Hyperion, Book II, especially the speech of Oceanus in lines J 67-243.
8 It is to be noted that in the same breath the evolutionists idealized
struggle and predicted the abolishment of war.
9 Browning, The Ring and the Book, X, 1430-32.
10 Man and Superman, "Epistle Dedicatory to Arthur Bingham Walkley,"
page xxxi.
II The World as Will and Idea, Book II, Sec. 21. Schopenhauer Selections,
cd. D. H. Parker, p. 73.
12 John Cowper Powys, Enjoyment of Literature, p. 436.
18 Hardy, The Return of the Native, Book IV, Chaps. 5 and 6.
Ulbid., Book III, Chap. 1.
15 Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper. See especially Chap. II,
"The Paradox of Humanism." Every optimist ought to read and try to
answer this book.
16 The Hairy Ape, Scene 8.
17 Joseph Conrad, Victory, p. 196.
18 /&,-<*., p. 219.
19 It is interesting that Maugham's first connection with philosophy came
from his hearing Kuno Fischer's lectures on Schopenhauer at Heidelberg.
See The Summing Up, p. 236. For a direct echo of Schopenhauer in
Maugham's own philosophy, see ibid., p. 73.
20 Of Human Bondage, p. 251.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1 John Keats, Complete Poems and Selected Letters, ed. C. D. Thorpe,
p. 609-10.
2 Sidney Colvin, John Keats. On page 352-3 Colvin dates all five of the
Crincipal
odes in May, 1819, while Keats was living with Charles Brown
i a suburb of London. On page 418 he argues that the Nightingale and
Melancholy were written together as a pair, and on page 420 he expresses
the opinion that Melancholy was the last ode written during the month.
8 See Thomas Mann, A Sketch of My Life.
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